

KEMALIST, TURKEY AND THE MIDDLE EAST

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TO
PROFESSOR DR C. H. BECKER
FORMER MINISTER OF EDUCATION IN PRUSSIA,
TO WHOSE KIND INSPIRATION
THE AUTHOR OWES HIS KEEN INTEREST
IN THE EAST

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

It may have been the martial spirit of the Turkish leaders which first induced me, in pre-war days, to begin a serious study of the Turkish language and literature. This, before the introduction of the Latin alphabet, was no light task; and without sustained enthusiasm I should hardly have mastered so difficult a language. It is, of course, very much easier to learn a foreign language when one is conscious of sympathy for the country and its people.

During the Great War the learning of Turkish became quite the fashion in Germany, and there were thousands who started in the race, but very few who reached the goal. Only six candidates applied when a Chair of Turkish Language and Literature recently fell vacant at one of the German universities.

This romantic interest in Turkey was, of course, mainly due to the fact that Germany, had so few allies; so that those few, like Bulgaria and Turkey, benefited in full measure by the affection bestowed upon them by an isolated and blockaded Germany.

I have the privilege of counting among my intimate friends many of those intellectual Turks who were educated in German schools or universities during the World War, and who are now in prominent and responsible positions in Kemal

Turkey. Close contact with these future leaders deepened my interest in Turkey, and induced me to undertake a thorough study of conditions in the new Anatolia; for which purpose frequent visits to the country became necessary.

In reviewing the recent literature on Turkey in the principal European languages, I have come to the conclusion that most of the books are merely the reflections of casual travellers, or of old European residents in Turkey who are too deeply engrossed in prejudices to be able to form an altogether objective and unbiased opinion.

German writers on Turkey may be divided into two categories: those who take the scientific point of view, look upon Turkey as the key to the Moslem world, and therefore regret the Kemalist reforms, which aim at detaching Turkey from that Moslem world, and putting her in the way of developing on European lines; and those more pragmatic observers who do their utmost to justify the whole policy of the leaders of modern Turkey.

The French literature on modern Turkey, compared with that of the pre-war years, is very poor. The Italians, however, have begun to take a profound interest in Turkey: not only economic, but also political, and they are trying to supersede France in the exercise of cultural influence throughout the Levant.

As for the English writers on Turkey, the majority seem to be ex-officials, whose contact with Turkey

dates from the hostile period of the Allied Occupation, when Greek ambitions ran riot in Anatolia.

I may claim for myself the position of a friendly observer, not in all cases sharing the uncritical attitude of my own countrymen, but endeavouring to state and examine certain problems which may imperil the equilibrium of Europe unless they are seriously studied and effectively settled.

My own observations, and the very large body of important material at my disposal, would have enabled me to produce a work of much larger dimensions, but regard for the demands of the book market of to-day, and the desire to make my knowledge of Turkey accessible to the general public, have induced me to limit the size of the present volume.

K. KRÜGER

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I

AN EXCURSION INTO THE RECENT PAST

WHEN writing a book about a country like Turkey, which since the war has undergone a series of kaleidoscopic changes, and is still in the process of shaping herself into a modern European State, it is impossible to explain the course of events without first giving a short survey of recent history.

We are living in times of very rapid change all over the world, and the prevalent tendency is to describe the various countries as the casual traveller or student finds them; with the result that the reader is liable to form erroneous conclusions, of a kind calculated to prejudice the country described. I have therefore thought it advisable to give a brief account of the events which followed the Young Turk rising of 1908.

In April 1909 the headquarters of the Young Turk Party at Salonika dispatched some reliable regiments to Constantinople, in order to depose Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid, the worst despot known to Turkish history. The astonished world witnessed an event of extraordinary significance: the surrender of the staunch Albanian Guard regiments at Yildiz Kiosk without firing a shot, while Abd-ul-Hamid was made prisoner and transported to the Villa Allatini in Salonika.

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The two revolutionary Turks, Talaat and Enver Bey, together with prominent leaders of the Young Turk Party, who had for many years been fugitives in Paris and Geneva, were the first Turkish politicians to have the opportunity of endowing Turkey with a European constitution. All the leading men of the subject nationalities—such as the Bulgars, the Greeks and Serbians of Macedonia, and the Armenians—were heart and soul in the new movement. The watchword was that all subjects of the Ottoman Empire, whether Moslems or Christians, were to enjoy the same rights and privileges. The new Sultan, himself forty years a prisoner of his brother Abd-ul-Hamid, and the heir to the throne, were in sympathy with the revolutionaries. In order to satisfy the Moslem world at large, the Sheikh-ul-Islam was induced to issue an appeal justifying the deposition of Abd-ul-Hamid and proclaiming the new Sultan as the Khalif. A general election took place, and the new Assembly was opened under the presidency of Ahmed Riza, an eminent lawyer, who had been educated in France. The leaders were honestly anxious to re-fashion the Ottoman Empire into a modern European State. The new Parliament was overloaded with legislative work and schemes of reform. But the rejoicings were short-lived. The Young Turks were soon to discover that the awful heritage of Abd-ul-Hamid and his long misrule had left the country in a state of utter political, moral, financial and economic collapse. The military and

the civil administration were both in a state of decay. Decades of espionage and mistrust had left the State burdened with a horde of inefficient and corrupt officials. The usual custom of salary arrears had compelled them to depend on *baksheesh* for a livelihood, and the most influential officials had been systematically discharged on suspicion of having relations with the Young Turks. Equally miserable were the conditions in the Army, as Abd-ul-Hamid was well aware that the Young Turkish movement was essentially an officers' movement; hundreds of the ablest officers were sent into the remotest parts of the Empire, South-West Arabia, Eastern Anatolia, or the outskirts of Macedonia and Albania. The whole population, and especially the peasantry, was crushed under the burden of heavy taxation, while the Turkish system of education, under the supervision of an ignorant clergy, had given a privileged position to the subject Christian nations, such as the Armenians and the Greeks. The vast territory of the Empire had no modern means of communication other than the pilgrim railway to Hedjaz and the Baghdad trunk line, most of which was still under construction. The financial resources of the country were further drained by the administration of the Public Debt. Industries were entirely lacking; foreign and domestic commerce was exclusively in the hands of Armenians and Greeks or other foreigners. Such was the state of Turkey after the deposition of Abd-ul-Hamid.

There was yet another matter of great importance, namely, the attitude of the Great Powers to the new Turkey. Of these nearly all, with the exception of Germany, had assumed an attitude of armed neutrality, and even Germany was not in a position to prevent Austria from finally annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serious risings had occurred in Albania, mainly under the inspiration of Austria and Italy. Moreover, the Macedonian comitadjis were renewing their activities. Riots took place throughout the South-Eastern portions of the Empire, and the activities of the Balkan politicians gave reason to believe that the Balkan League would presently come into existence, in order to fulfil Gladstone's ideal of throwing Turkey "bag and baggage" out of Europe.

England's Liberal Government under Asquith was not inclined to give Turkey the usual support, while Tsarist Russia, on the other hand, aided the Christian States of the Balkans against their historical enemy. All these troubles gave the Young Turks no chance to proceed with the internal reorganization of their country, but forced them to undertake the task of strengthening its military resources. Germany, at this time, was quite willing to render substantial assistance by completely reorganizing the military forces of Turkey. This was quite logical in view of the considerable German investments in Turkey, mainly in the Baghdad Railway. But scarcely had this work of military organization begun, when in

July 1911 Italy declared war on Turkey, disembarking a large army in Tripoli, and the Italian fleet bombarded the coast of Albania. The Great Powers maintained neutrality, and the weak Arab forces and the small Turkish garrisons in Tripoli offered a stout but hopeless resistance under the command of Enver Bey. A few months later, Tripoli having been annexed by Italy, the conflicting interests of Italy and Austria led to the recognition of Albania's independence by the Conference and Peace of London (May 30, 1913). The German Prince of Wied became King (Mbret) of Albania, though the definition of Albania's frontiers remained rather problematical, owing to the hostile attitude of both Greece and Serbia. In this manner Turkey lost her staunchest Mahommedan province, which for centuries had supplied the Ottoman Empire with military leaders and administrators. Meanwhile, in 1912, upon the initiative of Venizelos, who was acting under the inspiration of his great predecessor, Tricoupis, the Balkan League Pact was signed by Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia. Turkey was plunged into a new war (October 1912). All the Great Powers had protested through their diplomatic representatives in the Balkan capitals, but almost within a fortnight of this solemn protest the allied armies, under the Bulgarian General Savoff, were bombarding the last fortified lines before the gates of Constantinople, at Tchataldja.

The hurriedly mobilized Turkish army suffered

catastrophic defeats, and it was clear that the protracted misrule of Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid had deprived Turkey of the only powerful instrument which she had possessed for centuries past, namely her Army.

From the outset of the Balkan War the Great Powers were uneasy and alarmed, as they feared that the final settlement of the Macedonian question might easily lead to a general European war. England had invited the belligerents to negotiate a peace in London. Though the peace preliminaries were completed on May 30, 1913, the conflict between Bulgaria and her allies, Greece and Serbia, was still unsettled. In the last days of June of that year fresh fighting occurred between Serbo-Greek and Bulgarian troops, and a fortnight later Roumania attacked Bulgaria without declaring war, and marched into Bulgarian territory, meeting with no resistance. The Young Turks seized their opportunity to save at least Adrianople. This was not difficult, as Russia was definitely opposed to the occupation of Constantinople and the Dardanelles by any of the Balkan States. The final peace treaties of Bucharest (August 10, 1913) and Constantinople (September 29, 1913) deprived Bulgaria of her principal war gains; and by the first-named treaty she lost 6,000 square kilometres of the Dobrudja.

Turkey's military difficulties had been greatly aggravated by the fact that Russia had mobilized, in the Caucasus, three army corps, which throughout the whole of the Balkan War were ready at any

moment to march into Eastern Anatolia. The peace of London forced the Young Turks to concede substantial reforms to the Armenians, granting to the European Powers the right of organizing in Armenia a privileged force of local gendarmerie under the command of neutral officers.

It is needless to say that the loss of Macedonia, not only diminished the prestige of the new Turkey, but further aggravated her financial and economic troubles, and forced large numbers of Turkish peasants in Macedonia to emigrate to Anatolia (the *Muhadjir* movement). The Armenians, encouraged by the reforms, renewed their activities; fresh Armenian massacres took place in consequence—a fact which was very skilfully exploited in further damaging the moral prestige of the Young Turks.

The loss of Macedonia resulted in a marked reaction amongst the Young Turks, and it was at this time that the great spiritual leader, Zia Geuk Alp, began his celebrated Pan-Turkish and Pan-Turanian propaganda. His arguments were based on the Asiatic origin of the Turks, and emphasized Turkey's need to seek her salvation in the purely national idea. It was Zia who preached the ideal of co-operation with Turkey's racial brothers in Transcaucasia and Turkestan, which were dominated by Tsarist Russia.

The new ideal rapidly took root among the Turkish intellectuals, giving birth to new aspirations and hopes. But the Turkish political leaders, Talaat and Enver, although in full sympathy with the new

ideal, were not as yet prepared to abandon the religious privileges which the Ottoman Empire had enjoyed throughout the Moslem world by virtue of the Khalifate. They therefore reverted to the old tactics of the deposed Abd-ul-Hamid, sending emissaries to all the Moslem countries, whose function it was to preach Pan-Islamic solidarity among all true believers. The large donations collected from the Moslems in Russia and India during the Balkan War furnished a substantial inducement. These sums were employed in purchasing two battleships for the Ottoman fleet.

During this period it had become obvious that an armed conflict between the two groups of Powers—Russia and France *versus* Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire—could not long be avoided. Talaat and Enver clung fanatically to the idea of uniting the fate of Turkey with that of the Central Powers, and military circles in Germany were easily persuaded that in case of war they could count on receiving, through Turkey, the moral and material support of the entire Moslem world.

On the outbreak of the Great War the participation of Turkey on the side of Germany was already decided upon—at all events, as regards the ruling Young Turk leaders. This question, however, has been the subject of bitter controversy between the present official rulers of Turkey and the extinguished Young Turk Party, and in the great European capitals, even to-day, the opinion is firmly held

that Talaat and Enver ruined the Ottoman Empire by siding with Germany. Without entering into a discussion of this problem, and mainly considering the geographical position of Turkey as the guardian of the Straits, we are forced to conclude that the neutrality of Turkey during the war would have accelerated the issue by at least a year, and rendered the defeat of the Central Powers easier for the Allies (since it is fairly certain that the amputations of Ottoman territory would have been just as substantial as they actually were after the Peace of Lausanne!). But in politics no one asks for explanations, and the fate of eminent politicians and statesmen is settled always by success alone. The verdict of history was unfavourable to the Young Turks, since between their deposition of Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid in 1909 and the signature of the armistice on the Island of Mudros on October 30, 1918 the Turkish Empire lost everything—all that had been built up in centuries of fighting and conquest. It is therefore not astonishing that the fate of the three most prominent statesmen of the Young Turk Party—Talaat Pasha, Enver Pasha and Djemal Pasha—should have been so tragic. The first was killed by an Armenian in Berlin, and was buried there in 1929, in the lonely Mahommedan cemetery of Hasenheide, after his embalmed body had lain six years in the cellar of the chapel. Enver perished in the deserts of Turkestan, so that no one to-day even knows where his body is buried. And Djemal

fell a victim to an assassin at Tiflis, on his way from Moscow to Afghanistan. That the rest of the prominent members of this party found an inglorious end on the scaffold in Angora has been used as an argument against the Kemalist administration. But no one is in a position to prove that the severe measures taken by the Ghazi against the conspirators were not justified at a time when the country was still in peril. We have to remember that in Eastern States the fate of those politicians who are failures is always less comfortable than it is in Western Europe, where most of them are able to retire on a handsome pension. A similar act of punishment was meted out to the whole Greek Cabinet after the debacle of the Greek army in Asia Minor in the autumn of 1922.

The great Turkish leader, the saviour of his nation, Mustapha Kemal Pasha, had made no secret of the fact that in the last year of the Great War he was extremely sceptical as to the fate in which Turkey would be involved if she remained with Germany to the bitter end.

Certain prejudiced politicians have asserted that he was actuated by disappointed personal ambition, mainly on account of Enver Pasha's position as War Minister. But the heroic deeds which Kemal has since accomplished have surely proved that, for all his obstinate prejudices, he is incapable of petty intrigue.

Two events decided the fate of Turkey after the

World War: the collapse of Germany deprived her of her only source of material assistance, but it was the collapse of Russia, of Turkey's historical enemy, that was really the main cause of her downfall. England and France were then enabled to materialize their plans for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Sèvres, in so far as it concerns Greek and Armenian aspirations, would find no support to-day even amongst its principal authors.

In describing Turkey as it is to-day, under Mustapha Kemal Pasha, we must remember that at the time of the Armistice of Mudros in 1918 the Ottoman Empire was utterly destroyed. The flower of her Anatolian peasantry had perished on the battlefields of the Dardanelles, in the icy winter campaigns of Kurdistan and Armenia, and in the scorching deserts of Sinai and Mesopotamia. Even the Turkish intelligentsia had abandoned all hope of a revival. The Allied occupation of Constantinople, the Straits and the Gulf of Ismid was followed by the Greek occupation of Smyrna and Western Anatolia in 1920 and 1921. The Sultan was reduced to the position of Lord Mayor of Constantinople with a dummy Cabinet, which in August 1920 had to sign the Treaty of Sèvres (never recognized by the Kemalist Assembly). Most of the prominent Young Turkish politicians were taken prisoner. Talaat, Enver and Djemal were fugitives, and the army was entirely disorganized. It was in a period

of great political disorder that Kemal organized his first forces in the interior of desolate Anatolia.

We must remember that the Allied headquarters at Constantinople were not merely supervising the execution of the Treaty of Sèvres, but that their main concern was to render to the White Russians under Denikin such assistance as would enable them to overthrow the Bolsheviks in Russia.

At this period Mustapha Kemal was not yet in contact with Moscow. This is proved by his own declaration in the Great Assembly, to the effect that in 1919 he had offered the United States, through President Wilson, a mandate over all Turkey; and an influential American Mission under General Harbord, Chief of Staff of the American Army, visited him at Sivas, where he was met with placards glorifying the principle of self-determination proclaimed by Woodrow Wilson. This was on September 22, 1919. So hopeless then was the position of Turkey.

The whole of Transcaucasia, from Baku to Batum, was in British occupation. As soon as the Greek troops occupying Smyrna made their first advance into Asia Minor, Lenin in Moscow at once established contact with Kemal Pasha. But the Russo-Turkish alliance could not materialize until after the complete defeat of Denikin's forces early in 1920, and the occupation of the Azerbaidjan Republic by the Red Army in April 1920. The material help in arms and money given by Moscow to the

Kemalist forces has been greatly exaggerated; much more important was the moral support derived from Red Russia's friendship for Turkey, since the Anatolian peasant, with his traditional fear of Russia, was at last persuaded that he was safe from the attacks of the Russian Bear. Under these conditions it was not difficult to move the Turkish forces against the Greeks, who, as a former subject race, had never been feared by the Turks.

The Greek defeat on the banks of the River Sakaria in September 1921, and the debacle at Smyrna in September 1922, were the turning points in the revival of the Turkish national spirit. A true patriotic enthusiasm, until then the exclusive privilege of the intellectual circles, now infected the mass of the Turkish peasantry, and it is this enthusiasm which for the last nine years has made Kemal Pasha the subject of frenzied adoration.

That the Greeks and Armenians had to suffer complete expulsion from Anatolia, where they had been settled since the days of Alexander the Great and the Roman Empire, was a natural consequence of their having been used as the instruments of Turkey's enemies. The peace of Lausanne in 1923 finally crowned the prestige of Mustapha Kemal and his supporters, earning him that personal devotion which has been the mainstay of the Anatolian Government down to the present day.

When the sword of Mustapha Kemal Pasha, the Ghazi, the Victorious, had accomplished its task on

the plains of Asia Minor, his Chief of Staff, and later Prime Minister, put the finishing touches to the work at the green tables of Lausanne.

A new era opened in the life of Turkey and the Middle East.

II

PAN-ISLAMISM AND NATIONALISM

No contemporary politician has been the subject of more severe criticism than Mustapha Kemal Pasha. The whole world was taken aback by the brief telegraphic message of March 3, 1924, which announced that the Crown Prince of the former Ottoman Empire, the Khalif of all the Moslems, had received a few hours' notice to collect his luggage and take the Orient Express for his last journey to San Remo. Public opinion was unanimous in declaring that this step was simply madness on the part of Kemal, and might indeed have disastrous reactions, not only in Turkey, but throughout the Moslem world. European authorities on the affairs of Islam despaired of the future of Turkey. Some tried to find a poor consolation in complaining of the pernicious influence of Moscow on the Ghazi and his supporters. Serious revolts amongst the Indian and other Moslems were foretold. More reasonable people held that the deposed Sultani had comported himself in a manner unbefitting his dignity in becoming a tool of the Allied headquarters at Constantinople, and that Kemal Pasha had consequently no choice but to depose him. It was generally considered, however, that in order to uphold the influence of Turkey throughout the

Mahommedan world, he should have retained as Khalif the liberal-minded Crown Prince, with whom Kemal himself had made a journey of inspection to the Western front. We know now that all these fears and lamentations were without foundation, and the only outcome of Kemal's *coup* was the miserable Dervish revolt at the obscure village of Menemen in Western Anatolia.

We may reasonably ask why the Ghazi took the step of declaring Turkey a Republic, abolishing the Sultanate (November 1, 1922), and two years later the Khalifate (March 3, 1924). Was his action inspired by the interests of the country, or merely by personal caprice? A correct answer to this question gives us the key to the understanding of that enormous spiritual transformation through which Turkey has recently passed, and is still passing. In the foregoing chapter we have shown that even the Young Turks, who were imbued with the ideas of the French positivists, saw no alternative to adopting the Pan-Islamic idea as a political instrument. The Great War, however, and the last hundred years of Turkish history, clearly demonstrated the hopelessness of seeking to govern Turkey on Pan-Islamic foundations as a theocratic State. It is no secret that during the late war, in Palestine and Syria, and especially in Mesopotamia, Indian Mahommedan regiments fought against their Turkish co-religionists without a single instance of disobedience to the orders of their Christian officers.

Fortunately for themselves the Moslems of Russia were exempted by law from military service; but those who did enjoy the privilege of serving in the army—as, for instance, the Kazan Tartars—fought in the Russian armies on the Transcaucasian frontier from the beginning of the war to the very end. The Arabs, who constituted a very substantial proportion of the population of the Ottoman Empire, were giving trouble to their Turkish masters long before the Great War, and had the Khalif of Constantinople exerted the authority attributed to him by foreign theorists, Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia and Arabia could hardly have been detached from the Empire as easily as they were in fact. Mustapha Kemal and his immediate supporters did not forget that the Pan-Islamic illusion had done nothing to check the disintegration of the Empire, and that the Pan-Islamic ideal had remained a purely sentimental religious tradition, exploited by the clergy and those who derived profit from it. It was therefore quite natural that Mustapha Kemal should not shrink from abolishing both the Sultanate and the Khalifate.

There are those who believe that Turkey might have been made a Republic, might have abolished the Sultanate as a temporal power, while retaining the dignity of the Khalif; reducing the latter to a position similar to that of the Pope in Rome. But such a step would have been dubious even from a purely religious point of view. For we must remem-

ber that the self-assumed authority of the Sultan of Turkey as Khalif was based mainly on the very fact that the Holy Places of Arabia, Mecca and Medina were on Turkish territory, and the Sultan was rightly considered to be their guardian. But the moment the Holy Places of Arabia were lost to Turkey the external emblem of the Khalif at Stambul became illusory, and this was immediately demonstrated by the attempts of the Grand Shereef of Mecca, as well as of the Senussi Community, to re-establish the Khalifate. It is interesting to note the extent to which this question still survives, in a purely academic form; and so far it has not been solved, in spite of numerous conferences of delegates from all parts of the Mahommedan world. So far as Turkey is concerned, the abolition of the Khalifate and the proclamation of the Republic do not in any way prejudice the future of Islam. Simultaneously with the abolition of the Khalifate, Islam was proclaimed the State religion of Turkey. This proclamation was rescinded after the reactionary movement inspired by the Young Turks and the Kurdish uprising of 1924.

Mustapha Kemal and his friends were determined to liberate Turkey from ecclesiastical control, for the Shariat had dominated the whole legal life of the country, and education was a monopoly of the clergy. They were determined to make Turkey a national State on European lines. The first serious attempt to Europeanize Turkey was the abolition

of the picturesque fez, which has been so much regretted by sensation-seeking European globe-trotters, and by the few fez manufacturers in Austria who had to close down their factories. It is curious to note that in pre-war days by far the greater percentage of those who wore the fez were Greeks or other Christian subjects of Turkey. The enormous importance which Turkish statesmen attached to appearing in European dress in the Great Assembly and at social functions has often been ridiculed in the European Press; just as the abolition of the officers' Persian lambskin *kalpak* has been the subject of ironical comment. But these measures, purely spectacular from the European point of view, are from the Turkish standpoint expressive of a profound protest. Is not this reform analogous to the abolition of the long Chinese pig-tail after the revolution of 1911?

The new nationalism came to replace the romantic illusions of Pan-Islamism. The first act in this direction was the transfer of the capital of Turkey from Constantinople—hence to be known as Istanbul—to Angora or Ankara on October 13, 1923. Every patriotic Turk had sufficiently realized the pernicious influence of Constantinople as the capital of the Empire, a capital which had to surrender in the face of every demonstration made by the Allied fleets before Dolma Bagtche. The diplomatic missions, with their picturesque summer residencies on the shores of the Bosphorus, offered several

years' passive resistance before they decided to erect new buildings in Angora.

Thus the Turks returned to Anatolia, whence they came centuries ago. There is a traditional belief that the soil of Anatolia will restore to them the national virility which they lost while they had their capital on the European shore of the Bosphorus.

The rapidity with which changes have been taking place under the rule of Mustapha Kemal is undoubtedly due in part to the influence of the Russian Revolution, and it is difficult to understand why Western Europe should be so shocked by those reforms when the Greater Powers themselves have one by one comfortably found their way to Moscow, and entered into relations with the Soviet Government, which professes quite openly to be shaking the foundations of the whole capitalistic order.

For a hundred years Turkey, without suffering annexation, had virtually been a colony of the European Powers; the capitulations had deeply hurt and humiliated the national sentiment of every patriotic Turk. Europeans who were accustomed to dealing with the Turks through their Greek and Armenian intermediaries considered Turkey a backward country, and it is not surprising that Mustapha Kemal should first of all have turned his attention to legal reforms, which have entirely broken with the past, and at all events no longer give Europe an excuse for complaining that the administration of justice in Turkey remains primitive.

One of the most important incidents illustrative of the new nationalism was the enormous work accomplished in transferring masses of peasants from Macedonia to Anatolia; for the rulers of Turkey recognized that the vast territory left to them in Anatolia could be cultivated only by increasing its population. Based on the negotiations at Lausanne, a special pact relating to the transfer of national and religious minorities was signed on January 30, 1923. While about 1,350,000 Greeks left Turkish territory, Turkey received, between 1921 and 1927, an influx of about 220,000 males and 212,000 females. Further agreements relating to the exchange of emigrants were signed at Angora and Athens. At present the Turkish Government is undertaking the transportation of some hundreds of thousands of Turkish peasants from Bulgaria to Anatolia. These are peasants who had the option of remaining in Bulgaria after the Treaty of Berlin, and elected to do so; nor was their position in Bulgaria in any way unsatisfactory. This migration will provide the Bulgarian Government with reservations for the settlement of refugees from Serbian and Greek Macedonia.

The enormous task of reorganizing the Army has been accomplished, and the peasants, relieved of the heavy taxes of the Hamidian period, now flock willingly to the colours, although no immediate danger threatens the country. Much attention is also being paid to strengthening the fleet. Indeed,

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there is no sphere of national regeneration which has not been energetically tackled, and as the reforms are inspired by an ardent patriotism, marvellous progress has been and is being made, having regard to the limited financial resources available.

III

THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC RESOURCES

THE economic regeneration of Turkey dates from the signature of the Lausanne Treaty of July 24, 1923, including a special Trade Agreement and a pact relating to the Straits of the Dardanelles.

The outer world was sceptical, refusing to believe that a handful of successful military leaders would prove efficient in the sphere of economic reform. The exclusion of the Greek and Armenian commercial element was regarded as disastrous, and many were the prophets who declared that Turkey would not be in a position to enter upon a policy of economic reconstruction without the co-operation of these two hereditary agents of trade in the Near East. They forgot that the activities of the Greeks and Armenians were, on the whole, of very little advantage, if they were not actually detrimental to the Turkish national interests. We must ask ourselves just why these two elements had become so essential to European trade with Turkey. As a matter of fact, the Greeks and Armenians acted as agents for the European commercial houses. They sold European goods to the Turkish peasants, who honestly paid the bill, whereas in many cases the Greek and Armenian agents paid their European

principals nothing at all, or only a very small proportion of what they actually received, blaming the poor and honest Turkish peasant, representing him as a rogue, and thus creating a very bad reputation for Turkey. With the exception of a very few large Greek and Armenian houses in Constantinople and Smyrna, most of these agents were constantly on the black lists of the European banks as bad debtors. But the Greeks and Armenians found their Turkish business extremely profitable, on account of its dual nature, both the import and the export trade being in their hands. As most of the Turkish peasants of pre-war days were very short of cash they could pay for imported manufactured articles only in agricultural produce. Thus the Greek and Armenian merchants had the entire monopoly of the export of Turkish produce, for which they paid very low prices to the Turkish peasants, while they demanded very high prices for the manufactured articles given in exchange.

This resulted in the gradual impoverishment of the Turkish peasantry and the rapid enrichment of the Greek and Armenian go-betweens, who became possessed of the best house properties in Constantinople and Smyrna, while they enjoyed the protection of the Great Powers and of the various Christian organisations. They could even enjoy the luxury of educating their children at the American and other foreign colleges established in Turkey.

We are forced to conclude that the part played

by the Greeks and Armenians in the economic life of Turkey was largely detrimental to the Turks, not only financially, but also morally, as far as the national prestige was concerned. If we should seem to have embarked upon an unduly lengthy explanation, our excuse is that even at the present day every misfortune in the economic life of Turkey is attributed to the absence of these two elements.

It should be mentioned that in spite of the wholesale expulsions from all parts of Turkey with the exception of Constantinople, 45,000 Armenians and 80,000 Greeks have been able to remain in Stambul, and have not abandoned hope of playing a very active part in the economic life of Turkey.

Immediately after the signing of the Lausanne Treaty Mustapha Kemal's administration had to decide on an entirely new economic policy, as from the outset it was feared that the assistance to be rendered by the industrial nations of Europe would, by sheer force of habit, be of a very one-sided and dubious character. The new Government had to assume a much larger control in developing the resources of the country than had ever been attempted in any of the industrial countries of Europe, which had developed on individualistic lines. There were extremists who wished to copy the Soviet system of trade monopoly, but this policy was promptly rejected. The Turkish Government, knowing how easily the economic influence of European industrial enterprises may lead to political inter-

ference, has from the outset secured itself against such domination. Laws have been promulgated making the Turkish language obligatory for all foreign firms established in Turkey; and in the case of all industrial companies operating with foreign capital it is required that national capital should be represented to the extent of at least fifty per cent.

The export of such products of international importance as tobacco was subjected to State control, and mining concessions also were placed under Government supervision. A special industrial measure has been passed which enables home and foreign manufacturers to introduce machinery duty-free and to transport necessary material on the railways at a freight reduction of 30 per cent. Vital industries have been freed from taxation for the first ten years, or have at least been granted facilities in the shape of reduced taxes.

It was by no means easy to frame an economic policy for a country which had been ruined by the Hamidian regime, and by a succession of almost perpetual wars from 1911 onwards.

The country was devoid of all financial resources, and the Great Powers interested in the Ottoman Public Debt promptly demanded the settlement of foreign loans, France ranking first, with seven milliard gold francs invested in Turkey, during the Hamidian era, in State and Municipal loans and also in private enterprises. We must remember that

the greater part of this capital was of no direct benefit to Turkey, as the loans were mostly floated in France, on terms very unprofitable for Turkey; the bulk of the money, moreover, remained in France, being absorbed in payment for armaments and other Government supplies. Moreover, much of the French capital invested in private enterprises was of very little benefit to Turkey, as the numerous *Sociétés Anonymes* registered in France appropriated a large proportion of the capital for administrative purposes, and for the payment of dividends; very often on undertakings which had never shown a profit. The second place amongst the creditors of Turkey was occupied by England; then followed Belgium and the Netherlands. The German and Austrian debts were of course repudiated after the war, and the amounts owed by the Turkish State were claimed by the Allies on the strength of the Treaty of Versailles.

. The attitude assumed by the parties mainly interested in the Public Debt was the reverse of lenient. A special commission sitting in Paris was charged to negotiate with the Turkish financial delegation. After strenuous negotiations a satisfactory agreement was arrived at, which provided for long-term payments. This Paris Coupon Agreement of June 13, 1928 (ratified by the Great National Assembly at Angora on December 12, 1928), has already (in November 1930) been the cause of some friction between Paris and Angora, owing, in all

probability, not only to the delay in the Turkish payments but also to political differences.

It should be mentioned that the Paris Agreement does not cover the entire public debt of the former Ottoman Empire, but only a certain percentage of the sums calculated as owing on April 18, 1925, by the official arbitrator nominated under the Lausanne Treaty. The liabilities were distributed among the various States formerly belonging to the Ottoman Empire according to the following scheme (ratified on November 30, 1928—total debt: £T82 millions):—

		Loans before October 17, 1912 Per Cent	Loans after October 17, 1912 Per Cent
Turkey	..	62·25	76·54
Balkan States	..	21·24	0·71
Arabian States	..	18·51	22·75

Curiously enough, American finance took no interest in Turkey, so that the celebrated Chester Concession had to be abandoned. Germany, who, on the strength of her better knowledge of Turkish conditions, was quite prepared to take an active part in the economic reconstruction of Anatolia, had just emerged from the disastrous period of inflation, and was heavily overburdened with reparations. It was therefore plain to the Kemalists that no great hopes were to be placed on foreign financial assistance. They had to frame their economic policy accordingly. This fact is largely responsible for the tendency to favour some sort of State capitalism, of which a comprehensive and elaborate programme has been prepared.

A Supreme Economic Council now sits at Angora under the supervision of economic experts, whose duty it is to watch over the execution of a vast economic plan of reconstruction, and to suggest necessary reforms. Its General Secretary, Dr. Nurulla Esat, the President of the Bankers' Trust, is the financial expert who saved the Turkish currency from slipping into the abyss of inflation. The Council is in close touch with the Ministries, whose officials, far from being comparable with their predecessors of the Hamidian era, approximate as a rule rather to the European type.

The programme of reconstruction embraces every sphere of economic life, and private enterprise is steadily developing.

For the first time in the history of Turkey national and commercial banks have been established, though, of course, certain banking institutions had already been founded in Turkey in the days of the Sultan.

The oldest bank is the well-known Banque Ottomane, which secured its concession in February 1863 and its right to the enjoyment of a certain degree of extraterritoriality is to remain in force until March 16, 1935. The nominal capital amounts to 10 million sterling.

Next in importance is the Banque Agricole (*Zeeraat Bankasy*), which has been in existence since 1890, but the advantages which it offers have become apparent only since the formation of

co-operative societies of peasant farmers. The Great National Assembly inaugurated a system of peasant co-operation on the French model. The Banque Agricole has a nominal capital of £T30 million (21 million paid up), and has 300 branches with over 2,000 officials of both sexes.

For the years 1923-26, the following credits were granted:—

	<i>Millions of Turkish Pounds</i>				
1923	4.8
1924	16.4
1925	15.5
1926	16.3

Besides these two old-established banks of national importance, the newly-formed Industrial and Mining Bank (*Sanaat ve Maden Bankasy*), with a capital of £T6 million (since April 19, 1925) and the Mortgage and Trustee Bank (*Emlak ve Eytam Bankasy*), with a capital of £T20 million, are deserving of special mention. The latter was founded by law on May 22, 1926, and acts to a certain extent as the trustee of the confiscated landed properties of the *Vakf* ("the dead hand") and more especially as the trustee of the properties of wards (*eytam* = orphan).

Under the auspices of the President, the *Ish Bankasy* (Bank of National Economic Reconstruction) was established with a capital of five million Turkish pounds, and given the custody of public funds, thus replacing the Imperial Ottoman Bank, which formerly held this monopoly.

On the whole, there are some twenty purely Turkish banking houses in Turkey, representing a capital of £T70,000,000, their balance-sheet for 1927 showing a profit of £T3,000,000. The number of private bankers may be computed at seventy.

A considerable portion of capital has been provided by the former Khedive Abbas Hilmi of Egypt, and by some of the big Turkish merchants who survived the disaster, and were encouraged by the exclusion of the Greeks and Armenians. Abbas Hilmi founded the Oriental Monopolies Company at Mersina, in conjunction with the Turkish Trading Bank.

The monetary policy of these banks has been and is quite sound, and the note issue has been subject to severe restriction.

In the year 1928 Turkey had a trade balance of £T45,000,000 in her favour, made up as follows:—

Millions of Turkish Pounds

	Debit	Credit
Imports and exports	259·7	209·0
Services	5·3	9·8
Interest and divers profits	8·3	0·7
Foreign transfers on private account..	7·2	4·4
Foreign transfers on Government account	3·1	5·3
Export and import of capital	—	9·4
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	283·6	238·6
	<hr/>	<hr/>

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The budget of the State and its hopeful development may be illustrated by the following data:—

Millions of Turkish Pounds

	Expenditure	Revenue	Deficit	Surplus
1925	183·933	153·047	30·886	—
1928	207·111	207·173	—	0·072
1931	180·000	180·000	—	—

In spite of the payments on account of Public Debts made since 1930, a further recovery may be predicted, though a sudden but temporary decline will be unavoidable from time to time. The vast scheme of industrialization which was inaugurated with the help of the Government, has led to certain excesses; for example, instead of creating industries which would utilize the country's own raw materials and produce, it has favoured the establishment of factories for the manufacture of articles with foreign raw material. (In 1927 there were sixty-five thousand manufacturing establishments with 257,000 employees.)

The extremists began to talk of making the country industrially quite independent of Europe. The State monopoly in the tobacco and cigarette industry was maintained and reorganized. The profits of the monopolies for spirits, salt, explosives and matches were devoted to financing the industrial programme.

In the year 1928 the revenues from the monopolies

totalled the following amounts (in millions of Turkish pounds):—

Tobacco	22
Salt	10
Sugar (1930 abandoned)	5
Petroleum (1930 abandoned)	5
Matches	2
Spirits	5
Explosives	1
Posts and Telegraphs	7

But it was obvious from the outset that the country was still lacking in certain things which were most essential to its economic reconstruction: it lacked up-to-date harbours, railways and public roads.

At the beginning of the Kemalist era there were no railways in the country, excepting the main line to Angora and Baghdad, the Smyrna railway, etc. A considerable portion of the Baghdad line and the whole of the Hedjaz railway had been lost through the creation of the mandated territories of Iraq and Syria. Before the Great War the political conditions were unfavourable to railroad construction, notably in the eastern regions of Anatolia, where it was tabooed by the Imperial Russian Government. The absence of railway communication in this part of the country was indeed a main cause of the Turkish disasters in the various campaigns against Russia.

It was obvious that foreign capital would not be greatly attracted by the prospect of sinking large sums in the construction of railways in a vast and sparsely populated country—the more so as foreign

capital is naturally never interested in the construction of strategic lines which do not yield a commercial profit.

The Turkish Government had to work out a scheme by which foreign capital could be induced to finance this rather heavy programme. It decided, therefore, to construct State railways, foreign contractors being employed by the *Régie* only in the actual construction of the lines.

The first group of financiers who responded to the invitation for tenders were of Swedish nationality, but they, finding the task too onerous, sought and obtained the assistance of German capital, securing the co-operation of such well-known firms of contractors as J. Berger and Lenz & Co. of Berlin. They in their turn secured the support of the German State Export Credits Scheme to the amount of 65 million gold marks (£3,200,000 nominal). Now, after seven years of hard work, the original programme of construction has been very nearly completed, with the exception of the Sivas-Erzurum line, which has not yet been commenced. Owing to the mountainous character of Eastern Anatolia, and the hitherto purely strategical value of the route, the construction of this line has failed to attract foreign contractors as readily as was at first expected. Nevertheless, tenders have been received and are under consideration; and there is no reason to suppose that the Soviet Government objects to the building of this railway as did Tsarist Russia.

We cannot in these chapters attempt a detailed description of the Turkish plan of transport and communications; but some of its outstanding features may here be noted.

As already indicated, there existed only a few lines of railway in the days when the Greek troops were being repulsed by the vigorous attacks of the Kemalist armies. These were the Baghdad railway, starting from Haydar Pasha, the port on the Asiatic side of Constantinople and running through Ismid, Eskişehir, Afyon Karahisar and Konia, the old Seldjuk capital of Anatolia, to Ulukishla, on the slopes of the Taurus range, and the plains of Adana. Here it is joined by a branch line (belonging to the State) from Mersina on the Mediterranean. To the south of Fevzipasha the railway leaves Turkish territory. It is of some political significance that the station of Aleppo is situated in the mandated territory of Syria, while the continuation of the line lies once more within the Turkish frontier. At Nusaybin (Nisibin) the railway enters Mosul territory, and here a section of the line is still uncompleted. From Nisibin to Kerkuk (431 kilometres) a provisional motor service takes the place of the railway, but the transference of passengers and luggage to the trains for Baghdad and Basrah is effected without difficulty. The building of the Baghdad trunk line was financed mainly by the Deutsche Bank.

The branch line from Eskişehir to Angora was likewise constructed under German auspices. The

service from Stambul to Angora is regarded as the most important in the Anatolian railway system, and according to the new time-table the distance will be covered in nine hours.

The so-called London-Anatolia Express is generally provided with one dining-car and two sleeping-cars. It seldom happens that the train is late at Angora, and as regards comfort and convenience it is fully equal to the normal Continental standards.

Another fast train, the Taurus Express from Stambul to Adana, now provides a direct connection with Egypt. The latest time-tables show that the Anatolia Express leaves Haydar Pasha at 7 p.m. daily, arriving at Angora at nine the following morning. The Taurus Express runs three times a week; leaving Haydar Pasha on Wednesdays at 4 p.m., it arrives at Aleppo in Syria at 7 a.m. on Friday. Passengers by this train may arrive at Cairo at 10.30 p.m. on Sunday, or at Basrah on the Persian Gulf at 7 a.m. on Tuesday (the seventy-five kilometres between Rayak and Beyrut being covered by a motor service).

The Kemalist Government has exhibited surprising energy in the prosecution of its schemes of railway construction. The Angora line has been continued *via* Kayseri (Cæsarea) to Sivas, the work being accomplished mainly by native contractors; and from Sivas a branch line runs to the port of Samsun on the Black Sea (opened in 1932).

The Turkish Cabinet has already arranged to construct the prolongation of the line to Erzerum

(530 kilometres) in order to join the Russo-Caucasian railway system. £T55 millions have been allotted towards this undertaking; and a branch line has been planned which will penetrate the interior of Kurdistan. Kayseri will be linked up with Ulukishla on the Baghdad line. This branch will be opened in the autumn of 1932; the total length will be 173 kilometres, of which two-thirds is completed. From Fevzi-pasha, not far from the Syrian frontier, a branch line to Diarbekir is under construction, *via* Marash, Malatya and Arghana—the celebrated copper mines of Anatolia; of this a considerable mileage has been already laid, and since March 1931 trains have been running as far as Malatya. Turkish contractors and the Berlin firm of Lenz & Co. have undertaken this contract on behalf of a Danish-Swedish group who are the general contractors of the so-called Irmak-Filyos line, of whose 400 kilometres half are already completed, so that trains are now running to Tchangry. This branch line will link Angora with the coal basin on the shores of the Black Sea, and will open up for exploitation the extensive forests of Kastamuni in the north of Anatolia. And here it may be mentioned that the Angora Government has not overlooked the importance of scientific forestry. In the past the building industry in particular suffered greatly from the lack of good timber.

Smyrna, the great metropolis of Mediterranean commerce, was the terminus of a considerable railway system even in the Hamidian era; a system

which has been completed since the Greek War, so that it now serves such centres of agricultural production as Sokia, Egerdir and Denizli, and provides a direct connection with Afyon on the Baghdad line (*via* Alashehir), while through sleeping-cars are run from Smyrna to Angora.

While the railways of the rich hinterland of Smyrna were mainly built by English capital, the line running through Balikesir to Panderma on the sea of Marmora is a French enterprise. From Balikesir a branch line runs through the chromium mining region of north-eastern Anatolia, *via* Kutahia, the famous faïence porcelain centre, to Tavshanli on the Baghdad line (opened on January 24, 1931).

From Panderma there is a frequent boat service to Constantinople. More convenient, but not so rapid, is the sea route from Smyrna through the Dardanelles to the Golden Horn.

The Turkish Government has elaborated a programme for the construction and improvement of harbours, and the Cabinet has allotted for this programme a proportion of the funds provided for the general plan of reconstruction. Of the 240 million Turkish pounds provided (£110 equals about £1 sterling), 100 million have been reserved for irrigation works and the regulation of waterways, 94 million for railways (and in particular the Sivas-Erzurum line), and 46 million for harbours.

In the year 1927, 13.9 million tons of cargo were cleared at Constantinople, 5.5 million at

Samsun, 2.5 million at Smyrna, and 1.1 million at Mersina.

On the Black Sea shore the ports of Samsun and Ereğli are to be completed first; the estimated cost being £113 and £110 millions respectively. It is essential that the harbour of Samsun should be rapidly completed, as full use cannot be made of the railway service to and from Sivas until there is a modern port on the Black Sea with facilities for the export of agricultural produce and ores from the districts opened up by the railway. Samsun, moreover, is the great tobacco centre, and 2,500 tons are shipped here annually. The Turkish firm of Nemlizada Bros built narrow-gauge railways, which are now in the hands of the Government, from the Bafra district to Samsun, and also from Tcharshamba.

The ports of the north coast of Anatolia are for the most part merely open roadsteads. Of the Black Sea ports the second in importance is Ereğli, and this will be practically the terminus of the Angora-Filyos line. £110 millions have already been allotted for the purpose of modernizing the harbour.

The ports of İnebolu, Amasra and Trabzon will be furnished with new breakwaters, quays and warehouses.

The harbour of Mersina is the most important commercial centre of the south coast of Anatolia. Here the Swedish contractors who are building the branch line from Fevzipasha (on the Baghdad Railway) to Diarbekir have already constructed a

provisional landing-stage, in order to facilitate the unloading of their machinery and materials. This port will be used for the export of copper from the Arghana mines, and of agricultural produce from all the regions opened up by the various lines directly connecting with Mersina *via* Adana.

As regards road-making, Parliament has passed special legislation affecting motor roads and bridges, which explicitly requires that the national roads and bridges around Angora should be given precedence. The latest technical improvements are to be applied in the construction and maintenance of the national roads. The whole plan provides for more than 5,000 kilometres of motor roads, the necessary expenditure amounting to £T62 millions.

The motor roads projected by this scheme are as follows:—

	Kilometres
Environs of Angora	200
Kayseri-Marash	330
Angora-Stambul-Tchataldja	565
Marash-Hasa	122
Malatya-Kemaliye-Erzindjan	433
Smyrna-Salihli-Altuntash	405
Angora-Sivas-Erzindjan-Gumushkhane	979
Trebizond-Erzurum-Bayesid	560
Angora-Altuntash	370
Malatya-Siverek-Diarbekir	295
Tchataldja-Adrianople	169
Diarbekir-Bitlis-Van	265
Angora-Gulbashi-Kayseri	325
	<hr/>
	5,017

About two-thirds of these roads will open up entirely new and unbroken ground. The necessary expenditure will be provided out of the normal budget with the assistance of a special road tax. The budget provides for some £T39 millions, and of this £T23 millions must be furnished by the road tax. During the collection of the road tax 50 per cent. of the tax revenue will be deposited in the *Zeeraat Bankasi* (Agricultural Bank), in the ratio of £T8 for each taxpayer. The Bank settles its accounts with the Ministries of Finance and Public Works on the last day of each month.

The activities of the Government and the municipalities in the building of roads and railways have not escaped criticism from some of the Opposition leaders. It was formerly possible for firms of contractors to obtain a free hand from the Government, in spite of the laws and regulations relating to public tenders. The principal aim and effect of the above-mentioned criticism has been to make it more difficult to secure unlimited contracts on the basis of a monthly settlement of accounts. The policy of the Government has been particularly cautious since the advent of Fethi Bey, the former Turkish Ambassador in Paris, and the leader of the Opposition in the autumn of 1930.

Moreover, the disputes of the experts regarding the competition of the railways with motor traffic have had their repercussions in Turkey. In the author's opinion the Prime Minister, Ismet Pasha,

is perfectly justified in his preference for the construction of railways along the main lines of communication; even from a strategical point of view such a preference is justified. The policy of constructing branch lines, however, can no longer be defended (and this is especially true of the Kurdistan railway) as they would not be commercially profitable. Even the Diarbekir railway would be unprofitable but for the continuous freights of copper ores from the Arghana mines.

It should be the task of the Government to promote motor transport by all commercially legitimate means. The times are gone by when a super-cautious statesman could utter the warning words: "*Nous aurons les banques et nous aurons les routes et enfin nous aurons la banqueroute.*" Modern Turkey has her banks, and a good mileage of fairly practicable roads, but she is certainly far from economic collapse. An able and popular "good roads policy" would greatly contribute to the economic development of the country.

One immediate consequence of Turkey's political evolution is the enterprise of the various municipalities in promoting the construction of public works. Angora, for example, had a pre-war population of about forty thousand; its present population is double this figure, apart from a garrison of thirty thousand. New quarters of flats, villas and offices have been built, and the old town is steadily losing its Oriental character. The visitor to the new city

of Angora will readily overlook the fact that he is living in a part of Asia Minor which was formerly dreaded as a peculiarly unhealthy and infertile region.

With the growing prosperity of the new capital, drainage and water supply have become matters of urgency, and the tenders of contracting firms are now under consideration. A like activity in respect of house-building and public works may be observed in almost every town of any importance.

A few notes on building conditions in Turkey may be of interest to the reader.

Generally speaking, the Ministries or the respective municipalities draw up their schemes of town-planning, etc., and publish a schedule of so-called unit prices. The contracting firms complete their plans and estimates in accordance with these official maximum prices. On the occasion of a municipal invitation to put in tenders, the following prices were indicated:—

			Per Hour <i>Gurush</i> ¹	Per Day <i>Gurush</i>
Labourers	13	120
Qualified labourers	16	150
Carpenters	44	400
Motor truck, with driver	222	2,000

Excavations of hard rock, including cost of blasting, are paid for on the following scale:—

¹ 100 *gurush* = £T1 = about two shillings

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	<i>Gurush</i>
Boring of hole for blasting, 2 hours ..	104
Explosives (250 grammes of powder, 2 m. fuse)	68
Shovelling, 1 hour	13
Sorting broken stone, 2 hours	104
Levelling, 0.4 hour	5
Additional profit of 15 per cent.	42
	<hr/>
Cost per cubic metre	329
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The cost of excavating 1 cubic metre of sand or clay is 52 *gurush* (about a shilling).

For ferro-concrete, the following costs may be quoted:—

	<i>Gurush</i>
300 kilogrammes cement	1,350
0.4 cubic metre sand	26
0.6 cubic metre gravel	74
Filling and tamping—	
3 hours mason, 15 hours labourer ..	333
Additional profit of 15 per cent.	267
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Cost of 1 cubic metre of ferro-concrete, exclusive of casting mould, iron, and transport	2,052
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The cost of railway construction in general is calculated upon this system, which is of French origin. But as the native contractors are making constant progress, their competition with foreign firms is steadily increasing. At the same time the maximum costs and wages may be lowered by the authorities, so that the margin of real profit is constantly decreasing, for the so-called “additional profit” has

generally to be spent on overhead costs, insurance, etc. Native contractors can, of course, meet these difficulties with greater ease, while foreign firms are beginning to withdraw from all but the more important or complicated works requiring special experience.

The realization of the economic programme has proceeded, on the whole, pretty smoothly, although difficulties arose when it was found that the discounting of bills given to foreign contractors in payment was producing a heavy drain on the limited funds of the country. But the world at large will be astonished when it realizes the almost fanatical perseverance with which the new Turkey has pursued its economic goal, and the resource with which it has met and overcome the most insensate opposition and the most discouraging scepticism.

Needless to say, the active building programme has provided profitable employment for many thousands of labourers and operatives, thus increasing the purchasing capacity of the artisan class.

And here it should be mentioned that the native firms of builders and architects have reached a standard of efficiency unknown of old. The technical capacity of such firms as Messrs. Galip of Stambul and Messrs. Essemenli (Shevki) of Angora is fully equal to that of European or American firms of good standing.

A considerable industry for the supply of building materials, such as bricks, tiles, cement and mortar,

has come into being, and we may safely assume that for the next twenty years Turkish life will feel the influence of the continued progress of the building and reconstruction programme, especially in the provincial towns, where new public offices, sanitary works, tram-lines, electric power stations, hospitals, etc., have still to be provided. For the present, this work is progressing rather slowly owing to the strained financial circumstances of the country as a whole, and especially of the municipalities.

In connection with these enormous tasks of construction, foreign critics in general have conceived unfavourable and somewhat exaggerated opinions as to the alleged inefficiency of the Turkish authorities and their practice of demanding from foreign contractors substantial securities as a condition of awarding contracts. While the Turkish Government cannot be wholly absolved of responsibility in this matter, there is something to be said in favour of the practice in question, having regard to past conditions in Turkey.

Scarcely was the ink on the Treaty of Lausanne dry, when Stambul and Angora were invaded by large armies of speculators from all parts of Europe, and even the United States, who endeavoured to secure orders by all imaginable means, and especially by undercutting prices. The agents of companies with fantastic names crowded the antechambers of every ministerial building, and it was found, after orders had been placed, that most of these gentry

were obscure commission-agents without financial backing or the means of executing even the smallest contract. This had very embarrassing results for the Turkish administration, which had no alternative but to demand securities in future. A law was promulgated requiring that any foreign firm soliciting a concession should deposit in official Turkish banks $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the amount involved prior to negotiations, and a further $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in the event of a contract being signed. This 15 per cent., being the security for the proper execution of the contract, was forfeited in cases of proven dishonesty. Many foreign firms, having once received orders, relied upon the time-honoured practices of the Turkish officials of pre-Kemalist days, paying *baksheesh* and providing inferior material and work. The Anatolian Government—to its credit, be it said—has from the outset opposed such practices in the most rigorous fashion. The arrest and trial of the former Secretary for the Navy, Ikhsan, and other high officers of the Admiralty, in the winter of 1927–28, in connection with the refloating of the former German battleship *Goeben*, will be still remembered. It is clear that these drastic measures have induced many dubious adventurers to abandon their proposed pilgrimage to the Bosphorus, and have favoured the enterprises of large and efficient firms. These precautions would doubtless be abandoned once the Turks were convinced that they had nothing to fear from the dishonesty of foreign agents.

With a view to diminishing the doubts of really reputable and important European firms, the Angora Government has taken steps to consolidate commercial insurance. By an Act of Parliament of June 1927, a State monopoly of re-insurance business was instituted, and all the existing national and foreign insurance companies are now obliged to re-insure their risks to the extent of at least 50 per cent. Foreign insurance companies are required to register as Turkish companies with Turkish names, and even their original names have had to be spelt according to Turkish phonetics: the General Accident Insurance Co., for instance, figures as the "General Aksident."

Of recent years there has been considerable industrial activity in connection with establishing industries essential to national defence. The Turkish Government is resolved to maintain the highest efficiency in the Army, since it is to the Army that the country owes its regeneration; and ambitious schemes for the establishment of foundries and iron-works are awaiting execution.

What are the two main resources on which Turkey has to rely? The first and most important is agriculture; the second, mining. The pre-war methods of exploiting the resources of the soil were somewhat primitive, and the crops obtained were hardly proportionate to the vast area available for cultivation.

Agriculture may be divided into three categories: the first is the production of grain in order to feed the population; the second is the cultivation of such

valuable products as tobacco, cotton, flax, opium, the celebrated figs and raisins of Asia Minor, liquorice root, canary-seed, etc. In this connection much remains to be done, the more so as the ever-increasing demand for high-grade tobacco for the cigarette industry of the world offers Turkey enormous financial opportunities. The third category includes cattle-breeding, sheep-rearing, the dairy industry, and the production of wool and leather. In order to make more rapid progress in this direction, the Turkish Government has introduced an entirely new system of landed property, and has established numerous experimental agricultural stations; it arranges cattle shows in various parts of the country, and fosters co-operative societies and other mutual-aid associations, so as to prevent the exploitation of the peasants by usurers and speculators.

Turkey to-day has an area of 762,736 square kilometres. Of this area only 31 per cent. is at present arable; 19 per cent. consists of woods and forests, 36 per cent. of meadows and pasture-land, 12 per cent. of stony and rocky regions, and about 2 per cent. of swamps and marshy or waterlogged soil.

As to the area under cultivation, 92 per cent. is tilled for cereal crops, and only 3 per cent. is devoted to the raising of vegetables.

In 1928 the chief agricultural products were: wheat—2,826,000 tons; barley—1,600,000 tons; maize—427,000 tons; rye—318,000 tons; and oats—125,000 tons.

Between 75,000 and 100,000 tons of cotton, beans and peas were produced, while more than 50,000 tons of vetches, potatoes, "putlidjan" (egg-plants) and millet were raised.

Onions, rice, sesame and peas yield crops of 20 to 40,000 tons. Less important crops are lentils and linseed (8,000). Among the principal exports are grapes (60,000), figs (27), nuts (52), olives, flax, hemp, tobacco and opium (600 tons).

Tobacco is grown by more than a hundred thousand planters. The best qualities are produced in the districts of Samsun, Bafra and Trebizond, on the Black Sea coast. Smyrna and the coast of the Sea of Marmora are far less important as tobacco countries than the hinterland of Samsun, where a special railway has been built for the transport of tobacco.

In the Ottoman Empire the Turkish Tobacco Régie regulated the cultivation, sale and export of tobacco; but its actual function was practically that of a usurer. The planters lost all interest in increasing production. Moreover, the extension of tobacco planting was restricted by the Régie. On the other hand, smuggling could never be adequately suppressed, though in a period of thirty years about 40,000 men were killed in the struggle between the Government officials and the tobacco gangsters.

On February 25, 1925, the Great National Assembly replaced the Régie by a Monopoly Administration

The success of this administration was surprising. While in 1924 the Régie had sold 4,000 tons of tobacco, valued at approximately £T10 millions, the Monopoly Administration, only two years later, sold 9 million tons, valued at £T30 millions. In the year 1928 the net profits to the State were £T22 millions (about 1 million sterling), while the Régie had paid the Government only £T1,500,000 in thirty years! The production of Turkish tobacco could be increased at least threefold.

The Monopoly Administration owns ten factories with about 4,000 workers, two-thirds of whom are women.

The chief centre of fig cultivation is Western Anatolia (producing 28,000 tons in 1927). The same region produces considerable quantities of grapes and raisins (48,000 tons in 1927), which are exported as currants and sultanas. Now that Prohibition has been abolished the peasants have begun to appreciate viticulture from the European standpoint; a few wine-growers have already succeeded in producing wines of the Greek and Italian types, and exports of Turkish wines may be expected in the near future. The best vintages, however, are the "black" wines of European Turkey, as in Asiatic Turkey there is no inherited knowledge of wine-making.

Olives and olive oil are exported from Smyrna, and the quality equals that of other Mediterranean produce. 163,000 tons of olives and about 30,000

tons of oil represent the output of some two thousand factories, employing 15,000 workers.

Nuts exported from the eastern portion of the Black Sea coast are finding markets in Western Europe; the production amounts to some 30,000 tons.

Valoneas are a sort of acorns indigenous to Anatolia. They are used in European tanneries; the exportation amounts to 35,000 tons.

Cotton, silk and flax are receiving the special attention of the Government, which is doing its utmost to assist increased production. The Mersina district is extraordinarily well adapted to the cultivation of cotton (in 1928 140,000 bales of 500 lb. each were produced; the 1931 crop probably exceeded 200,000 bales).

Stock-breeding has already contributed largely to the economic rebirth of Anatolia. The following statistics relate to the year 1927:—

314,000 horses
175,000 bloodhorses
7,000,000 horned cattle
673,000 buffaloes
75,000 camels
1,100,000 asses
10,200,000 sheep
6,900,000 goats
2,500,000 mohair goats

Though agriculture will always remain the mainstay of Turkish economics, the mineral resources of Asia Minor are sufficient to attract foreign capital. The only difficulty in exploiting these resources is the

necessity of cheap and abundant capital, which can be provided by only foreign investors. The rich chromium deposits of Western Anatolia, the copper mines of Arghana and the coalfields near Zonguldak and Djidde on the Black Sea shore—the largest in the whole of the Mediterranean basin—were the factors especially regarded by the Government in so planning its railways as to facilitate transport to and from the mining districts. As we have already stated, the Angora-Filyos (Eregli-Zonguldak) line is now nearing completion. The importance of this line is due to the fact that it will not only open up the hinterland of Eregli, the port of which is to be modernized at the cost of a million sterling, but will in a few years' time carry Turkish coal to the railway-stations of the interior, though at the present moment the Turkish locomotives, whose numbers are constantly increasing, are still consuming English coal. It must be admitted that the Black Sea coal is not of the first quality, but if properly sorted the coal of many deposits will provide a satisfactory fuel.

The output of coal (1928) in this region is shown by the table on p. 66.

As to the other mining products, salt is deserving of particular mention. In pre-war days the production of salt was effectively regulated by the Public Debt Administration. Sea-salt was extracted near Smyrna, lake-salt on the arid plains of Konia, in the south of Angora, and rock-salt in the eastern

parts of Anatolia. The production of rock-salt now amounts to 13,000 tons, and of sea- and lake-salt. to 160,000 tons (in 1928: 239,000 tons).

Other mineral products are ores of silver-lead, mercury, antimony, manganese and boracite.

Coal	Production in Tons	Number of Workers	Working Days	Wages per Ton <i>Gurush</i>
Region of—				
Zonguldak	790,000	85,000	1,520,000	257
Kozlu ..	230,000	31,000	5,000,000	285
Kilimli ..	105,000	12,000	185,000	210
Eregli ..	95,000	29,000	315,000	360
Amasia ..	2,500	1,200	11,000	345
Total ..	1,222,500	158,200	7,031,000	291 ¹
1929 ..	1,436,000	—	—	—
1930 ..	1,557,000	—	—	—

It is petroleum, however, which is deserving of special attention. Cunningham Craig, the famous oil expert, once called petroleum the *femme incomprise* among the minerals. The geologists anticipate the discovery of future oilfields in the mountains of Eastern Anatolia, the natural continuation of the oil deposits of Mosul and Mesopotamia; but "the only way to find oil is to drill a hole for it," and derricks do not as yet exist in the promising regions of Anatolia. The hesitation shown by international

¹ Average.

capital in developing the incontestable oil riches of Iraq is explained by the present over-production of oil in other parts of the world. But when the petroleum output of Caucasia is no longer able to satisfy the as yet incalculable capacity of a fully "motorized" Russia both Iraq and Anatolia will assuredly be opened up to "wild-cat" prospectors—the forerunners of scientific exploitation. Under these conditions geophysical investigations will become a matter of urgency not only to the Angora Government, but also to the international oil interests.

The railroads which continue the Samsun-Sivas and Angora-Sivas lines *via* Erzindjan to Erzerum and Van may now be regarded as mainly strategic in character, but they will certainly have an enormous economic value in future, more especially in connection with the exploitation of the future oil-fields of Eastern Anatolia.

This sphere of economic development can be tackled only with the assistance of foreign finance; the ores and oil produced will have to be mainly exported, and such exportation would be of great assistance in maintaining and increasing Turkey's favourable balance of trade, and providing a sound and stable source of income with which to pay for foreign imports.

A country like Turkey, with her long stretch of coast-line, has to tackle the task of organizing her own shipping. It must be remembered that before

the war the entire coastal trade of Turkey was in the hands of the Greeks, and carried in Greek vessels, while foreign commerce was the monopoly of various European shipping companies. On July 1, 1926, the Turkish Government made the coastal shipping trade (*cabotage*)—which, since April 19, 1925, had been reserved for Turkish companies—a State monopoly, and it is now energetically building modern ships of its own.

The tonnage of Turkish ships at the close of 1928 was about 125,000. The Seer-i Sefayene Company is now in a particularly flourishing state; largely, however, owing to governmental subsidies.

The following statistics (for 1927) relate to the ships cleared in Turkish harbours:—

	Turkish	Foreign
Steamers	24,000	7,600
Tons	10,500,000	12,900,000
Sailing vessels	34,000	3,000
Tons	300,000	111,000
Total tonnage	10,700,000	13,000,000
Percentage	45	55

Turkey has the great advantage of being able to man her ships with experienced sailors, whose seaman-ship was renowned even in the ancient world, namely, the Lazes. Fanatical admirers of the heroes of ancient Greece may be astonished by the statement that the victors of the battle of Salamis were

probably Lazes. This sea-going race provided an enormous percentage of both the officers and the men of the pre-war Turkish Navy.


A survey of the economic life of Turkey would not be complete without some figures relating to the companies operating in Turkey, and to the Turkish Budget.

According to the official statistical year-book, the following limited companies were registered at the beginning of 1928:—

(a) <i>Turkish.</i>		£T Millions	
36 Banks	83	and £10 millions sterling
40 Commercial	9	and 3,700,000 francs
45 Industrial	8	
20 Transport	6.5	
16 Mining	6.7	
6 Farming	1	
7 Building	1	
4 Forestry	3.6	
27 General	8.8	
9 Monopolies	31	and 11,000,000 francs
Other companies	1	

(b) *Foreign.*

31 English companies	£57 millions sterling
21 French companies	903 million francs
12 American companies	285 million dollars
8 German companies	195 million marks
12 Italian companies	745 million lire
5 Dutch companies	286 million florins
5 Russian companies	70 million roubles
5 Russian companies	40 million francs
4 Roumanian companies	425 million leis
6 Belgian companies	156 million francs
3 Swiss companies	128 million francs
1 Swedish company	7 million crowns



(1) MILLIONS OF £T.

				1931	
				Imports Per Cent	Exports Per Cent
Belgium	6.4	2.8
Czechoslovakia	4.7	2.4
France	10.1	9.6
Germany	21.3	10.7
Great Britain	11.4	8.5
Italy	14.5	24.1
Russia	5.7	3.7
U.S.A.	3.2	10.0

The main statistics of Turkey's foreign trade (which should perhaps be accepted with some reserve) are

given as follows for the year 1929: Imports, £T256 millions; Exports, £T155 millions; but in 1931 the exports (£T127,000,000) equalled the imports (£T126,000,000). The general development of trade may be more clearly illustrated by diagram on p. 70.

The following table shows the apportionment of the Budget of the Turkish Republic for the year 1931-32. (In 1929-30 the total Budget was £T220,400,000; but by 1932-3 a further reduction of the total amount to £T145,000,000 was reported)

					£T Million
Great National Assembly	2·4
President of State	0·7
Minister President	0·8
State Council	0·2
Finance, Pensions	12·3
Debts	26·5
Customs	4·2
Interior	4·1
Foreign Affairs	3·1
Posts and Telegraphs	5·1
Public Security	4·2
Gendarmerie	8·7
Health	3·7
Culture	0·5
Education	6·6
Justice	7·4
Public Works	26·4
Economy	8·5
Defence	44·0
Armament Factories	3·4
Navy	7·9
Airfleet	3·5
Cadastral Survey	1·1
Other	1·1
Total	186·58

IV

CULTURAL AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS

PARLIAMENT

SINCE the spectacular failure of Fethi Bey (the former Ambassador in Paris) as the leader of the first Opposition party, Turkish parliamentarism has been the subject of severe criticism and even ridicule in the European press. It has often been declared that the Turkish people are not yet ripe for parliamentary institutions, and that the Turkish Parliament, dominated by the unique influence of Mustapha Kemal Pasha as dictator, is reduced to a mere debating-club, where members are at liberty to talk for hours, but never to make any constructive criticism, and least of all to organize an effective opposition. It is to be noted that at the present moment, when in most of the capitals of Europe the parliamentary system is regarded as having reached a condition of stalemate, and there is talk of the necessity of dictatorships to replace the debating machinery of contending political parties, those Oriental nations which have only just begun to enjoy the blessings of political freedom are fervent supporters of the parliamentary system. It has often been suggested that the Turkish electorate is not yet fitted to enjoy the blessings of democracy in the true sense of the word; and the mere fact that the Turkish Parliament

is dominated by a single party is accepted as a sign of political immaturity. The fact has been overlooked that the Great National Assembly is the direct outcome of the first struggle for political independence, which Mustapha Kemal and his immediate supporters began on the battlefields of Anatolia, and that the general admiration felt for the personality of the Ghazi is a dominating factor in the political life of the country. Such criticisms lose their urgency when we reflect that in Italy Mussolini has reduced the Italian Parliament, sitting in the very birthplace of constitutional government, to the status of a mere debating-club. One must bear in mind the real nature of dictatorship, which in effect means nothing more or less than the approval by the main body of supporters of all the actions and intentions of their tried and proven leaders. While the Turkish Parliament retains its theoretical responsibility, the executive power rests with the Ghazi and his immediate entourage. There is no reason to suggest that the national development of Turkey has suffered any disadvantage from this system. On the contrary, the deputies representing the various districts enjoy the advantage of an excellent political training, and when they return to their constituencies each of them is in a position to play the part of a Ghazi in miniature. There is no good reason for regarding the dignity of the Turkish Parliament as inferior to that of any of its younger European sisters; it has never, for example, been the theatre of such violent

incidents as are of common occurrence in the Parliaments of Warsaw, Prague, and other European capitals. The national importance of the Turkish Parliament lies in the verbatim reports published in the Turkish press, which enable every citizen to inform himself concerning the affairs of the country.

At all events, it would be reasonable to give Turkey some years of grace before expecting her to approach European standards of parliamentary government. Why should we expect the nation to show the discipline and training of the European peoples when they have but a few years of parliamentary experience behind them? It would be unjust to deny their capacity for progress, for a similar evolution has been observed in the capitals of all the Balkan countries which obtained their freedom in the course of the last century. In judging the political development of the Turkish people we must compare Turkey with her neighbours in the Balkans and the Near East rather than with the older civilized nations of Western Europe.

There is another aspect of the matter which is worthy of consideration: namely, the rapid enlargement of the Turkish political vocabulary, which has a great cultural significance in a country like Anatolia, where the number of those who have no political education is considerable, so that the parliamentary reports are of great educative value. The Turkish language itself has undergone considerable changes, and these changes are largely

the greater European capitals, who supply the latest and most reliable information. Further, the Governmental Telegraphic Agency, "A.A." (*Ajans Anadolu*) keeps the Turkish press supplied with the latest news, and in view of the fact that every copy of a daily paper is read by at least five persons, as is usual in Oriental countries, the educative value of the press is obviously considerable.

Foreign critics have often accused the Turkish press of subservience to the Government; but it is too readily forgotten that Turkey is still in the throes of regeneration, so that it is highly undesirable that matters of domestic and foreign policy should be the subject of controversy between the Government and the press.

Modern Turkey has severed all connection with the Hamidian era, and this fact goes far to explain the solidarity which exists between the Ministries and the Turkish journalists. The above remarks refer mainly to the daily press, but examination of the weekly and monthly periodicals—unknown to Hamidian Turkey—will convince the inquiring reader of their educational value. While before the Great War only a few periodicals were published in Turkey, most of which were devoted to literary criticism, we shall find to-day that every branch of science and art and social life is represented by at least one periodical. The magazines for children which are now published are quite a novel venture, and are of special interest.

Some 150 newspapers and 100 other periodicals are now published in Turkey, and in the following languages:—

				Newspapers	Magazines, etc
Turkish	127	89
French..	7	2
Greek	5	1
Spanish	3	1
Armenian	5	5
German	1	—
Italian	1	—
Russian	1	1

The daily newspapers are printed on modern rotary presses of European manufacture. The majority of the Turkish newspaper proprietors are also book publishers, a state of affairs unusual in Western Europe. There has been a very marked development of the press since the introduction of the Latin alphabet on January 1, 1929 (Act of November 3, 1928), which has so largely reduced the cost of printing that the losses sustained by the printers through the abolition of the Arabic alphabet have been already made good.

A well-known Swiss firm of publishers (Orell Füssli of Zurich) has established a profitable business in Turkey as up-to-date printers and publishers, while type-metal is generally imported from a Leipzig firm. The consumption of paper is steadily increasing, and the imports have reached about 50,000 tons. The opening up of the forest regions on the Black Sea coast by the Angora-Filyos railway

will probably lead to the erection of paper-mills and the creation of a home industry.

The introduction of the Latin alphabet has further resulted in the importation of considerable numbers of typewriters. Even in the first year after the introduction of Latin characters, the Government ordered 3,000 Remington typewriters from the United States, and the same number of Ideal and Torpedo machines from Germany. Although in pre-war days European and American makers (for example, Hammond) built machines which wrote from right to left and were fitted with Arabic characters, there was practically no demand for them in Turkey. An enormous impetus was given to the typewriter industry by the emancipation of women. Great numbers of women learned shorthand and typewriting, and the opportunity of staffing their offices at a small expense induced many officials and business men to rationalize their work and employ shorthand-typists. Portable machines are chiefly in demand, though only a small proportion of the educated classes are able to pay the normal market prices for machines.

While Kemal Pasha announced the introduction of Latin characters on August 19, 1928, and their use became obligatory on January 1, 1929, the Roman numerals have been in use since May 24, 1928. The only essential difference between the new Anatolian alphabet and the Latin alphabet is that some of the characters have a special phonetic value.

Extreme patriots therefore deny that they have accepted the Latin alphabet, maintaining that their alphabet is a purely Turkish one. Thus, the Anatolian *c* has the sound of the English *dj*; *ç* has the sound of *tch*, and *ş* is pronounced *sh*. The vowels have the same value as in German. The Turks, however, have added an undotted *i* to denote the "dull *i*." The orthography is strictly phonetic, in accordance with the best Stambul pronunciation.

The introduction of the new alphabet will enable the Turks to assimilate European civilization more rapidly, and will offer Europeans a greater inducement to learn the Turkish language and read Turkish literature. The critics of this reform have so far concentrated on the phonetic mistakes which a few years' practice will eliminate.

EDUCATION

One of the main reasons why the Turkish intellectuals—and for that matter, the intellectuals of the entire Islamic world—are antagonistic to the Mahommedan clergy is their profound belief that this clergy, through its dominating influence, and its virtual monopoly of the juvenile education, has been instrumental in delaying the progress of the Mahommedan world by at least two hundred years as compared with Europe. This belief goes far to explain the hostile attitude of all those Moslems who have had the opportunity of studying in Europe,

and who, since returning to their respective countries, have been striving to challenge the pernicious influence of the priests. The struggle is in many ways analogous to the war upon the mediæval scholiasts which preceded the dearly-bought victory of modern science over the Catholic Church. We can see this struggle proceeding in deadly earnest, from Gebel-al Tarik to Hyderabad and Lahore, although in those parts of the Mahommedan world which have come under the domination of such European Powers as England and France modern education has made marked progress as compared with those Mahommedan countries which enjoyed a nominal independence, such as Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan. Even in Russia the Moslem youth was given the opportunity of receiving a modern elementary education, and even of graduating at a university. The Mahommedans of Russia, although a subject race, have produced a greater proportion of intellectuals than the independent Turks, to whom they looked up as to their elder brethren. The Young Turks, it is true, once they had assumed control, made education a primary object of reform, but were unable to realize their full programme. The American colleges which have been established in Turkey during the last fifty years have turned out thousands of graduates, who have held prominent positions in all the Balkan countries, but only comparatively few students of Turkish race had the privilege of attending these colleges. The first important step

towards adopting a European system of education was made after Turkey had entered the war on the side of Germany. Over two thousand Turkish boys were sent to Germany, where they were educated in the high schools and universities, and in modern Turkey they constitute a very considerable proportion of the leading intellectuals. Mustapha Kemal has instituted a very radical reform in this direction by entirely suppressing the church schools (*medresses*) and secularizing education.

It was recognized from the outset that the first step in the Europeanization of Turkey must be the introduction of a European system of education. Elementary education has been made obligatory, and all school children are provided with school-books and equipment at the expense of the State. Mustapha Kemal has declared war on ignorance; he knows that the development of Anatolia into a modern State is impossible without the proper education of the entire population, both male and female.

A number of well-organized training-schools for teachers have been established, and the University of Constantinople has been completely modernized. Most of the teachers are graduates of European universities. A law school has been opened in Angora, in order to train the required number of officials for the various departments of the administration. Special attention is being paid to technical and agricultural education, and graduates from the

German, Italian, French and Belgian universities have been placed at the head of these branches.

The privilege formerly enjoyed by foreign missionaries, of establishing sectarian schools, has now been abrogated, as the missionary schools were accused in pre-war days of educating Christian subjects who were hostile to Turkey.

The development of the Turkish schools is well illustrated by the following figures, relating to the years 1913-14 and 1928-29. In considering these figures, it must be remembered that in 1913 Turkey had a population of 20,000,000 inhabiting an area of 1,500,000 square kilometres, whereas Anatolia has only 14,000,000 inhabitants inhabiting an area of 763,000 square kilometres.

<i>Schools.</i>				1928-29	1913-14
High	13	12
Secondary	118	16
Primary	6,735	3,623
<i>Teachers.</i>					
In High Schools	505	377
In Secondary Schools	1,885	1,109
In Primary Schools	13,669	6,395
<i>Pupils.</i>					
In High Schools	4,765	4,599
In Secondary Schools	28,161	13,475
In Primary Schools	445,726	222,583

In modern Turkey there are:—

- 26 Agricultural District Schools
- 2 Schools for Moslem Clergy (in 1924 there were still 29)
- 2 Naval Colleges

- 6 Secondary Commercial Schools
- 1 Secondary Industrial School
- 9 Trade Schools

in addition to schools for orphans, law schools, colleges for Government officials, railway functionaries, etc. The two agricultural high-schools are at Halkali and Angora (with a veterinary department).

Simultaneously with the improvement of the Turkish schools, a considerable number of students are sent abroad, mostly with Government scholarships, to receive their education in various European countries.

Generous funds are voted for educational purposes, and the Government has made strenuous efforts to stimulate the individual citizen's desire for learning. The introduction of the Latin alphabet has in itself led to a complete cultural revolution. Unfriendly comments have been made abroad on the introduction of the Latin characters. It has been criticized as an irrational breach with tradition, and as depriving Turkish youth of the possibility of studying the literature of the past. It has not been generally realized that the initiative in abolishing the Arabic characters was taken in 1924 by the Russian Soviet Government. The Soviet Government was not actuated merely by the desire of modernizing the education of its Moslem subjects; it was also pursuing the obvious political aim of diminishing Turkey's influence over the Moslems of Transcaucasia and Turkestan. In introducing the European

alphabet, Ghazi Kemal and his advisers were actuated by purely national ideals. The Arab language and the Arab characters have been mainly responsible for the fact that the Turkish masses have been for centuries illiterate—for it must be remembered that in the mosques the whole service was conducted in the Arab language, which was quite unknown not merely to the congregations, but in some cases even to the lower clergy. The introduction of Latin characters was perhaps the best possible means of educating the Turkish masses on European lines and combating the national ignorance. The educational reformers hope that within a space of ten years the proportion of illiterates will be reduced to little more than ten per cent—a proportion still exceeded in several Mediterranean countries.

JUSTICE

We are conscious that we are treading upon dangerous ground when we come to discuss so delicate a subject as the administration of justice, which in a theocratic State like pre-war Turkey was for centuries based on the Shariate and common law.

The bold attempt of the Turks to cut loose from tradition and to base the administration of justice on the Swiss and German codes has met with a great deal of scepticism in the countries of Western Europe. It was objected that so long as the general standard of civilization was low the introduction of modern

European justice would merely lead to misunderstanding and misinterpretation, but events have proved that the machinery of the law is operating much more satisfactorily than might have been expected.

The commercial law of modern Turkey is based on the German code, and the criminal law on the Italian and French codes. Of special interest to foreigners are the decrees passed by the Great National Assembly, on March 15, 1929, relating to private debts and their collection, which permit of much greater speed of execution than was the case before the Great War.

Under the present bankruptcy law, creditors may enforce execution in cases where no bills of exchange have been given; but the arrest and imprisonment of debtors have been abolished. For the protection of immovable property, the Swiss system of registration will be adopted, and twenty-eight officers of the law have been sent to Switzerland to study the subject.

A topographical and cadastral survey of the whole country, including the registration of all real estate, is now being carried through, partly with the assistance of aero-photography.

THE EMANCIPATION OF WOMEN

THE Kemalist reforms have had a very far-reaching influence on social conditions in modern Turkey. Foremost amongst these reforms is the liberation of Turkish womanhood. The greatest ecclesiastical authorities of the Islamic world have endeavoured for centuries past to represent the subjugation of Moslem women as a mere matter of form. Many of them have given economic reasons for this phenomenon, stating that polygamy was the best means of maintaining the division of labour in Moslem families. But the disastrous effects of the subjugation of women became glaringly apparent when the vast majority of the Mahommedan peoples came under the influence of colonial imperialism. While remaining secluded from male society, the Moslem women nevertheless retained supreme influence over the upbringing of the children of both sexes, and experience has shown that an enslaved mother can never train strong-willed children. Such children retain their childish mentality, even at an age when their European contemporaries are beginning to enter active life. However, the fable that every Moslem possessed a harem was never seriously accepted. It was always realized that the greater proportion of Mahommedans could not afford the expense of

maintaining more than one wife. Nevertheless, veiled Mahomedan woman could never be the real companion of her husband.

Mustapha Kemal Pasha solved the problem at a single stroke by liberating woman from the last shackles of slavery, and to-day there is no occupation in Turkey in which women are not ably competing with the stronger sex; and it may be said that the enormous task of national reconstruction which is being carried out by Turkey could never be successfully accomplished without the co-operation of women. Their emancipation has gone so far that the Turkish newspapers are now adding to their revenue by the promotion of beauty competitions.

While opening up all kinds of careers to women, Kemal has done well to stop short of admitting them to Parliament. He considers that the time has not yet come for female suffrage; modern education should precede the granting of the vote. But there are in modern Turkey many professional associations of women, and women are playing a prominent part in the art, literature and education of the country. And it cannot be doubted that the modern emancipated woman, who engages in all kinds of sports which would have been unthinkable in the pre-Kemalist era, will produce a strong generation of children.

That this sudden emancipation of women should have produced some regrettable results is only

natural. So far as the present generation of women is concerned, their emancipation is making very slow progress, as the religious tradition cannot be suddenly replaced. Turkish women of the upper classes did not suffer severely from the restrictions of Moslem life, as their husbands, who mostly belonged to the intellectual and official classes, had often enjoyed a foreign education. The real victims of the sudden emancipation are to be found among the women of the upper and lower strata of the middle classes. Here the removal of secular restrictions, the free intercourse of girls and young men, the frequenting of dance-halls, and the desire to equal and even to excel the women of Western Europe in the extravagances of fashion, have resulted in sexual irregularities; and the influence of the schools and of family life will lead in time to the restoration of a sense of proportion. At all events, the Greek women of Pera are no longer able to pose as the wives of Pashas and other dignitaries, extracting large sums of money from curious European travellers who dream of entering the enchanted circle of Yildiz Kiosk after the fashion of Pierre Loti.

Needless to say, the Turkish and Arabic intellectuals who had had the advantage of a Western education made constant efforts to emancipate their womenfolk, but their efforts, unfortunately, had no more useful results than the habit of reading French novels and smoking cigarettes in the privacy

of the Turkish home. Strangely enough, the Tartar women of Russia and the Moslem women of Northern Caucasia have long been accustomed to appear unveiled, but neither the assumption nor the discarding of the veil was necessarily regarded as an outward sign of degradation; and in the countries bordering upon the Moslem world even the Christian peasant women have retained the custom of closely veiling their faces and heads with shawls, leaving only the mouth and ears uncovered.

The Moslem clergy have attempted to argue that the seclusion of women in harems did not involve any limitation of their personal freedom, but was merely a precaution against the temptations of life. It would be idle to deny that one of the main causes of the backwardness of Moslem women as compared with those of European countries is their personal subjugation, which, as we have stated, has its repercussions on the rising generation. Cynical observers of the Moslem world have been known to state that as a matter of actual fact Europeans are more addicted to polygamy than are the Moslems; and they cite, in proof of their statement, the prostitution and the sexual freedom prevalent in the capitals of Europe. But they have forgotten that however pernicious the influence of the life of the modern European cities may be, the women of Western Europe are free and independent individuals.

In all the countries of Western Europe, even before the Great War, the feminist movement

opened new fields of activity to women, enabling them to compete or co-operate with men in every profession. The personal freedom of the Western woman must be an enormous advantage to the mother responsible for the upbringing of the next generation. The advantages of personal liberty were unknown to the Moslem women, and it is mainly due to this fact that the generations which grew up in their care were lamentably lacking in stability of character and initiative. At one stroke the Ghazi has shattered the chains which fettered the women of Turkey, and we now see them entering the professions on an equal footing with men.

The modern Turkish woman enjoys other advantages of a legal character; she is free to choose her husband, and any personal property which she brings into the marriage is secured to her. By way of contrast we may recall the barbaric marriage laws of Islam, under which the Mahommedan clergy, who would grant a divorce on the strength of a one-sided declaration by the husband, who could leave his wife without any means of subsistence.

VI

NATIONAL DEFENCE

THERE is no nation in the world whose name is so closely associated with the use of armed force as the race of the Anatolian Turks, who, almost from the time when they left their central Asiatic desert home in Central Asia down to the memorable defence of Plevna by Osman Pasha in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, maintained an unbroken martial spirit. The world at large has been accustomed to regard the Turks in all ages as very brave soldiers, but very bad administrators. There have been three outstanding periods in the military history of Turkey. The first was that preceding the conquest of Constantinople, when the Turks began to overrun the entire Balkan Peninsula, fighting their way to the very gates of Vienna, and when their armies were purely Turkish in character. The second period was marked by the conversion to Islam of the subject Christian races of Anatolia and the Balkans, who furnished the celebrated regiments of the *Yanitchars* (Janissaries); and the last period by the introduction of the European system of training officers, who were educated in the military schools of Europe, and more especially Germany. The German method of training produced staff-officers who were well qualified to modernize the Turkish army, but this third

period was unfortunately darkened by the misrule of Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid, who was particularly suspicious of officers trained in Europe, regarding them as politically dangerous. The purely democratic organization of the Turkish army has necessitated the maintenance of a proportionately larger corps of officers than is the case with modern European armies. The Balkan Wars and the Great War caused a heavy drain on the officer class; but since the armistice of Mudros, when nearly two-thirds of the territory of the Ottoman Empire was lost, a very considerable number of officers have remained unemployed. Turkey, therefore, has had to contend with a situation very like that which existed in Germany after the collapse of 1918. Thousands of former officers in the Ottoman army have had to change their occupation; to-day they may be found in all parts of Anatolia, either as civil servants or as merchants, or exercising the less dignified vocation of commercial traveller; and whether the gap left by the expulsion of the Greeks and Armenians can be filled depends very largely on their adaptability in these new professions.

It was these officers who constituted the original revolutionary army of Kemal, when he delivered his first blow in Anatolia. But by the time of their decisive victory on the banks of River Sakaria the Kemalist forces were in essentials a body of modern troops. The complete reorganization of the Turkish army on modern lines began only after the Treaty

of Lausanne, and not only have its uniforms been changed, but so have the army's technical equipment and its conceptions of strategy. Manœuvres on a large scale have been introduced. Special attention is paid to the training and education of the officers, with a view to making them more independent and capable of taking the initiative in the field. The men receive technical instruction in railway transport, wireless telephony, telegraphy, etc. The artillery is thoroughly up to date, and last but not least, the air service is undergoing complete reorganization. In view of the extensive coastline of Anatolia special attention is being paid to the naval air arm.

The magnitude of the sums required for the equipment of an army of 120,000 men, and the provision of war munitions of all kinds, has given rise to a movement in favour of the creation of a national defence industry, and the nation's resources in minerals and other raw materials are now being specially studied from this point of view. In this connection the *Mudafa'a Vekaleti*, the Ministry of Defence, is collaborating with the *Iktisat Vekaleti*, the Ministry of Economics. A number of foreign advisers have been invited to assist the General Staff in solving the difficult problems of supplying the necessary war material in the event of national danger.

Turkey is now taking advantage of the comparative peace on her frontiers to complete the work of

reorganization. The most striking proof of the progress already made was afforded by the despatch of large bodies of troops to the Persian frontier at the time of recent Kurdish risings.

Naval activity has not hitherto kept pace with the progress in the army, not merely on account of financial considerations, but also by reason of the fact that Soviet Russia is not as yet to be feared as a serious adversary. The fate of the Dodecanese, however, is not yet finally settled, and causes of friction with the Italian or the Greek Navy might easily arise.

The main task of the Government in the department of naval affairs will be the construction of dockyards capable of building swift motor vessels and of undertaking repairs. The first step to be taken is development of the Geulujuk dockyards at the eastern end of the Gulf of Ismid. The plant already existing will be enlarged and modernized, especially with a view to the accommodation of the modern ships on order at the Ansaldo wharfs in Liguria (Sestri Ponente), and in the submarine yards of Monfalcone. The Turkish Ministry of Defence has ordered from Italy the following units:—

					Tons
2 Destroyers	1,230
2 Destroyers	1,450
2 Submarines	624
4 Motor Torpedo Boats (44 knots)	33·5

Not counting the vessels built or building in the

Italian dockyards, the Turkish Navy consists of the following units:—

					Tons
Cruiser <i>Yavuz Sultan Selim</i> (<i>Goeben</i>)	22,500
Cruiser <i>Hamidie</i>	3,830
Cruiser <i>Mecidie</i>	3,300
4 Gunboats (500 tons each)					
3 small Destroyers					
1 Torpedo-boat					
2 Submarines					
3 Mine Layers					

Whereas in pre-war times British experts had been invited to reorganize the Ottoman Navy, a German Admiral and his staff were temporarily employed for this purpose by Kemal. Now the Chief of Naval Affairs, Mehmet Ali, and the Turkish harbour officials are technically advised by a German expert. The former German cruiser *Goeben*, however, was sent for repairs to a French dockyard, but the Turks were not satisfied with the work done.

As to the officers and crews, the inhabitants of the Black Sea shore—mainly of the ancient race of the Lazes—provide ample naval reserves, capable of profiting by modern methods of training.

Turkey is not a member of the League of Nations, and is favourably situated as regards the development of her navy; Soviet Russia is the only country with which she has hitherto concluded a naval agreement (early in 1931).

VII

RELATIONS WITH SOVIET RUSSIA

FROM the year 1774 onwards Russia assumed a dominating position amongst the enemies of Turkey. In the course of her ever-increasing efforts to rule over the Black Sea and the Straits of the Dardanelles, Moscow crushed the Hetman of the Ukraine, and began to advance against the Ottoman Empire on two flanks, in the Balkans and in the Caucasus.

The first blow in this direction was delivered by the conclusion of the Treaty of Protectorate between Catherine the Great and the King of Georgia, Heraclius II, in the year 1783. The Russian Empire disappointed Georgia's expectations of enjoying the protection of her great coreligionist, and Alexander I, by the special manifesto of 1801, annexed Eastern Georgia as an integral part of the Moscovite Empire, deposing the last King of Georgia, George XIII, and entrusting the administration of the country to the first Viceroy, Prince Tsitsianoff, who was Georgian by nationality, but Russian by education. Western Georgia retained its independence under King Solomon II, who concluded a similar treaty of protection with Russia; only to be annexed in 1810, with the exception of the coastal region, which was under Turkish domination. The King left the country as a fugitive, and settled at Trebizond, where he

died, and was buried in the Greek Cathedral. Down to the year 1828 Russia conducted a series of wars with Persia, and under the Treaty of Turkmen Tchai (1828) she annexed the eastern part of Transcaucasia, now known as Azerbaidjan, and the petroleum city of Baku on the Caspian.

Thus the Russians became dangerous neighbours of Turkey in Asia Minor, the more so as the decadence of Persia enabled Russia to concentrate all her power against Turkey.

England and France both protested against the annexation of Georgia, but without effect. The Napoleonic wars, in which England was engaged as the ally of Germany and Russia, prevented any further action in this direction. The activities of Russia were now directed towards the Balkan Peninsula. The liberation of Roumania, Greece and part of Serbia followed in quick succession, and by the Treaty of Adrianople (September 14, 1829) Russia succeeded in regaining the Sandjaks of Akhaltsikh and Akhalkalaki, formerly parts of the Georgian kingdom.

The Crimean War of 1853-1856 might have meant the liberation of Batum and the remaining regions of Western Georgia which were still under Turkish domination, but for the intervention of England and France, who fought against Russia as the staunch allies of Turkey. The Treaty of Paris (1856) imposed heavy restrictions upon Russia as regards the movements of her fleet in the Black Sea and the

Dardanelles, but it also brought about the abolition of serfdom, and for this reason Russian historians quite rightly regarded the Crimean defeat as an unmixed blessing, which contributed greatly to the consolidation of the Russian Empire. Tsardom now embarked upon a series of expeditions of conquest in Turkestan, where a number of independent and semi-independent Khanates were annexed to the Moscovite Empire, thus bringing the Russian Empire into close contact with Afghanistan and India. And this new danger forced Great Britain once and for all to consider the defence of Turkish territory as a matter of imperial security.

At the same time, the three million Mahommedan mountaineers of the two ranges of the Caucasus entered upon their celebrated war of liberation, which was inspired mainly by Turkey.

On the Black Sea side the brunt of the battle was borne by the Circassians, as they had to engage in a desperate struggle with the Kuban Cossacks, who had been settled in the north-western Caucasus by Catherine the Great after the amalgamation of the Ukraine. These Cossacks were of the same blood as the Saporojian Cossacks, who had for centuries been staunch enemies of the Turks, and they fought against the Circassians with the utmost ruthlessness.

After reducing the Circassian population from about one million to half a million, they forced the remnant to emigrate to Anatolia. A great number

of them perished during the voyage across the Black Sea, but the survivors were received with open arms in Turkey, where the men were formed into cavalry regiments.

On the Caspian side of the Caucasus a revolt broke out under Imam Shamil, who resisted the Russians with the greatest obstinacy and surrendered only after causing them enormous losses in men and material. This struggle ended the Turkish domination of the Caucasus, depriving Turkey of the possession of the entire Black Sea coast from Anapa down to the Batum corner.

After a short respite, during which the Russians, especially the intellectuals, the Government officials, the officers and the clergy became obsessed by the idea that Russia was to revive the glories of Byzantium and replace the Crescent on the mosque of Hagia Sophia by the Orthodox Cross, the war of 1877 broke out. Russia, aiming at liberation of Bulgaria, Macedonia, Constantinople and the Dardanelles, fought against Turkey with great ferocity, and within a year Russian troops were bivouacking at San Stefano, on the outskirts of Constantinople, when the demonstration of the British Fleet in the Bosphorus prevented them from entering the city.

Upon the battlefields of Plevna alone Russia lost eighty thousand men as the price of liberating Bulgaria. But the rapid success of the Russian troops on the Balkan front was largely due to the assistance of numerous Bulgarian and Serbian volun-

teers. On the Caucasian front also the campaign made good progress. Kars was captured, and Erzerum, together with the greater part of Turkish Armenia. The only resistance offered by the Turks was in the Batum area, where the Georgian Mahomedans fought against Russia, fearing that in the event of union with Christian Georgia they would be forcibly converted to the Christian religion.

In this case the fanaticism of the Georgian Mahomedans equalled that of the Bulgarian Pomaks and the Serbian Bosniaks. The Moslem religion has always derived a peculiar force from its ability to make fanatical converts among subject races; which explains the fact that when Russia appeared at the Berlin Congress of 1878 the province of Batum was still unconquered, and it was owing only to the special efforts of Bismarck that the province was presented more or less as a free gift to Russia.

The stipulations of the Berlin Treaty were very damaging to Turkey's prestige. The Ottoman Empire had to admit the independence of Bulgaria, maintaining only a shadowy suzerainty over Eastern Rumelia. The little that was saved for Turkey was saved mainly through the assistance of Disraeli, though England annexed the island of Cyprus (1878). The last war between Russia and Turkey turned Russia into something of a nightmare for Turkey, and the rulers of the Ottoman Empire became aware that Turkish soldiers had begun to feel an almost hypnotic dread of the Russian arms.

In the course of this war the remnant of historical Georgia, consisting of the entire province of Batum, and part of the province of Kars, was reconquered, largely with the assistance of the Georgian nobles and people.

Russia had thus consolidated her power in the Caucasus, and could now assume the position of military and political mentor to the new Bulgaria. Her Balkan policy had now passed into a phase of activity which gradually led to friction not only with England, who was regarded by the Russian imperialists as their historic enemy, but also with Germany and Austria. This friction was aggravated by the conclusion of a Treaty of Alliance between Russia and France in 1886.

Russia's political domination of Turkey continued and was constantly intensified, until the recent war, in which Russia's participation on the side of England and France was dictated exclusively by her ambition to conquer Constantinople, the Dardanelles and a large portion of Eastern Anatolia (under the pretext of liberating Armenia). As early as the period of the Balkan War not only the reactionary elements in Russia, but even the Liberals under Miliukoff, had begun to manifest an inexplicable interest in the liberation of Armenia, thereby camouflaging their real ambition of securing an outlet not only at the Dardanelles, but also at Mersina on the Mediterranean.

This explains why the German Government and

the military party under the Kaiser Wilhelm, though supporting Tsarism and the reaction, were yet unable to avoid war with Russia, as their *Drang nach dem Osten* conflicted with the imperialistic ideals of Russia, which could be realized only at the price of the complete destruction of Turkey.

From the first day of Germany's declaration of war against Russia, the Russian troops in the whole of the Caucasus military area were mobilized and ready to invade Asia Minor. This explains Enver Pasha's somewhat precipitate advance upon Caucasasia, which ended in disaster, so that in 1916 Russia was in occupation not only of Erzerum, but also of Trebizond, in spite of the fact that her Black Sea fleet had been reduced to complete inactivity, owing to the presence of the former German men-of-war, the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, in the Turkish Navy.

Turkey had, first, to defend her Caucasian front, and next, her various fronts in Mesopotamia, Palestine and the Dardanelles. Bulgaria's participation in the war, which prevented a Greek advance upon Adrianople, was the one circumstance in Turkey's favour. At the same time, she was always in fear of a possible Russian landing on the Thracian coast, and an attack on Constantinople.

The Russian success in Asia Minor produced in the Turkish high command the uneasy feeling that they were fighting for a lost cause. By this time the entire Arabian section of the Empire had been lost. It was at this critical juncture that the Russian

Revolution broke out, and Russia's Caucasian front, no less than her Western front, began to waver. It was only after the Peace of Brest-Litovsk (concluded on March 3, 1918, between the Central Powers and Russia) that the Russian troops turned their backs on Turkey and retired in disorder, abandoning not only the Caucasian front but also the whole of Transcaucasia.

The Russian Bolshevik revolution marks the beginning of a new phase of the relations between Russia and Turkey. Talaat Pasha headed in person a special delegation to the Soviet Government, and succeeded in obtaining from the Bolsheviks the Batum, Ardahan and Kars territories, amounting to some 6,000 square kilometres, under a clause of the Brest-Litovsk Preliminaries. Thus Turkey had regained the line which she had occupied before the Berlin Treaty of 1878. The newly-established Republics in Transcaucasia—Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaidjan—were recognized by Turkey. The German assistance rendered to Georgia prevented a further loss of Georgian territory to the Turkish troops which had entered Batum, and were taking over the control of the entire Transcaucasian railway system.

In Brest-Litovsk, the Bolsheviks abandoned at one stroke the imperialistic policy of Tsarist Russia in respect of Turkey, since at that time the main object of their policy consisted in ranging Turkey and all the Mahommedan peoples of the Middle East

against the Allies, and especially against Great Britain. Talaat and Enver Pasha, fanatical believers in Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanianism, saw a unique opportunity of effecting an union with Turkey's kinsmen in Azerbaidjan and Turkestan, which they regarded as a compensation for the losses sustained in the Arabic regions of the former Ottoman Empire. Resistance on the Syrian and Mesopotamian fronts was practically abandoned, much to the disappointment of the German high command. Turkey's martial activities were suddenly interrupted by the signing of the armistice of Mudros, and the political collapse of Germany. British troops occupied Transcaucasia, compelling the Turkish and German forces to abandon the country.

Talaat Pasha had to flee as a refugee to Berlin, while Enver Pasha first attempted to get into touch with Moscow, and then suddenly decided to place himself at the head of the Turkish tribes in Turkestan, where he fell in battle.

The Kemalist movement was only just beginning to gather way, and Moscow, knowing very well that neither Talaat nor Enver was acceptable to the Kemalists, took the initiative of getting into touch with Mustapha Kemal, who had his quarters at Sivas and Erzerum in Eastern Anatolia.

The main driving force in Moscow was Stalin, who immediately after the seizure of Moscow by the Bolshevik leaders had been appointed Commissar for Nationalities. Lenin, on the whole, favoured

Stalin's plans with regard to the subject nationalities of the former Empire and the Moslems of the Near East.

Contact with Turkey was regarded by Moscow as one of the main objects of their foreign policy, since the rapidly increasing resistance of Denikin in the south of Russia was supported mainly by the Allied headquarters at Constantinople, through which all the necessary war supplies were being forwarded.

The Greek occupation of Smyrna on May 15, 1919, furnished a very welcome means of turning Mustapha Kemal's sympathies toward Moscow, and the Kemalist Foreign Minister, Bekir Sami Bey, was dispatched to Moscow with an extensive power of attorney to enter into arrangements with the Bolsheviks.

It would not be unjust to say that the undue hostility to Kemal evinced by the Allied headquarters on the Bosphorus was mainly responsible for Kemal's *rapprochement* to Moscow. But as long as Denikin's forces retained a semblance of discipline, and British troops were occupying Transcaucasia, Northern Persia and Turkestan, there was no chance of serious co-operation between Moscow and Mustapha Kemal. At this time the attention of the Kemalists was directed towards the Russian fugitives in Constantinople, and by a strange irony of fate one might see Turks in the streets of Stambul greeting Russians as *kardashlar* (brethren). All the tradi-

tional hatred and fear of the Russians had been forgotten, and the two peoples were brought together by a common hostility to the Allied occupation.

Real co-operation between the Communists and the Kemalists first became possible after the defeat of Denikin and the evacuation of Transcaucasia by the British troops. The immediate consequence of Denikin's collapse was the occupation of the Azerbaidjan Republic by the Reds in April 1920. The Red troops marching into Azerbaidjan were full of plans for advancing upon Anatolia. In May 1920 the Reds attacked Georgia, but were heavily defeated. A treaty of peace was concluded between Tiflis and Moscow, and diplomatic relations were established. Small British forces still remained in occupation of the Batum Province. But in February 1921, Georgia, abandoned to her own resources, was overpowered by the Reds, and occupied after severe fighting.

On this occasion, Turkish regiments occupied the entire province of Batum, but they were driven out of the port and the city by a Red army, and had to retreat to the left bank of the River Tchorokh. The province of Kars had already been occupied by the Turks in November 1920, simultaneously with the entry of the Reds into Armenia.

Close territorial contact between Turkey and Soviet Russia had been effected. It is, by the way, quite incomprehensible that the Greeks should have delayed their advance against Mustapha Kemal until the moment when this contact was finally estab

lished. It merely proves the absence of any real martial spirit and enthusiasm among the Greeks.

Stories of the material assistance rendered by Moscow to the Kemalists have been very greatly exaggerated, as we mentioned in our first chapter. But the mere fact that the Anatolian peasant was assured that he had no longer to fight against Russia, but only against the Greeks, gave him great encouragement.

The reception of the first Bolshevik diplomatic mission at Angora was marked by great enthusiasm, as the first occasion when the Russians, even though Reds, had come as friends.

Moscow did not fail to take advantage of this excellent opportunity of introducing experts and propagandists of the Third International, most of whom spoke Turkish, and were of Azerbaidjan origin. Kemal and his followers, however, soon showed the Bolsheviks how unprofitable such an experiment was destined to prove. The Bolsheviks also sent an imposing economic mission to Turkey, which sought to explain the benefits of their economic system, and invited Turkey to profit by their experience in reorganizing Turkey on Soviet lines.

The only concession made by Mustapha Kemal in this direction consisted in renaming the Ministries (*nazaret*) Commissariats (*vekalet*) and the Ministers (*nazir*) Commissars (*vekil*). Since in 1920 Great Britain had signed a trading agreement with Krassin, the Bolsheviks were permitted to establish a trade

delegation in Constantinople. Russia began to supply Turkey with manufactured articles, such as cement and other building material, but as Turkey was in a state of destitution nothing could be exported in exchange. Nevertheless, a series of friendly agreements was signed, and the Kemalist Ambassador was enthusiastically received in Moscow.

The main task of the Soviets was to hinder the British from rendering further assistance to Denikin's forces, and this was accomplished firstly by means of Krassin's trade agreement, and secondly by encouraging the Kemalists in their fight against the Greeks. Great Britain had officially abandoned her efforts to assist the second adventure of the Whites under General Wrangel in the Crimean Peninsula, France alone undertaking to support that general. But the French assistance was of a somewhat platonic kind, as the main efforts of France were concentrated on Germany and the question of Reparations.

The Bolshevik press and propaganda greeted with enthusiasm the successful campaign of Mustapha Kemal against the Greeks; while to the Lausanne Conference the Soviets sent a strong delegation under Tchitcherin, accompanied by Comrade Rakovsky as the delegate of the Ukraine and Comrade Mdivani as the representative of Georgia. Moscow had intended to raise the question of the joint control of the Straits by the States in occupation of the Black Sea coast. The Soviets maintained that

Russia, the Ukraine, Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria and Roumania were alone entitled to such control, to the exclusion of the Allied Powers; but this scheme was an entire failure, thanks to the stubborn resistance of Lord Curzon. The Russian delegates were not admitted to the Lausanne Conference, and the most influential member of the delegation, Comrade Vorovsky, was assassinated by a Swiss subject, Conradi, who had long been resident in Russia. The attempt to secure some semblance of autonomy for a very small portion of Turkish Armenia was frustrated by Ismet Pasha, and the Treaty was signed with results quite favourable to Turkey, except in respect of the Mosul question, which was submitted to special arbitration.

One of the great achievements on the Turkish side was the abolition of the capitulations, while Russia now assumed the control of the Black Sea coast from Batum to Odessa. The hurried evacuation of Constantinople and the Straits in October 1923 had a bad effect on Allied prestige. The name of Mustapha Kemal has become sacred as that of the greatest national hero of modern Turkey, and his unique personal influence is recognized throughout the world.

The question of Turkey's adhesion to the League of Nations has been left open up to the present. In this connection Russia's influence has been paramount. In spite of the many attempts of the League to draw Soviet Russia into its circle, she has

remained obdurate. Fearing co-operation with the "capitalistic" States, she has, on the contrary, planned to create a League of her own, using Turkey as her main support for this purpose. Turkey has not only made a friendly agreement with Russia, both parties undertaking not to conclude any agreement with other powers without the mutual consent of both, but she has concluded similar agreements with Persia and Afghanistan. Here, then, are three States in the Middle East which have formed a close alliance with Soviet Russia. Russia would seem to have fundamentally transformed the Tsarist policy towards Turkey and the Mahommedan East, which had as its main object the extension of Russian influence, by way of Constantinople, amongst the Arabic States and Egypt, and by way of Afghanistan to India. The main benefit which the Soviets derived from their new foreign policy was that it left Moscow free to take the lead undisturbed in the Far East. As early as 1924 the first agreement with Peking and Tchang-Tso-Lin was concluded by Joffe, and a year later Japan followed the example of China.

How great has been the value to the Soviets of their general relations with China was shown by the events of 1926 and 1927, when the Kuo-Ming-Tang and the National Army under Tchang-Kai-Shek began their crusade against English and Japanese influence in China. We see here the old wiles of Tsarist Russia, merely transferred from the Middle East to the Far East. True, Russia has not

secured control of the Dardanelles, but she was satisfied at seeing the Straits in the hands of a friendly power like Turkey, the International Straits Commission being of a purely formal character with little real influence, as was proved by the recent passage of two Russian battleships from the Baltic to the Black Sea. For the first time in her history, Turkey was able to say that Russia was her friend, despite the vain expectations of Western Europe that Soviet Russia would be forced to assume her old historical mission against Turkey as a means of preventing the greatly feared "intervention" in the Black Sea, it being hoped in case of such intervention it would be possible to secure Turkey's help in return for the grant of further territorial advantages in Transcaucasia. As far as Turkish foreign policy is concerned, the longer the Soviets remain in power the better, as Russian stability will permit her to concentrate on her internal reorganization, so that all attempts to detach her from Soviet Russia are bound to fail.

VIII

RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE

IN reviewing the relations of Turkey to the Western European Powers, we must not overlook the predominance of economic factors. The Turkish Government, in the development of its relations with the Western Powers, is primarily influenced by the necessity of realizing its economic and financial programme, and it was quite natural that the first serious approaches should have been made towards Germany. It was fortunate that at the moment of the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne Germany had emerged from the terrible period of currency inflation, the German mark having been stabilized, and it must be said to the credit of large German concerns that they responded generously to the Turkish invitation. The great German banks re-established their branches at Constantinople, and firms of contractors got energetically to work. Relations with Germany have developed very smoothly, as there has been no question of any suspicions with regard to the political aspirations of that country. Apart from Germany's activities in the economic field, the purely cultural relations of the two countries are significant. The pilgrimage of Turkish youth to Germany continues unabated, and the number of those who obtain

competing energetically with Germany. Italy's latest financial effort, a £5,000,000 loan to Turkey, has had a marked effect. Her ambitions are perfectly logical, for Italian industry regards the Near East as the only important market for its manufactures.

The Italian banks give substantial credits to the Italian merchants and contractors trading or operating concessions in Turkey. Several of the larger banks have branches in Constantinople—for instance, the Banca Commerciale Italiana of Milan has three branches in Stambul and several in the interior; the Banca Italo Orientale has a branch in the Bashiret Han, and the Banca di Roma has one at Sultan Hamam in Stambul. It has already been mentioned that the Turkish Admiralty ordered battleships from the Italian shipyards, to be delivered in 1931.

Italy is also making a great effort to compete with cultural influence of France in the Levant, and the Italian University on the Island of Rhodes (Rodi) was founded largely in anticipation of an influx of students from Turkey. Considerable reductions in fares and fees are granted to students from Turkey and the Middle East, and quite a number of young Turks go to Italy for their education, more especially for the purpose of studying agriculture, as the climate and the flora of Italy are similar to those of Asia Minor. On the other hand, the Turkish competition with the agricultural export trade of Italy gives the Italian Government an added reason

for wishing to exert some influence over the economic life of Turkey. The efforts of Italy, however, to obtain large tracts of land for Italian settlers in Anatolia have not been crowned with success, as the Turks fear that such immigration might lead to unwelcome interference in the internal affairs of the country. Nevertheless, political relations have considerably improved, and Mussolini has succeeded in inducing Greece to conclude a favourable treaty with Angora.

These circumstances may be responsible for the fact that since 1930 French finance has been doing its best to discredit the economic prospects of Turkey, in order to detach the country from the anti-French constellation of Italy, Greece, and Russia.

Relations between Angora and Paris were not unpromising at the time of Kemal's campaign against the Greeks. It was even rumoured that the journey of Franklin Bouillon had resulted in a favourable settlement of the disputes relating to the Turco-Syrian frontier and the railways, as well as to the supply of substantial quantities of munitions. In the industrial and commercial sphere French activity was inconsiderable, apart from the regular exports of goods of a kind special to France; and in the matter of financial commitments France has maintained an attitude of rigid reserve, regarding herself as one of Turkey's principal pre-war creditors. There is no reason to suppose that France's attitude

toward Turkey—which resembles her attitude toward Soviet Russia—will undergo any immediate or substantial change.

In considering Turkey's relations with England and the British Empire, we must remember that the present rulers of Turkey are still deeply under the influence of the war and period of occupation. They argue that England, in siding with Tsarist Russia, abandoned her secular policy of friendship with Turkey. Not only did she deprive the Turkish Empire of its vast Arabian territories, but in establishing Iraq as a separate mandated territory she determined the Mesopotamian frontier in a sense most unfavourable to Turkey. The Turks blame England as the main inspirer of the Treaty of Sèvres, which involved a mutilation of Turkish territory as great as that which Hungary suffered by the Treaty of Trianon.

But apart from the above charges, the Turks regard the assistance given by Great Britain to Venizelos and Greece as one of her worst offences. This anti-British feeling has had a very aggravating influence on the members of the Great National Assembly and the Turkish intelligentsia. In 1925 the first Kurdish rising was attributed entirely to English aspirations in Iraq, and the Kurdish troubles of 1930 have been also charged to the British account. In the face of this prejudice the friendly endeavours of Great Britain to convince the Turks of her good intentions are rejected with suspicion as being part

of a covert design to involve Turkey in action against Soviet Russia.

It is therefore no matter for surprise that in a political atmosphere thus overcharged with suspicion there was no chance of any considerable co-operation of British industry and finance in the work of economic reconstruction in Anatolia. Nevertheless, in spite of their Anglophobia, Turkish statesmen will before long find it necessary to frame a responsible policy of peaceful relations with the British Empire, since such a policy is just as important for the future of their country as their relations with the Russia of the future, which we shall discuss in a later chapter.

As regards the rest of Western Europe, the Turkish attitude towards the Scandinavian countries—especially Sweden—and to Holland and Belgium is favourable. Switzerland still enjoys a privileged position on account of her vast trading interests in Turkey; while a new and steadily increasing trade with Poland and Czechoslovakia is developing.

IX

THE CHRISTIAN MINORITIES

THE whole Anglo-Saxon world, both before and—more particularly—during the Great War, was dominated by the idea that the Turks were barbarians who were still continuing the policy of exterminating the Christian minorities of the former Ottoman Empire, and it was in this atmosphere that the Treaty of Sèvres was dictated. It is my honest opinion that no book on Turkey can claim serious attention which avoids the attempt to clear up this matter; the Turks themselves have long abandoned all hope of ever counteracting the poison of Armenian and Greek propaganda, more especially in the Anglo-Saxon world. Although England has for centuries been regarded as the staunch political supporter of Turkey, we may safely say that those who share the traditional Gladstonian view of the unspeakable Turk are undoubtedly in the majority. But even during the War, when Turkey was ranged on the side of Germany, she found it extremely difficult to satisfy German public opinion in respect of her alleged policy of the persecution of the Christian minorities.

In considering the Christian minorities in Turkey, we think immediately of the Armenians and the Greeks.

• From the times of the *Diadochs* Asia Minor was

thoroughly Hellenized, and throughout the Byzantine period Hellenism retained its many ancient strongholds in Asia. The Greek population of the Ottoman Empire, up to the time of the Great War, may safely be estimated at one and a half million. 100,000 Greeks were resident in Constantinople, and 400,000 in Smyrna and other parts of Western Anatolia. The remainder were distributed over the Black Sea coast, the interior of Anatolia, and other parts of the Empire.

Their cultural superiority to the Turks contributed largely to the privileged position of the Greeks in Turkey. The privileges which they enjoyed under the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople amounted to cultural autonomy in all matters of religion, education, and associations of a non-political character.

This autonomy is best illustrated by the Greek system of education. By the beginning of the Great War there were quite a number of grammar-schools in which the children of the more prosperous Greeks were educated, and whence the pupils could proceed to the Universities of Athens and other European cities, being admitted on the same terms as European students. The education of girls was also well provided for, and many young Greek women were trained as teachers. In ecclesiastical matters the Greeks enjoyed extraordinary privileges, and the Greek community liberally supported its churches, as the strongholds of Greek nationality.

Territorially the Greeks were distributed all over Asia Minor—not merely in the south-western parts, where in the towns they were actually the predominant race, but in other districts also, such as Pontus with 25,000 Greeks, Cappadocia with 40,000, Adalia with 30,000, and Mersina with 22,000, and in the eastern regions of the Ottoman Empire, including Mesopotamia, which numbered about 200,000 Greek inhabitants.

We must reflect that the Turks found it quite impossible to compete with the Greeks in their own country, as the Greeks had the privilege of a cultural tradition of fifteen centuries, and a unique capacity for economic activity. The Turks have always greatly resented this predominance of the Greeks, and they considered that the Greek Œcumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople was in reality not merely a spiritual authority, but that it enjoyed political privileges out of all proportion to its importance; nevertheless, good relations with the Patriarchate were maintained by the Sublime Porte both in the Hamidian and Young Turk period, on account of one curious circumstance. It is well known that the Emperor of Russia, in virtue of a self-assumed authority, regarded himself as the supreme head of the Russian Orthodox Church, more especially after the abolition of the Russian Patriarchate and its replacement by the Holy Synod; but for political reasons the Russian Tsars considered that it was their mission to assume the protection of all

Orthodox Christians of non-Russian nationality, particularly in the Ottoman Empire. In order to give some practical effect to this idea, a number of monasteries were founded in Jerusalem and on Mount Athos. In these monasteries, which were subject to the Greek Patriarchate of Jerusalem, the most unchristian disputes between the Russian and Greek clergy were matters of daily occurrence. The Greek Patriarchates of Constantinople and Jerusalem and the Greek clergy were quite unwilling to accept the patronage of Russia, more especially as the Russian Holy Synod had begun to finance the Arab Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch at Damascus, and had established a number of schools there.

It was this friction between the Greek Church and the Russians which temporarily forced the Sublime Porte to favour the Greeks as the politically weaker side.

In considering the problem of the Greek minority in pre-war Turkey, we must consider the Greeks from three main aspects: as the mainspring of Turkish commerce at home and abroad, as wealthy peasants and artists, and, last but not least, as officials.

Before the Balkan War the position of the Greeks in Turkey was so strong that the animosity of the Turkish rulers never went so far as massacre, as in the case of the Armenians. The first signs of alarm on the part of the Turks did not become apparent until after the successes of the Balkan Allies, when

it was only by chance that the Greeks failed to annex the southern portion of Thrace. But the animosity of the Turks toward the Greeks was not fully demonstrated until the last year of the Great War, when it was openly announced that the Greek aspirations in Asia Minor had received the wholehearted support of the Allies. One of the main reasons for Greece's hesitation to side with the Allies was not the romantic tenderness of King Constantine for his brother-in-law, Kaiser Wilhelm, but the fact that the Greek leaders were afraid of bringing upon their kinsmen in Asia Minor the same fate as had befallen the Armenians. It was the influential Greek merchants of Smyrna who stood behind King Constantine. But Venizelos, with a Cretan Greek's hatred of the Turks, feared that any delay in siding with the Allies might deprive Greece of the realization of his own megalomaniac aspirations in respect of Anatolia.

In view of the very insignificant military support rendered by the Greeks to the Allies during the war, it is astonishing that they should have received such generous consideration in the Treaty of Sèvres. Originally the Greek demands even went so far as to claim independence not only for the Smyrna area of about 120,000 square kilometres, but also for the Trebizond Vilayet, which they proposed to rename the Pontic Republic. But this later project was abandoned on account of the isolated position of Pontus.

Even those concessions to Venizelos which were made by the Treaty of Sèvres were bound to make for disaster. We need only recall the headlong flight of the Greek divisions under the French General Anselme before the Bolsheviks in the Odessa district, whither they had gone to support the Allied landing.

It must be admitted to the credit of the Turks that in spite of the Greek aspirations, whose realization would have meant nothing less than the isolation of the Turks from the Mediterranean, they did not take any steps against the Anatolian Greeks until the actual landing of the Greek troops in Smyrna on May 15, 1919.

From that moment the national feeling of the Turks ran high, and the Greeks of Asia Minor were well aware that in the event of the failure of the Greek plans their last hour had come, and they would share the fate of Armenians. The Greeks had no just cause for accusing the Kemalists, nor could they deny that they had overtaxed the tolerance of the Turks; at the same time, it may be asserted that outside Smyrna and Stambul the bulk of the Anatolian Greeks were not in favour of a policy so unjustified as that pursued by Venizelos and his political supporters. The heavy defeat of the Greeks on the banks of the River Sakaria sealed for ever the fate of the Anatolian Greeks, and a race which from the days of Alexander the Great down to the Lausanne Conference had played so dominant a

part in Asia Minor had to abandon that country and seek shelter as refugees in Greece proper, where, in their hurriedly constructed barracks, they are now mournfully dreaming of the land that once gave them prosperity as the fruit of centuries of effort and economic penetration.

We must now speak of the most tragic fate that has ever befallen a race in modern times: the destruction of the Armenians.

And here we must be excused for reviewing at some length a matter which is regarded throughout the civilized world, and especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, as the blackest spot in the recent history of Turkey.

The tragedy of Armenia is due to her most unfortunate geographical position, at the cross-roads of all the invaders of Anatolia. From the time of the Romans contending armies have fought for its possession. The Arab invasion led to the destruction of the last semblance of an independent kingdom, and the hordes of Timur completed the process. The Seldjuks and Osmanlis contributed further towards the subjugation of the country, and even after the subsequent revival of Byzantium the Armenians did not succeed in recovering their independence. At the time of the capture of Byzantium, and during the flourishing period of the Ottoman Empire, Armenia was merely a geographical expression, and not a political entity. When the Armenians were divided between Russia and Turkey by the Treaty

of Turkmentchai (concluded between Russia and Persia in 1828), Russia obtained a portion of Armenia which was notable mainly for the inclusion of the ecclesiastical centre of the Armenian Catholicos at Edjmiadzin, and from that time down to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Armenian problem was mainly a question of Russian expansion at the expense of Turkey. By the Treaty of Adrianople, 1829, Russia received the older portion of the Kingdom of Georgia, Akhalsikh and Akhalkalaki, and in the latter region General Pashkievitch settled some 30,000 Armenian refugees from Turkey, permitting an equal number of Armenians from Turkey to emigrate to the north of the Caucasus, to the town of Rostov-on-Don and the Astrakhan region, a considerable number having also been settled in the Crimean Peninsula.

Since the Patriarchate of the Armenian Church at Edjmiadzin was under Russian protection, it assumed the supreme spiritual and political control of the Armenians, not only in Turkey but throughout the world. Colonies of Armenian emigrants from Turkey may be found to this day in the following countries: Syria, Egypt, Greece (Salonika), Bulgaria, Roumania, Poland (the Mehitarist Catholics in Lvov), France, England, and above all in the Northern States of the United States of America.

The bulk of the Armenian population in Turkey was concentrated in the following five vilayets: Erzerum, Bitlis, Van, Mamuretulaziz and Diarbekir, where nearly two-thirds of the entire Armenian

population of Turkey (that is, of a total of 1,800,000) existed before the war. Like the Greeks, they played a prominent part in the world of commerce, and one might say that while the Greeks had the monopoly of Turkey's foreign commerce, the Armenians had the monopoly of the home trade. By this division of labour, so to speak, two dangerous competitors avoided a collision of interests, though certain Armenian firms had important business interests in Constantinople and Smyrna.

The first and somewhat disquieting attempt to put the Armenian problem on an international basis was made at the Berlin Congress of 1878. Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin contained a clause by which Turkey undertook to carry out necessary reforms as a first approach towards granting autonomy to the Armenian minorities. But no serious attempt was made by Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid to fulfil this stipulation of the Berlin Treaty. On the contrary, in 1891 a massacre occurred at Sassoon in Anatolia, in which the celebrated Kurdish cavalry played a prominent part. It should be pointed out that the whole trouble concerning the Armenians in Turkey was really due to their unfortunate relation with the Kurdish population. The Kurds, being mainly nomads, lived largely by plundering the Armenian cultivators, and Abd-ul-Hamid was prompt to seize this opportunity of arming the Kurds and using them against the Armenians.

In 1895 terrible massacres of Armenians occurred

at Trebizond, Edessa and Biredjik. These impelled the Great Powers to press for reforms. On this occasion Germany joined in the protest, and on October 17, 1895, the Sublime Porte agreed to carry out the needful reforms; nevertheless, in 1896 massacres occurred at Kharput and Van, and there was no sign of any reforms having been instituted.

One of the causes of these deplorable massacres may be found in the activities of the Armenian revolutionary party of *Dashnaktsutyun*, officially founded in 1897, but actually in existence before that date. Numbers of Armenian volunteers were armed, and they assumed a provocatively hostile attitude, thus further aggravating the precarious position of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. The Turks had not forgotten the Russian occupation of Erzerum in 1877. On this occasion Armenian volunteers had fought on the Russian side. Russia, of course, was mainly prompted by the idea of seizing Erzerum, with its commanding strategical position in Eastern Anatolia, and it is very doubtful whether, in the event of success, the Russians would have given any real autonomy to the Armenians.

Dashnaktsutyun had its propagandist centre at Geneva in Switzerland, working in close contact with those of the Young Turks who were living in exile abroad, and also with the Russian revolutionaries, while the fighting headquarters in Transcaucasia profited by the tolerance if not the secret protection of the Russian authorities

Towards the close of the nineteenth century, when Prince Golitzin was Governor-General of the Caucasus, the Russian authorities attempted to suppress the activities of *Dashnaktsutyun*, and several hundreds of the Armenian Church schools were closed, and the Armenian Church funds expropriated. But this personal policy of Golitzin's was promptly reversed on the appointment of Count Vorontzoff-Dashkoff as Viceroy of Caucasia in 1903. The Church Funds were restored and the schools reopened; and *Dashnaktsutyun* continued to supply the Armenian volunteers in Turkey with arms.

With the advent of the Young Turks to power, the Armenian hopes of autonomy revived, but the massacres of Adana in April 1909 showed that Talaat and Enver were continuing the Hamidian policy in respect of the Armenians. During the Balkan War and the later negotiations in London an Armenian delegation under Nubar Pasha arrived in London to plead for a free Armenia, but no positive results were achieved. It was only after Germany had sent a strong military mission to Turkey that Russia took the initiative of pressing for reforms. A convention was signed by the Sublime Porte on February 8, 1914, which provided for a system of foreign inspection in Turkish Armenia, on similar lines to that introduced in Macedonia previous to the Balkan War. Two general inspectors were appointed, a Dutchman, Westerneck, and a Norwegian, Hof. These plans also failed to materialize,

and merely strengthened the intention of Talaat and Enver to side with Germany.

Upon the outbreak of war, and after Turkey's intervention on the side of the Central Powers on November 1, 1914, Russia permitted the Armenians in Transcaucasia to organize a volunteer force, whose military value was insignificant, though their presence in the Russian Army invading Turkey led to a series of terrible massacres of the Moslem populations of the conquered provinces in Eastern Anatolia. The defeated and retiring Turkish Army, together with the fleeing Anatolian inhabitants, then took their revenge upon the Armenians. Many Armenian villages and suburbs were suddenly attacked and burned. Men, women and even children were either killed or deported. It is difficult to state with any pretence at accuracy the exact number of those who perished. But there is no doubt that the majority of the victims were among those who were deported in the direction of the Syrian and Mesopotamian deserts, and who perished on the journey across the southern mountain ranges of Anatolia.

While no real friend of Turkey could attempt to excuse such atrocities, it must be admitted that in the struggle for her national existence on every front the Turks had become exasperated, and that their victimization of the Armenians was indirectly one of the tragic consequences of Russian imperialism.

From that time up to the date of the Lausanne Conference the Armenians were in a tragic situation.

The tragedy of the early days of the war ought to have been a sufficient warning to the Armenian leaders in Russia and Western Europe, as well as in the United States of America. It ought to have checked them in their conception of extravagant plans as to the restoration of the historical Armenia. But unfortunately for this unhappy race, its leaders did not learn their lesson, and the Treaty of Sèvres sealed the fate of the remnant of the Armenian people. One must realize that the Treaty of Sèvres, by granting the Greek and Armenian claims, had actually reduced the Turks to the position of the Hungarians after the Trianon Treaty. One cannot wonder that the Turks became further exasperated, for at the time of the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres Russia had not only been defeated, but had completely withdrawn from the occupied provinces of Turkey and also from Transcaucasia. There is no excuse for alleging that the Armenian claims were pressed by Russia. The maintenance of these dubious claims was therefore a most capricious move on the part of the authors of the Treaty. The surviving Armenians have now found a home in the small Armenian Republic in Transcaucasia, to the north-east of Mount Ararat. This State forms a component part of the Transcaucasian Federation, together with Georgia and Azerbaidjan, all three being federal units of the U.S.S.R., the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

The Treaty of Lausanne led to the disappearance

of the last Armenians from Asia Minor, and to-day Turkey's rulers declare that there is no Armenian problem so far as Turkey is concerned.

It is an instance of the irony of history that those Christian minorities, both Armenians and Greeks, who for centuries enjoyed the protection of the Great Powers by virtue of their Christianity should have been expelled from Turkey at the very moment when Kemal and his followers were signing the death-warrant of the Pan-Islamic idea, and had forever abolished the theocratic state of the Osmanlis. It is not a little significant that the pressure of the Greek and Armenian national aspirations should have ended by teaching the Turks themselves the power of true national feeling.

The world at large looked on quite apathetically at the migration of populations in Central and South-Eastern Europe after the settlement of the new frontiers. We have but to remember the treatment of the Hungarians and Germans inhabiting territories comprised within the new post-war States. The Turks, however, had so many enemies in the world that what was overlooked in the case of other countries has been unduly magnified in the case of the minorities in Asia Minor.

These things are now past history, but their effects are still felt by the Turks, especially in their relations with the Anglo-Saxon countries. The extensive propaganda conducted by the Armenians has had its effect in creating a feeling of aversion

towards the Turks. Years of reconstruction and cultural regeneration will be necessary before Turkey will be able to assume her proper place in the family of nations. It is this untoward fate which explains the almost sacred regard which the Turks feel for the French poet, Pierre Loti, who *malgré tout* has remained their best friend in Europe; the erection of his statue on the Bosphorus is an eloquent testimony of the gratitude which Turkey feels toward those who were not afraid to stand up for her in evil times, when such championship called for a profound strength of conviction in the face of the prevailing popular opinion.

X

TÜRKISH RELATIONS WITH THE BALKAN STATES

THE Balkans, which are generally considered to have furnished the immediate cause of the Great War, were of course always a thorn in the flesh of the Ottoman Sultans. It would have been far safer for the Turkish Empire to have retired from the Balkans altogether from the very moment when it was forced to abandon Hungary. The struggle to retain dominion over the Balkan peoples absorbed the entire strength of the Anatolian Turks from the time of the liberation of Greece in 1829 down to the conclusion of the second Balkan War of 1913, which left Turkey in the possession only of the tomb of Sultan Selim at Adrianople and the badly shaken defence lines of Tchataldja.

Mustapha Kemal, in his famous memorial speech before the National Party Congress of October 15-20, 1927, a speech which took thirty-six hours to deliver, categorically condemned imperialism as suicidal for Turkey, since the history of empires tells us that only when the mainland has been consolidated is there any lasting possibility of imperialistic expansion. It would have been strange indeed had the Ottoman Empire, based as it was upon Anatolia, with its primitive conditions of life,

succeeded in permanently retaining so vast an area as the Balkan Peninsula, inhabited by Christian races superior to the Turks in culture and civilization. The enormous task of repressing Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Roumania, as well as Mahomedanized Albania, exhausted the resources of the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century.

Russia, inspired not only by the desire for territorial expansion and the control of the Dardanelles, but also by the spiritual ideal of liberating the Christian races of the Balkans, found it easy to deal the Ottoman Empire a series of staggering blows. If the other Great Powers—for example, Great Britain and France—offered a certain resistance to the Russian advance on the Balkans, this was due not to the fact that they were in any way hostile to the liberation of the Balkan peoples, but solely to their determination to prevent Russia from capturing Constantinople and the Straits.

A staunch belief in their mission as protectors of all Orthodox Christians enabled the Russians to conduct a sort of crusade against the Turks throughout the whole of the nineteenth century, and this crusade resulted in the liberation of Greece, Serbia, Roumania and Bulgaria. Hand in hand with this movement, Moscow was enabled, by the conquest of Caucasia, to threaten Turkey from the Asiatic side.

Thus Turkey and the Balkans became the constant subject of discussion in all the foreign chancelleries of the Great Powers, under the general

heading of "the Eastern Question." Not only England and France, but Austria and Germany also were obliged to take part in the general congresses for the settlement of the fate of the Balkans, as, for example, at the Berlin Congress of 1878.

Needless to say, the sympathies of the whole of Christendom were on the side of the Balkan peoples; we have only to recall the inspiring example of such a sacrifice as that of Lord Byron for the liberation of the nation which humanist Europe regarded as the legitimate heir of the classical Hellenic culture. And we must not forget the personal visit of Mr. Gladstone to Greece, which led to the cession of the Ionian Islands to Greece by Great Britain.

In the struggle to maintain her position in the Balkans the Ottoman Empire received no moral support from any of the Christian Powers of Europe. It was not without reason that Lord Rosebery coined the famous phrase as to England "having backed the wrong horse."

Russia, in the second half of the nineteenth century, became the Mecca of the Serbian and Bulgarian intellectuals, who were accepted as students at the military and other schools, and were given the caressing title of *Bratushkis* (little brothers). It was in no vain imperial cause that 80,000 Russian soldiers fell on the heights of Plevna in overcoming the gallant defence of Osman Pasha.

The liberation of Macedonia might have been accomplished long before 1912-13 had not the

Balkan peoples hated one another more than they loved their independence; but coming as it did so short a time before the Great War, the Balkan War precipitated the downfall of Turkey as an Empire.

The moral prestige of the Committee of Union and Progress was destroyed as a result of the victories of the Balkan States, which involved the final liquidation of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, and the fulfilment of Gladstone's ideal of throwing Turkey "bag and baggage out of Europe."

In reviewing the relations of the respective Balkan countries towards Turkey, we may fitly start with Bulgaria. This State, which had borne the brunt of battle in the Balkan wars, had not only to abandon all her conquests, but was compelled to surrender to Roumania an important area of her integral territory in the Dobrudja. It is therefore not surprising that on the outbreak of the Great War Bulgaria, after some hesitation, sided with the Central Powers, and thus opened a line of communications for military supplies from Germany and Austria to Turkey, which were especially needed for the defence of the Dardanelles. It is idle to ascribe Bulgaria's entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers purely to the machinations of the Tsar Ferdinand. The Bulgarian nation was influenced in its foreign policy primarily by its hostility to its rivals in the Balkans—Roumania, Serbia and Greece—and the mere fact that Bulgarian troops had to fight beside the Austrians and

Germans against the Serbians and Roumanians gave much satisfaction in Sofia. In spite of the strenuous efforts of the German and Austro-Hungarian high commands, it proved impossible to induce the Bulgarians to move against Russia, which country they still regarded as their liberator from the hated rule of the Turks. But it is no exaggeration to say that Bulgaria, a small country with limited resources, was reduced by her three years' participation in the Great War to a state of utter desperation.

At present the relations between Turkey and Bulgaria are cordial, and Bulgaria still dreams of joining her former allies in order to regain her old position. That Italy, in her expansion towards the Balkans, has been able to achieve so close an *entente* with Bulgaria is merely a proof of the latter country's still smouldering hatred of Serbia.

Angora's present relations with Greece may fairly be described as correct, since the expulsion of the Greek population from Asia Minor has entirely removed all causes of friction, with the exception of the question of a few islands in the Ægean Sea. There is something strangely ironical in the recent visit of Venizelos to Angora when one considers that he was the very man who tried to deliver the death-blow to Turkey. Hundreds and thousands of Greek refugees from Anatolia, now living in congested and hurriedly-built shelters, gaze sadly towards the plains of Anatolia, where lie their old homes which they have had to abandon for ever.

But the fact remains that the two countries, being next-door neighbours in Thrace, have been compelled to come to some kind of understanding; but Bulgaria's ambition to recover her old outlets to the Ægean at Dedeagatch and Cavalla still gives cause for much uneasiness.

Serbia, thanks to her territorial isolation from Turkey, does not come into the picture. A million Bosniaks who formerly owed allegiance to the Khalifate are now unsupported against the Croats in their struggle for the preservation of their religious autonomy.

Albania, two-thirds of whose population are of the Islamic faith, and which during centuries of Turkish rule supplied the Sultans with some of their most gallant soldiers and most eminent statesmen, now maintains only a sentimental connection with Angora. Albania, of course, is in no position to act independently as long as she has reason to fear the territorial ambitions of her Greek and Serbian neighbours, to say nothing of the establishment of a semi-protectorate by Italy under the auspices of King Zoghu.

The question of Turkey's relations with Roumania is more complex. Roumania is interested in the fate of the Dardanelles to a greater extent than any other Balkan State, but unfortunately the strained relations between Roumania and Russia, whose claims to Bessarabia have not yet been abandoned, make it imperative for the Kemalist Turks to main-

tain an attitude of strict neutrality toward Bukharest, and until diplomatic relations between Soviet Russia and Roumania are restored Turkey will assuredly refrain from making any move towards closer friendship with the latter country.

XI

THE FUTURE RELATIONS OF TURKEY AND RUSSIA

THE most difficult problem of our generation is the prediction of Russia's future. It is a singular fact that although Russia includes one-sixth of the territorial area of the globe, and contains a population of about 150 millions, and has played a prominent part, during the last seventy or eighty years, in shaping the destiny of Europe and Asia, Western Europe as a whole is just as ignorant of her as in the days of Ivan the Terrible. The one Russian product known and admired throughout the world is Russian literature; few writers' names are more universally familiar than those of Tolstoy and Dostoievski; and of recent years Russian music and Pavlova's divine art of dancing have contributed towards enhancing the popularity of Russian art. But Western Europe knew little or nothing of the history of three centuries of the Romanoff dynasty, while before the Japanese War the military power of Russia was believed to be enormous, and was universally feared.

But in the course of a century of steady consolidation, during which vast tracts of the Central Asian deserts were added to the Siberian possessions of the Tsar, Russia had become a Eurasian Empire.

The possession of Siberia and Manchuria advanced her frontiers to the shores of the Pacific, while her victories over Turkey gave her the mastery of the Black Sea.

One thing above all strikes the observer who considers the geographical position of Russia: namely, the absence of access to the open highways of the ocean, and the fact that Russia remained a landlocked empire. None of her outlets—through the Baltic, the White Sea or the Black Sea—gives free and direct access to the ocean.

As the northern coasts of Russia lie behind a barrier of Arctic ice and mist, the main efforts of Tsarist Russia were always directed towards securing an outlet in Norwegian Lapland (perhaps not without a sidelong glance at the iron deposits of Northern Sweden), in addition to gaining an outlet from the Black Sea through the Dardanelles. In the name of Balkan liberation Russia strove against Turkey throughout the nineteenth century for the control of the Bosphorus. After the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway, Russia's policy adopted a new orientation: she leased the three provinces of Manchuria, and having thus shortened and secured her line of communication by rail with Vladivostock, she was further enabled to enjoy the use of Dairen as an ice-free harbour on the Sea of Nippon.

But the Japanese victories of 1904 once more turned the tables, depriving Russia of Southern Manchuria. It was then that Russia revived her old

Balkan policy—and in this perhaps we should see one of the principal causes of the Great War.

On the other hand, the Bolshevik leaders, once they were in power in the Kremlin, succeeded, by their victorious campaigns against Denikin and Koltchak, in reintegrating the former Russo-Eurasian Empire within its old frontiers, except for substantial tracts of territory extending from the Gulf of Finland to Bessarabia. And these losses were mainly responsible for Russia's fresh concentration of her efforts upon the Near as well as the Far East. The programme of expansion remains as of old; only the methods have changed.

The Soviet Government, however, suffers from the duplicity of its politics. On the one hand, it adheres to the doctrine of international revolution; on the other hand, economic factors compel it to conduct its foreign policy on purely national lines. This Janus's head of Russian policy means the unabated continuance of a new feature of foreign policy, unknown to the old Russia: the championship of movements for the liberation of the Asiatic masses from the European imperial powers.

Russia's participation in the Chinese nationalist movement has been very detrimental to the interests both of the European Powers and of the United States; and as is well known, the Soviets have been instrumental in fanning the flame of revolt in British India and the Dutch East Indies. In Afghanistan and Persia the Soviet Government has succeeded in

gaining a position of considerable influence. It is illusory to seek to obtain from the Bolsheviki guarantees of abstention from the conduct of hostile propaganda. Even a country like Germany, which has made many concessions to the Soviets, finds herself, eight years after the Rapallo Agreement, the victim of a well-organized system for undermining her social foundations.

While the world at large was ill enough informed as to conditions in Russia during the Tsarist period, when there was every facility for obtaining information, it must be admitted that information concerning present-day Russia is even more obscure. The whole country is hermetically isolated from the rest of the world, and the majority of the foreigners who seek to obtain reliable information are handicapped in every possible way. Hence it comes about that the opinions held as to the probable duration of the Soviet system are so varied and inconsistent.

Those engaged in commerce with Moscow try to persuade themselves of the possibility of an evolutionary development of the country; but these people are merely a small group of European capitalists, who are trying by all means to secure reasonable openings for business and investment in Russia. Public opinion at large is utterly misinformed. There can be no correct prophecy as to Russia's future that does not base its calculations on the social history of Russia in the nineteenth century.

In this connection there are three main factors to be considered:

The first factor is the subordination of everything else to the agrarian question. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century the Russian revolutionaries were trying to persuade the peasants that they could obtain possession of the land for which they vainly longed only by overthrowing the Tsarist Government, and with it the landowners. But actually the guns of the German armies under Hindenburg, having worn down the Russian resistance after three years of war, automatically prepared the way for the overthrow of the Government, and for an overthrow more radical than even the most enthusiastic revolutionaries could have anticipated. The Kerenski Government failed to solve the vital problem of the land by reason of its preoccupation with the conduct of the war, so that Lenin and his immediate followers had little difficulty, with the backing of the defeated millions of the peasant army, in overthrowing it, and establishing the communist system. But in the early days of Soviet rule, and especially in the years 1919 and 1920, when they had to fight Denikin and Koltchak, the Bolsheviks left the peasants to themselves, and the expropriation of the estates of the great landowners and the crown lands was carried out by the peasants independently, on the principle that "might is right." It was therefore natural that the cleverest and most robust of the peasants should secure the best portions of land. This led to the

creation of a special class of peasants, numbering 16 millions, whom the Bolsheviks termed the Kulaks (rich peasants).

The main concern of the Communists at the time was to organize the Tcheka (now the G.P.U.) and the Red Army, which was recruited mainly from the industrial workers; and it was in the name of the latter that the dictatorship was exercised. Even Lenin did not find time to tackle the land problem, and the struggle that ensued after his death between Stalin-Dzhugashvili and Trotski-Bronstein was due chiefly to divergent opinions as to the proper settlement of the agrarian question. Stalin's gigantic programme for the collectivization of the land has led to the wholesale expropriation of the peasants, and now that the whole of the land is regarded as State property the peasants are forced to work under very unfavourable conditions. The sixteen million Kulaks have been outlawed and deported to the northern regions of Russia and Siberia as slave labourers.

It is, we may safely assume, over this very reform that the present policy of the Soviets will one day break down, so strong is the individualistic instinct amongst the Russian peasants, even though they have never yet tasted fully of the blessings of private property. The Russian peasant dreams day and night of title-deeds to his small holding, duly stamped with Government stamps, so that he and his fellows may know what they are working for. It is difficult to guess whether or how or when

things will come to a climax, but the atmosphere is overcharged, as the millions of the Russian peasantry are now feeling the pinch of hunger, which renders them deaf to all promises of a future socialistic paradise.

In evolving their vast plan of industrialization, the so-called *Piatiletka* (Five Years' Plan), the Soviets are thinking mainly of satisfying the peasants by the mass production of agricultural machinery and implements, as well as of articles of first necessity, such as clothing, shoes, etc. Even here the experts differ, for some consider it impossible that Russia, in her primitive condition, even though she obtains machinery and plant from the outer world, should ever be able to produce goods as cheap and of as good quality as the products of the industrial countries of Europe and America, which are now suffering from over-production and engaged in a struggle for markets.

This vast plan of industrialization has provoked a financial crisis of unprecedented magnitude, which has led to a rapid depreciation of the Tchervonetz currency, and to the notorious dumping of Russian exports. Every conceivable article is to-day being exported from Russia—not merely such staple exports as grain, flax, skins, timber, ores, etc., but also such minor exports as preserved fish and vegetables, produced at a very high cost, fruits, eggs, poultry and, last but not least, the treasures of various museums, consisting of valuable pictures,

tapestries, sacred ikons, etc. Never in her history has Russia pushed her export trade as she is doing now. That under such conditions the purchasing power of Russian currency should have been reduced to zero is only natural, and the population at large is suffering great privations, being unable to obtain elementary necessities, including even food. From every European country, indeed, thousands of parcels of foodstuffs are being posted to Russia, by persons anxious to save their relatives from starvation.

The second problem which the revolution has left unsolved is the non-existence of civic liberties, such as freedom of speech and the right of persons arrested to release by the courts on bail.

There are those who declare that the Russian peasants do not require these luxuries, but it is ingenious to suppose that the Russian peasant is a being devoid of natural wants and desires, although some of these may hitherto have remained more or less latent.

The third problem of importance, and one which the Bolsheviks tackled in their own fashion from the very outset, is that of religion of whatever denomination. They declare that "religion is the opium of the people," but if the Russian population ever felt the need of resorting to opium in order to obtain some relief, it must have been during the thirteen years of Bolshevism, and every attempt to suppress religion merely increases the force of its appeal.

One is reminded of the experience that early Christianity had to face in the days of Nero. Russia is actually passing through a religious revival, and when a change comes it is highly probable that despite all these years of suffering the Russian masses will still be fanatical in their religious persuasions.

The only means by which Russian statesmen can hope to save Russia as a unit is to revive the national spirit and outlook in the minds of the people, and, rightly or wrongly, to create new ideals on purely imperialist lines, since the existing philosophy of the State has already lost its proselytizing power.

These observations are preliminary to the suggestion that there is a possibility of the emergence of a new National Russia. We will endeavour to estimate the probable attitude of this new Russia towards Turkey and the countries of the Middle East.

Most observers are agreed that Russia's foreign policy, even after the present regime has been replaced, will be bound to follow the same general lines as the old Tsarist policy. There are even some grounds for asserting that in certain directions the Bolsheviks have already surpassed the achievements of the Tsarist Government. Let us therefore seek to analyse the aims of Russia in the Middle East as they are likely to affect Turkey.

Two regions in the Middle East are of vital importance to Russia: Transcaucasia and Turkestan. The future of these territories will largely determine the

attitude of Moscow and her relations to Turkey in the Transcaucasian region, a geographical area of supreme importance as the bridge between Europe and Asia. Here the three Republics of Georgia, Azerbaidjan and Armenia were proclaimed in 1918, Georgia and Armenia being recognized by the Western Powers, including Germany. After the defeat of Denikin and Koltchak these three States were annexed to the U.S.S.R., and they are now federal members of the Soviet Union. The attitude of the Armenians, and the existence of the extraordinarily rich oilfields of Baku, make it inevitable that these three republics should remain in close union with the Russian nation, whatever political form the latter may assume.

The Russians have an exaggerated dread of Turkish aspirations in Azerbaidjan, the bulk of whose population is of Turkish race and Moslem faith. They fear that Turkey may be prompted, especially after a Kurdish rising, to lay hands on Persian Azerbaidjan, which contains two million inhabitants of Turkish race, and will thereby come into territorial contact with Caucasian Azerbaidjan.

In respect of Turkestan the position of Russia is much more favourable, especially since the opening of the new Turk-Sib railway, which connects the country with the Trans-Siberian line. Turkestan, populated largely by Turkish-speaking races, is regarded as part of the original home of the Turkish race. But even before the war settlements of

Russian peasants had been established in Turkestan, and the penetration of the country has proceeded more rapidly under the Soviets. The Russians fear that the Turkish aspirations in these regions may extend as far as Afghanistan. Russia, be it noted, contains at least 18 million inhabitants of Turkish race; that is, a larger population than that of Anatolian Turkey.

Although Kemalist Turkey, far from showing any sign of interest in Turkestan, has recently been expelling immigrants from Azerbaidjan and Turkestan, Russians of all parties, and not merely the Bolsheviks, remain obsessed by their distrust of Turkey's aspirations.

There seems reason to believe that this question will lead to an estrangement between the new National Russia and Turkey, for Russia is bound to reinforce her military position in the Caucasus and around the Caspian. In her future developments Russia, as a vast industrialized country, will consider those regions not merely from their political aspect, but mainly as sources of raw materials for her industries, such as petroleum, copper, manganese ores, cotton and other subtropical products. We may regard it as certain that Russia will not be content to stop until she has brought Persia, or at all events the northern regions of that country, into close dependence upon Moscow. During the Great War the Russian imperialists were fully resolved, in the event of victory, to annex Northern Persia, which

Turkey on a purely national basis. The famous society known as "Turk Odjaghy" was organized, numbering among its members all the intellectual leaders of the nation, but the outbreak of the Great War prevented its further development. The Russian Foreign Office and the Embassy at Constantinople were prompt to scent the danger to the security of the Russian Empire, and their suspicions became intensified when during the Balkan War large sums of money for the Red Crescent were collected amongst the Russian Mahommedans, it being apparent that the sympathies of these twenty millions of Moslems were on the side of Turkey during the Great War.

It thus came about that the Imperial Russian Government regarded all its Moslem subjects as suspect. Since the two centuries of Tartar domination, which left such profound traces upon Russian life, the Moslem problem has been the subject of special consideration. There are two main branches of the Moslem peoples in Russia. The purely Tartar remnants of the once ruling race have been concentrated in the region of the Ural mountains, in the province of Kazan, and on the left bank of the River Volga, including the province of Orenburg, down to Astrakhan on the Caspian. Isolated colonies of Tartars are found also in Western Siberia as far east as Lake Baikal. Turkestan proper, on the other hand, is populated by various peoples of Turkish stock, the most prominent being the Kirghiz and

the Usbeks. About 2,000,000 people of Turkish stock live in Eastern Transcaucasia, in the so-called Azerbaidjan Republic. Before the war the Turco-Tartars of the Russian Empire numbered about twenty millions, all of whom were included under the general heading of Mahommedans. Even in the Russian Duma there were representatives of a so-called Mussulman Party, consisting mostly of Kazan Tartar merchants and clergy.

For both official and general purposes, the Moslem community was divided into the Sunni and the Shia denominations, the latter being only found in Caucasian Azerbaidjan, each denomination being subject to a special ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The Russian Mahommedans were staunch adherents of the Ottoman Khalifate, and prominent among the pilgrims to the Holy Places of Arabia. Politically, they enjoyed equal rights with the rest of the population of the Empire; they were excluded only from military service, the Russian soldier being officially regarded as a "Christ-loving Orthodox warrior." But this exemption can hardly be regarded as detrimental; it was rather a privilege. With the advent of the Pan-Turkish ideals, however, the Moslem question, as far as the Russian Government was concerned, lost its purely religious aspect, and thenceforth the danger to the Empire became emphasized. After the collapse of Tsarist Russia, and the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Turkish frontier and the whole of Transcaucasia on

May 28, 1918, the Republic of Azerbaidjan was proclaimed. Previous to this the region of Baku had been occupied by Ottoman troops under Nuri Pasha. This was the first Turkish attempt to detach a Mahomedan unit from the Russian Empire, and, incidentally, Azerbaidjan was the first republic in the whole Islamic world to introduce female suffrage. The attempts of Enver Pasha to establish the independence of the States of Turkestan failed, firstly on account of the White Russian opposition, and subsequently owing to the Bolshevik invasion and domination of the whole of Turkestan. From this time forward both the Red and the White Russians began to exhibit hostility toward the aspirations of the Turco-Tartars. Although Azerbaidjan and Turkestan are nominally autonomous, federal states within the U.S.S.R. constant efforts are made by the Red rulers of Moscow to Russianize both republics, reducing them to a purely theoretical existence. This policy of the Soviets meets with the complete approval of the Russian *émigré* circles. A book on the "Pan-Turanian Peril," published in Paris by an Armenian, M. Sarevand, and prefaced by the former Dragoman of the Imperial Russian Embassy at Constantinople, M. Mandelstam, evoked considerable feeling not only among the Russian nationalists of the "*Vozrozhdenia*" ("Rebirth") organization, but also among such politicians as MM. Miljukoff and Kerenski, all of whom are agreed that the Russia of the future should take very

strong measures to forestall any separatist movement on the part of the Turkish peoples of the Caucasus and Turkestan, by colonizing these regions with Russian peasants. Some even go so far as to declare that since Turkish Anatolia is very sparsely populated, it would perhaps be best to compel these peoples to migrate into Anatolia. The expulsion of the Greeks and Armenians from Turkey after the Treaty of Lausanne is cited in justification of the action proposed.

But the alleged "peril" is undoubtedly exaggerated, and this exaggeration is very liable to lead to premature conflict, not only with the peoples concerned, but even, in the future, with Turkey. As a matter of fact, there are no grounds for suspecting Kemalist Turkey of any adventurous plans. On the contrary, greatly to the credit of their administration, the Kemalists have set their minds exclusively upon the reconstruction of Anatolia, and their aims are perfectly pacific. But unfortunately for Turkey, the natural ambitions of Azerbaidjan and Turkestan, which have recently become conscious of their racial affinity with the Turks, do afford Russia a welcome and plausible pretext for accusing Turkey of the Pan-Turkism and Pan-Turanianism which are so greatly dreaded. It is argued by many politicians that Russia will for some time be confronted by tasks of internal reconstruction of such an exacting nature as to divert her mind effectively from any sort of imperialistic policy. Those who cherish such

illusions know little of Russian history and the Russian character. We must not forget that one half of European Russia consists of forests or of barren steppe. The poverty of the fifty million Great Russians who constitute the bulk of its population fosters in them a profound longing for a southern paradise on the rich plains of the Ukraine, or even in Caucasia or Turkestan. Russia, fortunately for herself, is a continental Empire; it is therefore easy for her to extend her communications and control over these vast territories by the construction of an ever-growing network of railways. She possesses no oversea colonies, which would require a large navy and an enormous expenditure for the purposes of maritime defence. No internal reconstruction will induce Russia to relinquish her pressure towards the South. We may see how, even at the present time, the Soviets have been able to reduce Persia to a considerable measure of dependence by forcing her to institute a trade monopoly on Soviet lines. A nationalist Russia would be under no inducement to follow any other policy, since the inherent weakness of Persia and the vastness of its territory simply invite trouble, and we firmly believe that in the very near future Russia, Turkey and England will be engaged in settling the fate of Persia. A further reference to this subject will be made in the next chapter (XII).

Eastern Caucasia, Northern Persia and Turkestan may, as we have seen, prove very disturbing factors

as regards the future relations of Russia and Turkey. The aspect of affairs is entirely changed when we come to consider the Black Sea and the Dardanelles.

There can be no doubt that sooner or later Russia will at least attempt to obtain control of the Black Sea. This policy is almost dictated to Russia by the long extent of her coast-line from Batum to Odessa. But rather than offend the Turks, Russia will by every means endeavour to prevent Turkey from ranging herself on the side of other Powers. She will undoubtedly favour the Turkish control of the Dardanelles, and in view of this policy will spare no efforts in support of Turkish interests. Some sort of naval agreement will be concluded, and the recent agreement between Angora and Moscow may be regarded as a mere preliminary.

The economic relations between Turkey and Russia will become of much greater significance. The northern regions of Anatolia face the opposing shores of Russia, and even in pre-war times the commercial intercourse between the Turkish and Russian ports was of great importance, but all previous records will inevitably be broken when the industrial Russia of the future begins to purchase Anatolian products and raw materials in exchange for its manufactured articles. Even if we assume that the industrialization of Turkey will make successful progress, it may safely be asserted that it will never be able to keep pace with that of Russia. There is much in this prospect which pro-

mises advantage to Russia, but which can in the long run be only a source of injury to the Western European Powers and to Turkey.

Three factors should be taken into calculation:

1. Firstly, the cheapness of sea transport across the Black Sea.

2. Secondly, Russia may secure a monopoly for the supply of cheap petroleum, cement, timber, textiles, sugar, etc.

3. Thirdly, a great number of specialists may be expected to flock into Russia from Western Europe, especially from Germany. A Russia in process of industrialization, and developing production on an unprecedented scale, would be able to offer German engineers and other experts, now idle and waiting for a chance of employment, the opportunity of developing the productive powers of the country, just as the Ruriks and the Hanseatic merchants effected the awakening of mediæval Russia.

The pre-war Russian cigarette industry, to take only one instance, was using up to thirty per cent. of Turkish tobacco. This percentage is bound to increase in future under the Russian tobacco monopoly. Russia would also offer the best market for the fruits and vegetables of Anatolia, since Western Europe is abundantly supplied from the Mediterranean countries and from overseas.

Lastly, we must not overlook the importance of the port of Constantinople as a clearing-house for Russian trade. Great warehouses will be erected for

Russian merchandise in transit, and it may be anticipated that a free port will be established, yielding Turkey an enormous revenue as middleman, and affording profitable employment for an army of workers.

It is mainly due to the absence of Russian trade that Constantinople is now in so sorry an economic plight. The Russian shipping lines will have coaling stations at Stambul, and the city will enjoy a tremendous access of prosperity on the full recovery of Russian trade.

The completion of the lines of railroad linking the Turkish system to that of Transcaucasia will act as a further stimulus to commercial relations, and Russian finance will be readily induced to seek profitable investment in Anatolia.

The close proximity of Turkey and Russia is naturally an important factor in the development of their commercial intercourse, and ten years should suffice to enable a restored National Russia to compete successfully in Turkey against her Western Europe competitors.

XII

TURKEY AND HER EASTERN NEIGHBOURS

ANY description of Turkey's relations with her neighbours in the Middle East must take into account the proximity of the Ottoman Empire to the Arab States in the south-east as well as to Persia and Afghanistan.

Throughout the nineteenth century the Turkish Empire had to conduct a mainly defensive struggle for the maintenance of its possessions, which had formerly extended as far as Austria and Hungary, and, in Africa, to the coast of Morocco. In their conflicts with Russia the Turks sustained severe losses in the Balkan Peninsula, which were approximately equalled by their losses in North Africa. The liberation of Greece in the war of 1821-29 and the loss of Serbia in 1829 were followed by the loss of Algiers in 1830.

France, taking advantage of the Turkish involvements in the Balkans, saw an opportunity of pressing her claims, and in 1881 Tunis also was lost to Turkey, while the British occupation of Egypt followed in 1882. Tripoli, partly populated by the fanatical Mahommedan sect of the Senussi, was abandoned only after a severe conflict with the Italian armies in 1911—and this abandonment was

a prelude to the loss of Macedonia in the Balkan War of 1913. By this time the Ottoman Empire had lost not only all her Balkan possessions, but also her Arab territories in Africa. The purely nominal suzerainty of Turkey in Egypt was abolished by the annexation of Egypt to the British Empire in the year 1914.

It is interesting to observe how the Ottoman Empire came to be engaged in this twofold struggle—vainly fighting for the preservation of her Balkan dominions against the rebellious Christian populations, while at the same time she was being driven from the vast Arab provinces peopled by her co-religionists. This leads us to consider the historically rooted animosity subsisting between the Arab and the Turk.

Although the originators and the creators of Islam, the Arabs (other than the Wahabis) have never been such fanatics as regards the political ideals of Islam as is popularly supposed. Strong national sentiments have always come first among the Arabs, who consider that they have contributed more to human civilization than any other section of the Moslem world.

Above all, the Arabs have always taken pride in cultivating their language, and wherever such a love of the mother tongue is found it signifies the presence of a true national spirit. Further, the Arabs regard their language as the foundation of all Turkish and Persian literature, standing to these literatures in a

relationship similar to that of Latin to the Christian literatures of Western Europe.

The Arabs have always looked down upon the Turks as barbarian invaders and destroyers of their supreme civilization, and if we consider the history of the early Seldjuk and Osman conquests, which occurred when the Arab civilization was at its zenith, we cannot deny that their attitude has some justification. Moreover, no section of the Arabs has ever reconciled itself to the self-assumed Khalifate of the Turkish Sultans, dating from the Sultan Selim, and such high ecclesiastical authorities as the Sheikh-ul-Islam of Stambul, the Ulema of Cairo and Delhi, as well as the four Grand Muftis of Mecca, have always disagreed on this question. The failure of the Jihad proclaimed in Constantinople at the beginning of the Great War was mainly due to the non-recognition of the spiritual authority of the Sultans. In spite of the fact that both the Turks and Arabs are Sunnis, the Arabs have always adhered to the belief that the temporal representative of the Prophet invested with the dignity of Khalif must be an Arab by birth.

The world at large was not interested in this divergence between the Turks and the Arabs, though from the time of the Ottoman conquest down to the beginning of the Great War the Arab portions of the Empire had always to be kept in subjection by military force. Neither Abd-ul-Hamid nor the Young Turks ever attempted to make any

change in the strong centralized system of administration, which had disastrous results in the Balkans as well as in the Arab portions of the Empire. A systematic decentralization would probably have made separation from Turkey seem less desirable. But such a course would not have suited Abd-ul-Hamid's officers and civil servants, who would have had to sacrifice their opportunities of securing lucrative posts.

German military advisers, fearing the weakness of Turkey's position in Arabia, consistently urged the Turks to make some concessions to the Arabs, but in vain. The Turks continued to occupy only the coast-line of the Arabian Peninsula, and they had constantly to suppress risings, which became more frequent under the Young Turks. The last rising in the Yemen may be cited as a typical example of the danger which the Ottoman Empire had to face in this direction. It is a generally accepted belief in modern Turkey that the detachment of the Arab provinces was due mainly to French and British policy, but the fact is overlooked that the dissatisfaction of the Arabs themselves facilitated the realization of this policy.

I. SYRIA AND PALESTINE

Of the Arab provinces of the old Ottoman Empire we will first consider the mandated territories of Syria and Palestine.

Syria lies on the border-line that separated Arabia

from the rest of the Ottoman Empire. From time immemorial the geographical position of Syria has made her a bone of contention between Hittite and Egyptian, Roman and Persian, Byzantine and Arab, and, finally, Arab and Turk. The two harbours of Alexandretta and Beyrout served as starting-points for the caravan-routes proceeding by way of Aleppo and Damascus to Mesopotamia, Persia and India. Hence prior to the opening of the Suez Canal Syria was a key position of especial importance. Towards the second half of the nineteenth century the consciousness of the Russian peril became a factor of predominant influence in Syrian affairs.

The Arabs of Egypt have an ancient saying to the effect then when a mosque falls down in Cairo the top of its minaret reaches to Damascus. The regard in which Damascus is held by the Arabs as a spiritual centre gives the city its importance to the surrounding Arab world.

The French, however, have been instrumental in introducing Christianity, which is professed to-day by half a million believers, of whom 100,000 are of the Greek Orthodox faith, 80,000 Jacobites, 300,000 Uniat Catholics, and about 20,000 Roman Catholics. This Christian Arab element includes many descendants of those Genoese and the Venetians who mixed with the natives, and who constitute the true Levantines. In detaching themselves from their original Islamic faith they have developed a strong national feeling, which has received effective support

from the French and Americans. The activities of the American Board of Missions have contributed greatly towards the cultural progress of the country, and the American University at Beyrout, established in 1866, had 1,100 students in 1928. It must be remembered that under Turkish rule many of the graduates of this University used to emigrate to the United States and the Argentine. The Syrian colonies in the United States of America, numbering some 30,000, have engaged in a nationalistic propaganda whose influence extended not only to Syria itself but also to Egypt. A large number of Syrians belonging to the liberal professions—lawyers, physicians and engineers—may be found to-day in Egypt and Syria, and also in the adjacent Arab territories, which are on a lower cultural level. The educational efforts of the French have likewise been of great importance; the Jesuit University of St. Joseph at Beyrout, established in 1875, had about 210 students in 1929.

At present the territory of Syria proper is in the form of a triangle, containing about 200,000 square kilometres, with a population of 2,800,000. The French mandated territory covers 149,000 square kilometres, which have a population of two millions. In addition to the half million Christians already mentioned, there are some 1,875,000 Mahommedans, mostly Sunnites. There are 560 Government schools.

For administrative purposes the French mandatory

power has created a Customs Union (May 14, 1930) containing four sections:

1. The Syrian State proper, containing 127,000 square kilometres and 1,500,000 inhabitants, including the States of Damascus and Aleppo, and the autonomous Sandjak of Alexandretta (constituted on January 1, 1925, by virtue of the Franco-Turkish agreement of October 23, 1921, revised on February 18, 1926).

2. The Alawiyya Territory (now renamed Latakia) containing 6,500 square kilometres and 260,000 inhabitants.

3. The Lebanon Republic, containing 9,300 square kilometres and 600,000 inhabitants.

4. The Djebel Druse, containing 6,000 square kilometres and 60,000 inhabitants.

The French anxiety to secure a *pied-à-terre* in the Eastern Mediterranean, from the very beginning of the nineteenth century down to the grant of the Syrian mandate by the League of Nations, has always been mainly a question of prestige, for the hinterland, which determines the economic position of a coastal country like Syria, is not in French hands, and the military expenses involved in keeping a restive population like that of Syria in order are scarcely justified by the revenues collected. This was well demonstrated during the Druse revolt, when even some of the historic mosques of Damascus suffered from the bombardment. The French position in Syria being what it is, Franklin Bouillon

was only too ready to agree to a rectification of the Turco-Syrian frontier at a time (1922) when Mustapha Kemal was engaged in war with Greece.

Syria has a thousand kilometres of railway lines, and the motor roads may be reckoned at something over 4,000 kilometres, but the motor transport services from Beyrout across the desert to Baghdad and on to Teheran are run by British companies.

The French system of centralized administration, which has been of great advantage in Algiers and Tunis, has entirely failed in Syria with a population of mixed race and divergent creeds. The division of the administration into the four sections enumerated creates a semblance of federation, but the French, as is generally known, are bad federalists. As a matter of fact, the Anglo-Saxon race alone seems to have been endowed with a genius for this system of government; as applied in Syria it has led to such confusion that all sections of the country are now struggling for independence. The failure of the French system becomes further apparent when it is compared with the skilful management of the Palestine mandate, although the British have been confronted with the extremely difficult task of co-ordinating the native Arab interests with those of the Jewish immigrants.

In Turkish political circles, as well as in Syria itself, the future of the mandate has been extensively discussed of late in connection with Franco-Italian friction in the Mediterranean.

The over-population of Italy has given rise to the belief that France might be willing to transfer the Syrian mandate to Italy, if Italy were in return to forgo her claims in Tunisia. This possibility is extremely displeasing to the Turks. They have not yet abandoned their hope of securing further concessions from France, notably at Aleppo, in view of the isolated position of the French in Syria. Should Italy, already in possession of the Dodecanese, succeed to the Syrian mandate, the Turks fear that the Italians might take advantage of a future Russo-Turkish conflict to renew their claims on the Adalia littoral. While there is no immediate danger of such a possibility being realized, allowances must be made for Turkish susceptibilities, since a race which has suffered for the last hundred years under the continual hammer-blows of imperialism is bound to remain suspicious for a long time to come. We may therefore regard it as certain that the Turks will give no trouble to the French, but will on the contrary seek to remain on the best of terms with them, and all talk of Turkish plans for the reconquest of Syria may be dismissed as an absolute invention.

With the possible exception of the creation of Liberia, Palestine is the first example in history of the creation of a new State, not as a result of the political and economic factors which have been the mainsprings of statesmanship since the beginning of the world, but as an act of the world-conscience,

which sought to restore one of the most ancient races of humanity to its long-lost national home. To what an extent even the Jews themselves doubted the possibility of ever realizing this ambition may be deduced from the fact that as long ago as 1903 a split occurred in the Zionist Congress at Basle, when the party of the so-called Territorialists made their first appearance, questioning the readiness of the Christian world to allow the Holy Places of Palestine to come under Jewish dominion. They proposed Uganda in East Africa as the territory best suited for Jewish settlement, and even such influential Jewish leaders as Max Nordau and Zangwill were in favour of this scheme. It must be admitted that much of the inspiration of Zionism came from the Russian Jews, who suffered most acutely. But the Zionist policy received a great deal of support from the Jews of Germany, where, in spite of the constitutional liberties of the Empire, the feudal and military caste succeeded in imposing certain restrictions on the Jews.

The Jews of those countries in Europe and America where they enjoyed equal rights with other citizens were very lukewarm in respect of the Zionist ideal, and restricted themselves to financial contributions in support of the cause. It is therefore only natural that the most prominent members of the World Zionist Committee, such as Professor Weizmann, Nahum Sokoloff, Ruthenberg, Jabotinski and Dr. Jochelmann, should be Russian Jews.

It is curious to note that although the peoples of Western Europe regarded Turkey as a backward country, she was always most tolerant to the Jews, and was the first country to admit the "Spaniols" or Hispanic Jews who fled from the Spanish inquisition. Nevertheless, the Jews never made any serious attempt to establish their National Home in Palestine so long as the Turks ruled the country. This was mainly due to the fact that Turkey's authority in Palestine was considerably restricted by the Great Powers; moreover, since Jerusalem is a Holy Place for the Mahommedan as well as for the Jews, Turkey could not afford to offend the susceptibilities of the Arabs.

The pre-war Jewish population of the Ottoman Empire amounted to about 420,000, this number being distributed as follows: in European Turkey, about 100,000; Anatolia, 60,000; Syria, 50,000; Palestine, 120,000; Mesopotamia, 60,000; and in the Yemen, 30,000.

The privilege of taking the first steps towards the establishment of the Jewish National Home in Palestine fell to Great Britain, and in view of the enormous power exerted by Jews in the world to-day it is no small matter for the British Empire to have won the sympathies of that ancient and capable race.

As is well known, the main difficulty of the Palestine administration arises from the friction between the native Arabs and the immigrant Jews. But it will be no easy task for the primitive Arab

peasantry to get the better of the Jews, who have given good evidence of their capacity as colonists, notably in respect of the introduction of modern agricultural methods and machinery.

Kemalist Turkey has at the present time only an academic interest in Palestine, and cherishes no political ambitions in that direction. Russia remains the only country which is likely to influence the destinies of Palestine, just as surely as it was Russia that gave birth to the Zionist idea.

There is not the slightest doubt that with the overthrow of the Bolsheviks anti-Semitic feeling will be exacerbated, and as Russia and Poland contain the vast majority of the Jewish population of the world, large numbers of Russian and Polish Jews will have to seek refuge in Palestine. The Zionist organizations are quite aware of this danger, and they are making provision in advance to tackle the difficult task before them. The attention of the Jews must have been drawn to the dangers which threaten them in the near future by the wave of anti-Semitism which swept across Germany after the elections of September 14, 1930.

Before the war, Palestine was prominent as a centre of pilgrimage for Christians from all over the world, the majority of the pilgrims being Russians. The Russian Imperial Government maintained a so-called Orthodox Palestine Society which used to collect large funds throughout Russia and assist in the provision of shipping facilities from Odessa to

Jaffa, passages being available at a fare of only £2 10s. per person. Many elderly Russian peasants used to sell up their belongings with the intention of emigrating to Palestine and securing burial in the vicinity of the Holy Sepulchre. The Greek Churches and the Patriarchate of Jerusalem received large donations from the Russian Government. The overthrow of the Tsarist regime was a real catastrophe for the Greek Patriarchate at Jerusalem, which was able to obtain financial assistance neither from the Greek Government nor from the Holy Synod in Athens, and in 1924 some of the landed properties of the Church had to be sold by auction. But the revival of Russia will undoubtedly give a new impetus to the old tradition of pilgrimage; the pilgrimages may not perhaps reach the same proportions as before the Great War, but the revival will be sufficient to make itself felt. This revival in turn may possibly lead to Jerusalem becoming the headquarters of an International League of Faiths, centering round the Holy Places of three prominent creeds—the Christian, the Jewish and the Moslem faiths.

Just as Switzerland is the neutral country in which the most effective ideals of international, political and economic solidarity have been evolved, so Palestine might come to play a similar part in the sphere of religion. This would win for her a larger measure of international recognition, and would secure her against any species of political danger.

2. HEDJAZ, YEMEN AND NEDJD

The only compensation which Turkey received for her many troubles in the Arabian Peninsula was the possession of the Holy Places of Mecca and Medina. The mere fact that Turkey was the guardian of the Holy Places was the source of her enormous prestige throughout the Islamic world. The Moslems of Russia, India and Java are, or were, fanatical devotees of the pilgrimage. Abd-ul-Hamid astutely exploited his possession of the Holy Places, and although there is no statistical material available for calculating his income from this source, there is every reason to believe that the revenue received was substantial. When Mecca and Medina were detached from the Ottoman Empire it was felt that this would mean the loss of Turkey's prestige in the Mahommedan world; but it will be noted that the Kemalists have not made the slightest effort to recover their advantages in this respect. On the contrary, Kemal has abolished the dignity of Khalif, and has carried out reforms which have dealt the death-blow to the theocratic system of the former Ottoman Empire. This was a natural reaction in view of Turkey's post-war disillusionment with the Pan-Islamic idea, and effective steps have now been taken towards the reconstruction of the new Turkey on a purely national basis. Recent years have seen a revival of the power of the Wahabis, but the whole development of the Middle East is tending

toward the creation of a great Arab confederation under British tutelage. So long as the Arab Peninsula remained part of the Ottoman Empire it could live undisturbed in its atmosphere of primitive isolation, but now that mandatory powers have come into close contact with it, and *Arabia Deserta* is experiencing an economic revival for the first time since the Omayyads, conditions are rapidly changing. The general belief that Arabia is a sterile desert is devoid of all foundation, as the country has potentialities of palm cultivation, cattle-breeding and mining which would contribute largely to the prosperity of the country and give it a chance of settling the unruly Bedouins in peaceful occupations. Railroad surveys and motor roads are now disturbing the peace of these isolated deserts, and the development of a modern economy is bound to put an end to the friction which has hitherto existed between the numerous tribal chieftains; but no colonial power of less experience than Great Britain could undertake a task of such magnitude.

In the Yemen the Italians have set to work on an impressive scale, particularly since the signature of a special agreement with Imam Yahya on September 2, 1926, by which they secured concessions in respect of mining, road construction and aviation. The Imam Yahya is extremely ambitious, and eager to strengthen his position by rendering himself independent of the resources of countries other than his own; the Italians have plenty of experts in

search of profitable employment, so that they should be able to make considerable progress, especially if they succeed in completing the construction of the Trans-Abyssinian Railway from the opposite shores of Erythrea to the Indian Ocean. But the fate of such places on the Persian Gulf as Muscat and Koweit is closely bound up with British interests in the East.

The Kemalists have lost all political interest in this part of Arabia, just as they have lost all interest in Palestine; they now regard Palestine at most as a possibly dangerous competitor in respect of their agricultural exports.

3. IRAQ

Though Kemalist Turkey has reconciled herself to the loss of the Arabian portion of the former Ottoman Empire, she nevertheless refuses to regard the northern frontier of the State of Iraq as finally settled. As early as the Lausanne Conference Turkey put up a stubborn resistance, delaying the settlement of the frontier, although she had accepted the delimitation effected under the League of Nations. The Turks argue that their strategic positions cannot be regarded as secure so long as the Mosul Vilayet remains outside Turkey proper. The Mosul region engages their attention mainly because they would like to possess the oilfields of Mosul, and in them a valuable asset to pledge as security for financial assistance (though the geologists are by no means

agreed as to whether the oil of Mosul will ever amount to a commercial proposition). There is, however, a small party of extremists who go even further, and demand the complete abolition of the Iraq State, which would enable the Turks to enjoy free access to the Persian Gulf. These extremists have acquired a special influence since the last Kurdish troubles in 1930. They regard the Iraq State as an artificial creation with no chance of survival unless the British military forces remain in the country permanently. But now that the withdrawal of the British forces has been decided upon, and Great Britain is about to propose the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations as an independent State, the Turks believe the time has come to make a bid in this direction.

Three considerations are uppermost in the minds of Turkish statesmen: the oilfields of Mosul, the Kurdish question, and the outlet on the Persian Gulf, the most important of these undoubtedly being the Kurdish question.

Before the Great War, and more especially in the Hamidian era, no such problem as the Kurdish question ever existed, and the Kurds, and in particular their chieftains, were regarded as forming a privileged section of the population, much as were the Albanians. The division of the Kurds, into numerous tribes and the conflicting interests of their chieftains would never have permitted them to raise the question of independence, and even the

Treaty of Sèvres, which amputated so many vital parts from Turkey, contained a most confusing article relating to Kurdistan: one year after the signature of the Treaty the Government was bound to permit the establishment of an independent Kurdish State, subject to a plebiscite proving that the majority of the Kurds were in favour of the same. This suffices to show that the independence of Kurdistan was a vital part of the Allied policy, at all events after the establishment of Armenian independence. An autonomous Kurdistan was conceived as a triangle lying between Iraq, Armenia, and Persia on the one side and Turkey on the other, thus cutting Turkey off from contact with Persia. But Turkey's victories over the Greeks made these plans illusory. While before the Great War the Kurds and their lands lay partly in Turkish territory and partly in Persian, now, since the establishment of Iraq, a third section of the Kurds has come under British rule. Thus, of the entire Kurdish population of some three millions there are 500,000 in Iraq, 650,000 in Persia, and 1,700,000 in modern Turkey. For the first time in the history of this people, who by language and race undoubtedly have a strong affinity with the Persians, a sort of nationalist propaganda has come into being. The proclamation of the Kurdish tongue as the official language in the north of Iraq on the Turkish border, and the creation of special Kurdish levies, are the matters which have most alarmed the Turks; they have also had

a very inflammatory effect upon the Kurds of Anatolia and Persia. The Kurdish rising of 1924 was suppressed by the Turks with the utmost severity, and it is strange to note that the Kurds, who were once employed in massacring the Armenians, have now themselves become the victims. Anti-Turkish propaganda, as conducted by various Sheikhs amongst the Kurdish tribes, has met with enthusiastic support from the reactionary Kurdish chiefs, who are extremely hostile to the Turkish reforms in the domain of religion. It was therefore an easy matter for the chiefs to inflame the fanaticism of the ignorant masses. The mountainous character of the Kurdish regions, lying isolated in Eastern Anatolia, without proper means of communication, was one of the greatest obstacles which the Turkish military forces had to encounter. Turkish opinion at large was prompt to accuse Great Britain of being responsible for this trouble. It was alleged that so long as the Kurds in Turkey and Persia were assisted from Iraq there could be no peace. This question was the subject of some very strongly worded notes exchanged between Baghdad and Angora, while the execution of several influential Kurdish leaders at Diarbekir further aggravated the relations between the Turks and the Kurds. But matters reached a climax during the second rising of the Kurds, in August 1930, when from a military point of view the insurgents were much better organized and armed, their attacks being based on the Persian

territory round Mount Ararat. The serious nature of this second rising was indicated by the mobilization of considerable Turkish forces to suppress it. Again the absence of proper means of communication involved the Angora Government in heavy expenditure; the measures taken to suppress the revolt were much more drastic than in 1924. Moreover, a serious political conflict occurred between Angora and Teheran, the Anatolian Government accusing the Persians of affording partial support to the insurgents, or at all events of doing nothing to prevent the Kurds from using Persian territory as a base for their operations. Certain rectifications of the Turko-Persian frontier in the vicinity of the Khanate of Macu were proposed by the Turkish Government, with an exchange of territory to the advantage of both parties. This matter has not yet been settled, and is the subject of further negotiations between the two Cabinets. Moscow has offered her services as arbitrator, no doubt in consideration of the bearing which an exchange of territory between Turkey and Persia in the region of Mount Ararat might have upon the adjacent Federated Soviet Republic of Armenia. Both before and after the 1930 rising (to the contrary of what had happened on the previous occasion) there was a great deal of nationalist propaganda among the Kurds, who sent a delegation to Geneva to plead their case before the League of Nations, while committees were formed in New York and in certain European

countries. Angora suspected that the Kurdish cause was obtaining secret support from the Armenians, and feared that a guarded attempt might be made to establish an independent Kurdistan in Armenia, thus entirely separating Turkey from Persia. Persia's attitude to this question has been influenced in the first place by the military weakness of the Central Government at Teheran, which is as yet hardly able to provide for the military security of the outlying regions of Iraq, and secondly by the fear lest if an independent Turkistan should come into being part of the Persian territories might be incorporated therein. The Turks, for their part, once more accused Great Britain of supporting the Kurdish cause as a means of safeguarding Iraq.

Turkey has no fears as regards the inviolability of her north-eastern frontier, thanks to her friendly relations with the Soviets, who, having had to rely on Turkish friendship in their struggle against the Georgians, Armenians, and Azerbaidjanians in Transcaucasia, would not attempt to trouble Turkey here. The northern, western and south-western frontiers of Turkey are determined by nature and protected by the sea. But the Turks are still anxious in respect of their southern frontiers where these march with Syria and Iraq, as well as the eastern or Persian frontier, in spite of the latest frontier settlements of December 1925 (Mosul) and June 1929 (Syria).

The scepticism expressed in some English circles with regard to the security of Iraq, and the readiness

of the British authorities in England to retire as far as Basrah in the event of an emergency in Iraq, have induced the Turks to believe that they are correct in their calculations. The next few years will decide not only the final destiny of Iraq, but also, to a large extent, the future relations of the British Empire and Turkey. It would be no exaggeration to attribute Turkey's ever-growing friendship with the Soviets to the fact of her unsatisfactory relations with Iraq, arising largely out of the Kurdish question. As a result, the traditional hostility of two centuries between Russia and Turkey is a thing of the past.

It is therefore not astonishing that the question of the Mosul oilfields (as to whose commercial possibilities the experts are far from agreed) is reserved by the Turks as an argument of substantial bargaining value in bidding for political support in influential quarters. Of the extremists who would lose no chance of causing the downfall of the Kingdom of Iraq, it need only be said that the ultimate aim of their policy is to secure an outlet for Turkey on the Persian Gulf. But those who entertain such far-reaching ambitions are quite conscious of the dangers which they involve, and would not attempt to realize them in the near future, for they are well aware of the importance to British interests in India of the Trans-Arabian line of communication from the Syrian, or rather the Palestinian coast, across the desert to the Persian Gulf.

4. PERSIA

The history of the relations between Persia and Turkey demonstrates perhaps more clearly than anything else how vain it is to dream of uniting the peoples of the East on purely Pan-Islamic lines. The Islamic conquest of Persia at a time when the Persian civilization was at its zenith had merely the effect of creating a Shia section of Islam, which amounted to nothing less than a remoulding of the Islamic faith on national Persian lines. At no time, since the Arab rule was replaced by that of the Turks in Asia Minor, has it been possible to speak of friendship between these two countries. The decadence of Persia, beginning with the Treaty of Turkmentchai in 1828, proceeded so rapidly that after Russia's conquest of Turkestan the two Empires of Russia and Great Britain became involved in constant friction in respect of Persia, a state of affairs which was eventually terminated by the celebrated Anglo-Persian agreement of 1907. While England adhered to the spirit and letter of that agreement, Russia seized every opportunity of extending her power in the northern sphere specifically allotted to her. In 1910 she overran Northern Persia with her troops, and began to build barracks there. In 1912 Colonel Liakhof, at the head of the Persian Cossack Brigade, commanded by Russian officers, forcibly dissolved the *Medjlis* (Parliament), and several influential Persian

patriots were executed, notably at Tabriz. The well-known American expert in charge of the reconstruction of the Persian finances, Mr. Morgan Shuster, was expelled from the country, and Russia reigned supreme. A highly influential Persian committee, formed in London under the chairmanship of the enthusiastic friend of Persia, Professor Browne of Cambridge University, bore witness to the extent to which Russia had violated the stipulations of the Agreement, the present Prime Minister, Mr. MacDonald, being a member of the committee. The protests of the committee were of little avail, as the Balkan War then raging forced Great Britain to maintain a strictly reserved attitude with regard to Russia, her future ally in the great coming struggle with Germany.

During the Great War the Persian Government attempted to maintain a nominal neutrality, but in vain, as her northern territory, and in particular Azerbaidjan, was used by the Russians as a military base in their campaign against Turkey. In the South, Great Britain found it necessary to form the celebrated South Persian Rifle Brigade under the command of Sir Percy Sykes. The Germans and Austrians, led by Niedermeyer, made a feeble effort to make their way with a small force through Persia, and beyond to Herat and Kabul. But this effort was bound to fail, thanks to the impotence of the Persian Government.

After the collapse of Russia, and the complete

withdrawal of the Russian troops, not only from the Turkish Vilayets which they had occupied, and from Northern Persia, but from the whole of Transcaucasia as well, British forces advanced from Mesopotamia to Enzeli, the Persian port on the Caspian, and thence to Baku.

The British Government concluded a special treaty with Persia in August 1919. This actually meant the establishment of a British protectorate over the entire territory of Persia for the maintenance of public order and security. The economic collapse of Russia deprived Persia of the important customer who had been accustomed both to buy Persia's produce and to supply her with manufactured articles and other commodities.

But the defeat of Denikin, and the reconquest of the Caucasus and Azerbaidjan by the Bolsheviks, once more brought the Russian forces to the Persian side of the Caspian, where they landed at Enzeli, forcing a small British force under General Ironside at Resht to retire (May, 1920). Thus Northern Persia was once more abandoned to Russia, and the diplomatic relations between Moscow and Teheran were re-established; but they were accompanied by the renunciation on the part of Russia of all agreements forced upon Persia by the Tsarist Government.

A special Persian delegation under Takizade proceeded to Moscow to negotiate a commercial agreement, but after sitting in vain for a whole year in Moscow they had to return to Teheran.

The Russian "Wneshtorg" established branches at Enzeli, Teheran, and Tabriz, and began to supply Persia with petroleum, sugar, and manufactured articles, taking Persian produce in exchange. The Russian Discount Bank at Teheran was reopened in 1923, and the country was entirely subjugated by the Bolshevik influence. Moscow's demands went even so far as to force Persia into proclaiming a Republic, and the young Shah had to flee to Paris. But the advent of the new Shah, Riza Khan, has put an end to this experiment, and has led to the re-establishment of old order and the reorganization of the nation's military forces. The only substantial source of revenue remaining to the State were the royalties paid by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to the Persian Crown.

The benefits conferred by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company on Persia have been very substantial, mainly because the British Government succeeded in forcing the unruly tribes of the South to respect the agreements concluded with them.

The Bolsheviks took advantage of the deplorable economic state of Persia and her sorry financial plight (due to the depreciation of the silver currency) to extend their influence over the country. No more is heard nowadays of the promised abrogation of the Tsarist agreements. On the contrary, the exploitation of the oil wells of Northern Persia, of which the rights had been sold by Mr. Khoshtaria to a sister company of the Anglo-Persian, North Persian Oil-

fields Ltd., has been suppressed in the interests of Russia, and permission will not be given to resume operations unless the Soviet Government is allowed the lion's share in the concessions. The Bolsheviks have also introduced the practice of paying for purchased goods in Russian Tchervonetz currency, and when the Persian merchants refused to comply with this arrangement a silent boycott was declared, which produced an acute economic crisis in Northern Persia, and a corresponding depreciation of the Persian currency. This pressure gradually paved the way to the new reform adopted by the Persian Parliament on March 14, 1931—namely the institution of a Foreign Trade Monopoly, whereby all exports and imports are brought under State control. Persian exporters of produce have to deposit with the Government metallic currency to the value of their exports, and in the case of imports they must prove that Persian products of corresponding value are being exported. Taking into consideration the fact that the internal trade of Persia is of very little value, by reason of the poverty of the population, and that only the foreign trade is of economic importance, one cannot predict with any certainty how Persia will contrive to operate such a measure in a country with such enormous frontiers, and an army of officials who will have every financial temptation to make the law a dead letter. It is characteristic that petroleum and its by-products should so far have been exempted from the above law.

There has been much talk of late about modernizing Persia. There are in the country itself new forces making for progress. Some hundreds of young men have been sent abroad, mainly to Germany, Belgium, France and Switzerland, to receive a university education. Most of those sent to Germany are studying engineering, chemistry or agriculture. They are all Government scholars, receiving financial support from the State, and are under an obligation to enter the Government service after the completion of their studies.

Some difficulty is caused by the absence of a proper system of elementary education in Persia, so that the young Persians who go to Europe cannot enter universities or technical colleges until they have taken preparatory courses. Before the Great War good results were obtained by the German college at Teheran, and at the present time equally good results are being achieved by the English public school at Shiraz. A sort of Polytechnic of an elementary grade has been opened by the Germans at Teheran, but much yet remains to be done in the sphere of education. Before the war the sons of high officials and the landed nobility used to come to Europe for their education, but these were all destined to become high officials in various Government departments, or in the diplomatic and consular services. There has not yet come into being, as there has in Egypt and in Turkey, any group of intellectuals who could be usefully employed in

contributing to the economic and cultural regeneration of their country.

The ability displayed by the youth of Persia in acquiring the European languages and sciences is extraordinary, and gives an indication of the qualities that went to the making of Persia's ancient civilization. Many Persians received their education at the Russian grammar schools of Transcaucasia under the Tsarist regime; so that Russian has become quite a *lingua franca* in the Northern provinces of Persia.

The education of Persian youth is a matter of vital importance, as the spirit of enlightened nationalism now prevailing in that country will make it impossible for European firms to do business without the close co-operation of the Persian element. The education of Persian girls is still neglected, for while everything has been subordinated to the division of Persia into two spheres of influence by rival foreign powers the political reforms attempted in such directions as the enfranchisement of women have been spiritless and meagre. Russia has done practically nothing for the economic reconstruction of the country, while out of sheer jealousy she has prevented Great Britain from doing anything very considerable in her own sphere of influence; but the enormous progress made by the Turks since the war has awakened in Persia a very healthy desire to emulate the Turkish example, and at the present moment a number of European contractors are engaged in railway construction and other enter-

the Persian Government has been paying great attention to the connection of Teheran with Beyrout by motor-road *via* Kermanshah; further, the construction of a great highway from Urumia to Mosul and Alexandretta is under consideration as a means of opening up a new route to the Mediterranean for the benefit of Persia's export and import trade. But it is to be feared that this proposed road may be excessively expensive, on account of the costs of transport, and new railway schemes, such as English firms have recently suggested, would of course be preferable.

The execution of many of the works now being undertaken will be facilitated by the opening of Teheran's first cement factory, with a daily capacity of fifty tons; several other factories will follow, for the raw material can be obtained in abundance.

The question of transit from Northern Persia across Transcaucasia to the Black Sea was always, even in the Tsarist era, a cause of conflict between Russia and Persia. The Soviets have effected very little improvement in this respect. The limited quantity of goods which they admit in transit through Baku and Batum is destined chiefly as freight for the Soviet trading vessels in the Black Sea; and strangely enough, freight charges and insurances have to be paid in foreign currency, which, of course, makes the prices of the goods excessively high. In the Tsarist days serious attempts were made to forward Persian exports from Tabriz

via Erzerum to the harbour of Trebizond by motor lorry and caravan. The completion of the Turkish railway from Erzerum to Sivas and Samsun will provide considerable facilities for the export trade.

Despite the platonic efforts of the Soviets to induce Turkey to conclude friendly agreements with Persia and Afghanistan, thus bringing the three countries into a common opposition to the Western Powers, it has been impossible to prevent the outbreak of frontier feuds.

It has already been mentioned that the Kurdish population, during recent insurrections, used Persian territory as a refuge and a base from which to direct their raids upon Turkey. Since the Iraq authorities have taken military measures against the Sheikh Mahmud in the Suleimania region, and so given evidence of their determination not to encourage Kurdish aspirations, the Turks have turned their hostility against Persia. And when the railway lines running from Eastern Anatolia to the Persian frontier are completed we must be prepared for military activities, which may perhaps drive the Kurds out of Turkey into Persia, and lead to frontier rectifications in favour of Turkey. Angora's plan of settling the persistently insurgent Kurds in Western Anatolia still remains to be executed.

The Persian fears of Turkish irredentism in Persian Azerbaidjan, with its population of 1,500,000 inhabitants of Turkish race, merely reflect a problem which belongs to the distant future; the completion of

Turkey's internal consolidation must come first, the more so as Russia's attitude to any such changes as those for which the Turks may hope is very doubtful, on account of the proximity of Caucasian Azêrbaidjan, which likewise contains a Turkish population, and also rich oilfields.

At all events, the development here outlined brings Persia once more into close contact with the rival interests of Russia and Great Britain in the Middle East, while Turkey sides with the Soviets.

This chapter on Persia cannot be brought to a close without a reference to the stupendous achievements of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in the neighbourhood of Ahvaz. The operations of the company were so far advanced that shortly before the outbreak of the Great War the refinery at Abadan in the Persian Gulf was completed, and at the outbreak of hostilities between Turkey and Great Britain Turkish troops tried to capture the oilfields, but had to abandon the attempt; meanwhile the Anglo-Persian Company have been in a position to continue their activities undisturbed to the present day. Previously a wild desert, where only brigands were to be encountered, the districts of Ahvaz, Naftun and Mohammera have been modernized throughout, and supplied with European technical equipment of every kind, and even with luxuries.

Apart from the substantial royalties paid to the Teheran Government, which are still the most

important item of the State revenues, the money paid in wages to the native workers is of great benefit to the country. The enormous production of crude oil, and the necessity of saving transport costs, have led to the creation of one of the greatest tanker fleets in the world. The oil tanks carry the crude oil to the plants at Llandarcy in Wales or Grangemouth in Scotland, where it is refined for sale on the markets of the world.

It is needless to emphasize the importance of these oilfields for the British Navy, and for the defence of Britain's imperial interests in the East. The interests of the British Empire have become closely linked with those of Persia, and any change in the political situation of Persia and the Southern Iraq Territory is impossible without British co-operation. On the other hand, it is for this reason that Persian patriots look with confidence to their future relief from the steadily increasing pressure of the Russian Bear.

5. AFGHANISTAN

The fate of Afghanistan may be compared with that of Albania: it became independent against the wishes of its own population. Thanks to its favoured geographical position as a buffer State between the Russian Empire and British India, the country became an object of interest after the Indian mutiny of 1857, when Russia, following her fresh defeats in the Crimean War, turned her attention toward

Central Asia, in the hope of being able to strike a blow at Great Britain.

After the completion of a comparatively easy campaign, ending in the occupation of the mediæval Khanates of Turkestan, Russia had to stop short at the Afghan frontier. The Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907 contained several clauses relating to the disinterestedness of the contracting parties in respect of the internal affairs of Afghanistan, which still remained closed to all foreign influence, though the Indian Government continued to be responsible for the foreign policy of the country.

During the Great War the primitive lethargy of Afghanistan was considerably disturbed, and the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 brought the country into close contact with the emissaries of Moscow, who, after overthrowing the Khanates of Khiva and Bokhara, invited the Afghans to proclaim their independence. After a short skirmish with the British forces on the North-Western Frontier of India peace was concluded, and the Soviets were among the first to recognize independent Afghanistan. A large Afghan delegation was sent to visit Moscow, Berlin and other capitals of Europe, venturing even as far as Washington to plead for the recognition of their independence. They succeeded in persuading the various Governments to accord them the desired acknowledgment, and Ministers were exchanged with several European States; Italy, the first to show any great interest in the

growing resources of the country, sent about sixty experts to assist the Afghans. The German Government could not afford the extravagance of appointing a Minister at Kabul, but in 1923 the German Consul-General was accredited with the rank of Minister.

The Afghan Legation in Moscow may claim to have enjoyed a diplomatic honeymoon, as the Soviets showed great interest in the new State, hoping to use Afghanistan as a stepping-stone in their proposed advance down the Khyber Pass, and also for smuggling forged Indian paper currency into India.

Their close relations with the Soviets helped the Afghan Mission to overcome many financial difficulties in its first years abroad. But the climax was reached when the Red Soviet Army was paraded before King Amanullah in the vicinity of the Lenin Mausoleum in Moscow. This extraordinary procedure produced great confusion of feeling, not only amongst the Russians, but also amongst foreign Communists, who began to doubt Stalin's loyalty to the Communist ideal.

The reception given to Amanullah in the various European capitals proved most disastrous in its effects on himself; one of the younger crowned heads of the world, he felt, so to speak, morally obliged to prove to Europe, at least *post factum*, that he was the man to risk carrying out extensive reforms and bringing Afghanistan into the European family of nations. But Amanullah overreached him-

self, underrating, as he did, the conservatism of his mountaineers. The clothing of members of Parliament in European garments, and the appearance of European ladies of doubtful reputation as dancers at public festivities in Kabul, was too much for his countrymen. Their stormy reaction swept away the thin veneer of European reform which he had attempted to introduce, and the British Royal Air Force had to arrange for his escape from Kabul. He has now settled in Rome, where he can reflect at ease upon his past mistakes.

The Italians and Germans who had settled in Afghanistan in considerable numbers were forced to leave the country for lack of occupation. Seventy Afghan boys who had been sent to Berlin in 1919 to receive an elementary education had even to return without completing their studies. The Turkish military mission of forty-five officers charged with reorganizing the Afghan army had likewise to return *via* India, and the country is now progressing at a more moderate rate of evolution under Ameer Nadir Khan.

The only resources of the country worth mentioning are its minerals. Generally speaking their exploitation is not justified, on account of heavy cost of transport. Certain German firms of contractors, including the well-known Berlin firm of Lenz, have had to abandon their schemes of railway construction on account of their commercial impracticability. But the interest of the Soviets continues

unabated. They are endeavouring to send to Afghanistan experts of every kind, and to supply agricultural machinery and implements, as well as maintaining regular commercial intercourse between Afghanistan and Turkestan. Afghanistan is bound to play a part of some importance in the future relations between British India and Russia.

Turkish influence, which, previous to the Great War, rested mainly on a religious basis, the Afghans being Sunnis, is still considerable, at all events as regards the military and civil administration of the country. A number of Afghan cadets have been trained at the Turkish military schools, and are now serving with the colours in their own country, but it is very doubtful whether the geographical distance between the countries will ever allow Turkey, separated as she is from Afghanistan by Persia, to extend her influence further, except, it may be, in connection with the Russian plans. The fate of Afghanistan, however, is bound up with that of British India, and the present ruler has been prompt to adopt quite a different attitude to Moscow than Amanullah's. So long as Russia dominates the Mahomedan peoples of Turkestan, it would be impossible for her to give proof of sincere friendship for Afghanistan.

XIII

THE GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION OF TURKEY AND ITS BEARING ON BRITISH AND RUSSIAN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

THERE is no doubt whatever that the present rulers of Turkey are determined to devote the next ten years at least to the internal reconstruction and consolidation of their own country, and to avoid any schemes involving Turkey in extravagant and dangerous politics such as those of Abd-ul-Hamid or his Young Turk successors. This is a natural reaction from the disastrous policy and illusory ambitions of the Young Turks. But unfortunately for Anatolia and its rulers, its unique geographical position forces the country, contrary to its wishes, to pursue, in the interest of security, courses which are not dependent on its own will.

If only Turkey enjoyed a geographical isolation like that of Sweden or Norway matters would be much easier for Angora, but in Anatolia we may see how detrimental an exposed position may be to a country's prospects.

In this respect we must distinguish between two main lines of Turkey's foreign policy: one is shaped by her relations to the British Empire in the East, and the other by her relations to the Soviet Russia

of to-day and to the Nationalist Russia of the future.

British policy must be reviewed both from the European point of view and from the national Turkish standpoint. To the foreign observer it is obvious that the British attitude toward Turkey is gradually becoming more and more friendly, for the British interests in the adjacent territories can dictate no other policy. Great Britain aims at the consolidation of the Arabian States, including Iraq, and in the decade which has passed since the San Remo Conference, when the mandates in the Middle East were distributed between England and France, substantial progress has been made. The determination of Great Britain to maintain, parallel to the Suez Canal, a landline of communication through Arabia, down to the Persian Gulf and India, has actually been carried into execution. Since the Lausanne Conferences Iraq has remained the weak point of British policy, and, as we have tried to indicate, it is not only the Mosul problem, but the whole future of Iraq which must be taken into consideration. The consolidation of Persia is another matter of vital importance to the future relations of Great Britain and Turkey. With regard to the Black Sea and the Dardanelles there is no occasion for Great Britain to take the same active line as before the Great War. The main reason for Russia's participation in the Great War on the side of the Allies was undoubtedly her desire to obtain posses-

sion of Constantinople and the Straits, an aim which could best be achieved by the partition of Turkey in Asia Minor. The Soviets have so far shown no inclination to pursue the old Tsarist policy in this direction, but should the Nationalist Russia of tomorrow attempt to threaten Turkey British and Turkish interests will assuredly coincide, and this possibility is the principal reason why certain political groups in Turkey are anxious to maintain friendly relations with Great Britain.

The Turkish attitude towards Great Britain is, however, somewhat complicated by the fact that sundry prejudices prevailing in political circles have yet to be overcome. Soviet Russia has been mainly responsible for fostering ill-feeling towards Great Britain. The Turks argue that while all their territorial losses in the Great War were due to Great Britain, it is from Russia that they have gained their only compensations—namely, in Transcaucasia, where Turkey has recovered, by a process of so-called “disannexation,” the frontier lost in 1878 under the Treaty of Berlin.

Turkey is extremely hostile towards any idea of the international control of the Black Sea and the Dardanelles with the participation of the Allied Powers. During the Lausanne Conference Russia was willing to participate as a friend of Turkey, and the very fact that she was prevented from doing so has led to the dismantling of the fortifications in the Straits. Nevertheless, modern weapons of

warfare would enable the Turks, in the event of hostilities, to close the Dardanelles by means of land-batteries and mine-fields, and to prevent any hostile fleets from passing through. But the main obstacle to the growth of any sincere friendship for Britain lies in the importance which the Turks attach to the consolidation of their southern and part of their south-eastern frontiers; they are unanimously of the opinion that at least the greater portion of Iraq, especially the former Mosul Vilayet, should be included in Turkey, so that she would hold a commanding strategic position to the south of the Taurus range; further, Turkey looks for a rectification of frontiers which would enable her to settle the Kurdistan question once and for all, since here she is determined to make no concessions. It is difficult to estimate how far the proposed entrance of Iraq into the League of Nations will safeguard her future prospects in relation to Turkey, for we are still face to face with a similar problem in Europe, where Poland continues to violate Lithuanian territory in the Vilna region, in spite of protests and threats from the League. The Turks do not regard Iraq as a buffer State; they regard her *de facto* as British territory, and believe that the further existence of that State will entirely depend on the readiness of the British Government, even after the renunciation of the Mandate, to provide for the full military defence of Iraq. The Turks were much irritated by the interference of the League of Nations

in settling their common frontier with Iraq, and regard this as a main obstacle to their entering the League.

From Russia the Turks have secured all the advantages which they could ever expect in return for their undertaking not to join the League, or to enter into any serious agreement with the Great Powers without Russia's consent. Strangely enough, in the first years of the struggle with Denikin and Koltchak the Soviets conducted their foreign policy in the Middle East mainly on Pan-Islamic lines, giving Turkey a leading position in any coalition of the Mahommedan States; and the Turks indicated their ready acquiescence in this Soviet scheme by concluding friendly agreements with Persia and Afghanistan. But so long as fundamental national interests come into conflict with the rival aspirations of neighbouring peoples, as in the Kurdish question, all theories of solidarity will break down. The attempts of the Third International to initiate regular activities in Turkey by the formation of local groups of supporters have led to a series of trials and condemnations. The Kemalist Turks show no signs of slackening their efforts to suppress the Communist peril.

At the present time Turkey's friendship is of supreme importance to Moscow, on account of Russia's everlasting fears of intervention. The Russian press tries very ingeniously to explain away all the failures of the Soviet's economic policy

by references to the perils of international "capitalist" intervention. The Soviet Government is far more anxious for the safety of the Black Sea than for that of the Baltic, since intervention through the Black Sea would deprive Russia of the granaries of the Ukraine and the oilfields of the Caucasus. This would lead to a complete collapse of the Soviet Power. The Soviet rulers have therefore left nothing undone which will keep Turkey on their side, since for the Turks to side with the "internationalists" would seal the Bolsheviks' fate.

The Soviets, accordingly, are endeavouring to convince their Turkish friends of the necessity of increasing both the Black Sea fleets. Besides two warships which were smuggled through the Bosphorus, a notable addition will be made to the Turkish forces in the shape of vessels built in Italian dockyards.

In order to eliminate any lingering Turkish suspicions, the recent Naval Agreement with Turkey was concluded, limiting the naval armaments of both countries. The Soviet dread of an imaginary "intervention" may give the Turks further opportunities of obtaining substantial concessions from Moscow; but Turkey is looking ahead, and is not wholly without apprehension as to the possible collapse of the Soviet power, and the attitude which a future National Russia might assume towards her. It remains to be seen whether the Russia of the future will continue to pursue a friendly policy

towards Angora. There is reason to believe that in the first decade of her existence the new Russia will certainly try to follow the same policy. This would in turn determine the attitude of the Turks towards Great Britain, as the mere fact of having the Russian Colossus behind them, and more particularly the fact of sharing with them in the possession of the Black Sea, will compel Turkey to concentrate on the preservation of friendly relations with Moscow. The economic advantages which the Turks may hope to derive from the Russia of to-morrow have already been made the subject of a special chapter.

The one obstacle which may remain in the way of the mutual relations of the two countries will be due to the much discussed Pan-Turanian and Pan-Turkish problem, which, though it belongs to the more or less distant future, is bound eventually to influence very largely the inter-relations of Turkish and British interests in the Orient. Thus we perceive the essential importance of the geographical factor which compels Turkey to gravitate between these two great rivals, just as she did the whole of the nineteenth century. History repeats itself, and the present rulers of Turkey are well aware that their foreign policy must depend upon the above considerations.

Everything else will be of minor importance; even Germany's interests are bound to be overshadowed by the possible movements of these major constellations in the Oriental firmament. The present

lines of Germany's political and economic development eastwards, through the medium of a series of customs unions spanning the Danube and extending towards the Black Sea, must ultimately tend to restore Germany to her position in the Near East, but this restoration will be due to a combination of geographical, economic and cultural factors, excluding any element of military ambition. The Turks themselves are very favourably disposed towards any assistance that Germany can render them; the more so as that country is not suspected of cherishing any territorial or political designs at the expense of Turkey. Yet even so it cannot be doubted that if Russia develops on the lines which we have indicated she will put Germany completely in the shade. And this, of course, will be greatly to the detriment of Germany's economic interests, for overseas, and in the United States, she cannot hope to compete with her Anglo-Saxon rivals.

ΣIV

TURKEY'S HOPES OF THE UNITED STATES

THE financial predominance of the United States of America in nearly all the countries of Western Europe has acquired, since the World War, something of a hypnotic influence. Nearly all these European countries, now passing through an economic crisis, pin their hopes of finding a solution of their difficulties on the United States. The generous financial assistance given by America to so many countries has tended to create a belief in the almost unlimited capacity of that giant nation to assist in the reconstruction of impoverished Europe. One reason for this firm belief is the supposition that American loan and investment organizations cannot, on account of the abundance of ready cash, afford, as a general thing, to pay so high a rate of interest as is obtainable in Europe. It is too often forgotten that the mere offer of high interest does not of itself afford the investing country sufficient security for the large capital sums required. Certain pre-war failures might be cited as good evidence of the need for caution; thus, the vast amount of French capital invested in Tsarist Russia was attracted not only by political considerations, and the desire to secure an active alliance against Germany, but also by the

unduly high percentage of interest offered to the investor; the same thing was true of the French investments in most of the South American Republics. English finance wisely abstained from following the French example, apart from purely speculative investments in petroleum and mineral ores, and in certain public utilities such as municipal loans and railway bonds. There is no need to give American capital any advice as to its attitude towards Turkey; we will content ourselves with indicating the Turkish hopes in this connection. But first of all let us glance at the history of the relations between the United States and the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East generally in the past. America's first contact with Turkey dates as far back as the opening up of Japan by Commander Perry, the aims then pursued by the Americans having been of a purely religious and philanthropic character. At that time, soon after the Crimean War, Turkey had not yet been held up to odium for her slaughter of Christians; but none the less, all the Great Powers, whether friendly or hostile, preferred to mask their intervention on the lines of modern crusades; American missionaries were interested in the Holy Places and made Syria their centre, and there they remain to the present day, despite the competition of the Catholic^{*} Fathers, who, although their Orders have been expelled from France, are readily accepted as propagandists of French influence in the Middle East. America's next move was the establishment at

Constantinople of the magnificent institution known as Robert College, with a sister establishment for girls at Arnautkeu. One needs only to visit the Balkan capitals in order to perceive the enormous cultural benefits which these institutions have conferred, especially on the upper classes. There is no department of State wherein the graduates of these colleges cannot be found occupying prominent positions, in addition to those who continued their education at American Universities in the United States.

But these benefits were conferred mostly on the Christian peoples of the Balkan countries and Turkey. The number of purely Turkish graduates is very limited. After consolidating their position in Syria and Constantinople, the American Missions transferred their activities to the Eastern regions of Anatolia, mainly to Turkish Armenia, where a number of schools were established. In the more important towns of Turkish Armenia, such as Sivas, Erzerum, Bitlis, Van, etc., American mission schools for both sexes were organized, together with homes for orphans, and the men and women in charge of these institutions deserve the highest commendation for the unselfish work which they carried on for the benefit of the persecuted Armenians. The British Vice-Consulates established in Turkish Armenia after the massacres of 1896, in order to supervise the carrying out of the reforms, received a great deal of information and assistance from the American missions in these regions.

The present rulers of Turkey, as well as their Young Turk predecessors, have looked with suspicion on the activities of the American missionaries, accusing them of having championed the cause of the Armenian and Greek minorities in Turkey; more especially since the "Near East Relief" organization, with its headquarters in New York, carried out its magnificent work, for the rescue of the Chaldean Nestorians, as far as the shores of the Caspian in Transcaucasia and down to the Lake of Urumia.

The catastrophe which overcame the Armenians and Greeks in Anatolia ended in their almost complete expulsion; the one remnant of American activity which survives is the Robert College at Constantinople, and the Turkish administration has been attempting to terminate the privileges which this institution enjoyed under the capitulations.

This compromised Turkey once and for all in the eyes of the American people, and a first result was the failure of the celebrated Chester Concession, the most generous and far-reaching concession ever granted by modern Turkey to any group of foreign capitalists. The promoter of this concession, Admiral Chester, failed to obtain the working capital for his extensive schemes, and no further attempt has been made by Americans to sink any substantial capital sums in Turkey.

There is another point of great importance which serves to discourage American capital, and that is

the fact that the United States' trade with the Ottoman Empire was entirely in the hands of the Greeks and Armenians, nearly three hundred thousand members of each race having become naturalized citizens of America. The trade in tobacco, which was bought in great quantities by the American Tobacco Trust, and was the largest item of Turkish exportation to the United States, was exclusively in the hands of Greek and Armenian agents. Organized Turkish counter-propaganda in America would scarcely be worth while, for it would in all probability be discredited on the principle of "*qui s'excuse, s'accuse*." Some endeavour has been made to acquaint the American public with the massacres perpetrated by the Greeks during their invasion of Anatolia, and more especially during their retreat, but with no apparent result; the Turkish leaders have therefore come to the conclusion that the only chance of interesting American capital in Turkey is through the intermediary of a European country, which would act as guarantor and trustee, and that European country is Germany, to whom the Turks look as their main support in their task of economic reconstruction. The very considerable amounts of American capital invested in Germany give reason to hope that this project may meet with favourable consideration. In American financial circles one of the reasons for adopting the line suggested is that it will not suffice merely to supply Turkey with capital—actual co-operation

and supervision of the undertakings financed is desirable. Germany is most efficiently organized for tasks of this kind. There are other important considerations which weigh with Germany, notably the need to secure further fields of profitable activity in order to fulfil her obligations under the Treaty of Versailles.

Some large American industrial concerns would, of course, be prepared to establish direct contact with Turkey without German mediation, but the work to be done in Turkey, especially during the next ten years, must be treated as a matter of urgency if she is to consolidate her position before hostilities occur in the Middle East between Russia and the British Empire.

German co-operation will have other advantages from a psychological point of view; the Americans are accustomed abroad to stick to their own hustling and clean-cut methods, which in the Middle East are far from advisable, and in some ways even perilous.

The Germans, on the other hand, have acquired a hereditary gift of patience in overcoming all sorts of difficulties, especially in dealing with Oriental countries. This does not mean that Germany could create a monopoly for herself in Turkey or elsewhere; on the contrary, she has to contend with the ever-increasing competition of Italy, and with that of neutral countries like Switzerland, Holland and the Scandinavian kingdoms, which accumulated an abundance of capital out of their war profits;

the Turkish leaders are indeed taking advantage, with increasing success, of their acknowledged preference for German enterprise to reduce its remuneration to more and more modest levels by contrast with that of the other competitors who are being invited to enter the field.

In years to come the steady pressure of Russia will have to be taken into calculation. This, however, has been sufficiently indicated in other chapters.

In hoping to interest American capital through the medium of Germany the Turkish leaders have had in mind the ruling tendency of international capital, particularly since the war, to look for greater and greater security, as was obvious before the war in the case of the two Anglo-Saxon nations. Finance is no longer the monopoly of a few groups; banks and investment houses have now to address their appeals to an increasing mass of small investors, who, while ready to lend their capital, are somewhat impatient in waiting for results. This compels the banks and investment houses to look for the maximum security, and so it happens that in the raising of major loans, as well as capital for regular investment in industry or commerce, international combines come into being, acting, so to speak, on the principle of re-insurance; hence the smaller States and the undeveloped countries find it very difficult to obtain foreign capital on the same individualistic lines that obtained before the war. The system of international combines, applied in the case of Germany, where it

has been developed in order to deal with the problem of German reparations finance, seems to be predestined to serve as a model for other countries, and even for the Russia of the future. And so it would seem that the pre-war game of playing one country off against another can no longer succeed. The new spirit of international co-operation now prevails in all countries, but especially in those which suffered most in the late war. Turkish statesmen, for their part, are hopeful that the political initiative taken by America in proposing the Kellogg Pact will be extended also to the financial and economic affairs of the world.

XV

TURKEY AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

ONE of the lasting results of President Wilson's activities in connection with the Paris Peace Conference and the various Treaties elaborated at that Conference was the working out of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Similar attempts were made after the Napoleonic Wars, and more particularly at the Congress of Vienna, but these attempts were premature, as the feudal system then still prevailing over most of Europe, and the tradition of the Holy Alliance, did not permit of the evolution of any such democratic plan as is possible in our own days. Lloyd George was quite right when he declared at Westminster, on the occasion of Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria's adhesion to the Central Powers: "This is a war of the lawyers against the kings!" He meant, with due respect to his own profession, that the lawyers represented democratic Europe, and it is perhaps one of the greatest tragedies in the history of the German nation, which has been rightly called "a nation of poets and thinkers," that it should have been afflicted with the Hohenzollern anachronism. It was obvious that all the magnificent efforts of the German nation in the Great War were doomed to failure so long as the system of government prevailing in Germany and Austria was, at

the best, merely an enlightened and reformed mediæval autocracy. Without entering into the discussion of war guilt, which to-day can serve no purpose but that of war propaganda, there is no doubt that the ruling military caste of the German and Austrian Empires dangerously underrated the temper and capacity of the 'Anglo-Saxon democracy which they had to face. But what was even more disastrous was that the mass of German civilians were put into uniform and were driven to the uttermost point of exhaustion, which led to the revolution. The Weimar Constitution surpasses all other modern democratic constitutions. That the American Senate should have rejected the Peace Treaties, which were, after all, a one-sided settlement of accounts with their enemies in Europe, for which America had neither interest nor understanding, was quite intelligible; but America's rejection of the whole system elaborated in the League of Nations' Covenant is extremely deplorable.

This attitude of America led to the withdrawal of the Argentine and Brazil from the League, so that the American Continent, and particularly South America, is now represented in the League by minor States, which find themselves in the awkward position of having to sit on sundry commissions charged with adjudicating upon the domestic problems of Europe—the affairs of Upper Silesia, Danzig, Lithuania, or the Græco-Italian quarrel over Corfu.

The Soviets have from the very outset been

afforded the fullest opportunity of participating in the work of the League, but it was obvious that in their honeymoon period of military communism the Bolsheviks felt no inclination to join that organization, although they deeply regretted having to forgo the excellent opportunity of exploiting the tribune at Geneva as an ideal means of spreading international propaganda.

Strong international influences, however, force them from time to time to appear at Geneva at various economic conferences, and, strangely enough, the invitation is always made on the initiative of States which happen to be receiving substantial orders from the Soviets.

Russia has not only herself remained outside the League of Nations, but has tried by every means to prevent other Oriental States from participation. Of these the most important is Turkey, which has been induced to conclude special pacts with the neighbouring States of Persia and Afghanistan. It is Moscow's usual custom, whenever an attempt is made to persuade Turkey to join the League, to conclude with her a special agreement which indirectly prevents her from taking this step. The Soviets have also done their utmost to induce Persia to abandon the League, but so far they have not succeeded, as Persia, in her geographical isolation, finds some consolation in belonging to the League, as a means of obtaining at least a semblance of protection, and so far indeed she has been success-

ful in inducing the European Powers to renounce their capitulatory privileges, which have gone some way to compensate her for the constant pressure which she has to endure from the Soviets. But Turkey's negative attitude towards the League is in no way dictated by the Soviets, there being other considerations of greater importance, which may here be briefly enumerated.

When after the Treaty of Lausanne the frontiers of Iraq were being settled, Turkey consented for once to the arbitration of the League, but having reluctantly accepted the decision of the League's Commission on that occasion, her rulers seem to dread the submission of any further disputes to the League. They complain that their frontiers with Syria, Iraq and Persia are neither satisfactory nor final. The whole question of Turkey's relations with her neighbours in the Middle East—not merely with Persia but with the mandated territories as well—still remains obscure. The mere fact of Iraq's proposed entry into the League makes the Turks nervous, and they believe that membership of the League would force upon them compromises which would be injurious to their own future interests. But so long as they remain outside the League they are able to negotiate with each of their neighbours separately, and without that invisible moral pressure which they would undoubtedly feel at Geneva. They do not feel themselves strong enough to resist the influence which the League could bring to bear

on them as members, nor are they prepared to risk losing the favour of Russia, which has brought them so many advantages.

Apart from these considerations, there is a plan afoot for the creation of a League of Eastern Nations, perhaps without the tutelage of the European Powers. It need not be supposed that the present rulers of Turkey are over-submissive to the Soviet policy, for the treaties recently concluded with Italy and Greece have been quite contrary to the demands of Moscow. Certain Balkan politicians have lately revived the idea of a Balkan Federation, and it is even proposed that the next conference shall take place at Stambul, with the due participation of Turkey. While Turkey has agreed in principle to participate in this conference, mainly for the sake of improving her position in Thrace, it is very doubtful whether she would ever join a Balkan League, as this might only too easily drag her into an alliance with those very countries which contributed most to the destruction of the Ottoman Empire.

Meanwhile the question of Angora's adhesion to the League of Nations at Geneva will remain open so long as Turkey is unable to decide her future line of action towards Russia on the one hand, and towards the British and French Mandatory States in her immediate neighbourhood on the other.

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